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PART III. Appellax. 
CHAPTER 1. 
PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRES. 
The use of standard measurements for the 
appraisement of human abilities is first found in the 
pioneer work of Francis Galton, MacKeen Cattell, and 
Alfred Binet. A new field of psychological study 
was opened which instead of preoccupying itself with 
the general processes of mind treated in the 
abstract, pushed the individual into the forefront 
and sought to determine the basis and extent of his 
differences from other individuals. The psychology 
of individual differences, as it came to be called, 
stressed the uniqueness and variability of human 
nature and soon dominated the scene as an independent 
discipline. ItsIspecial feature was its very close 
alliance with the other new science of statistics 
whose formulations it liberally employed in its own 
methodology. 
Measuring instruments fitting a very wide 
variety of human activities were fashioned and 
eagerly tried by the educationist and the industrial - 
ist., Greater strides were taken, in the beginning, 
in the direction of the so- called "general intelli- 
gence" tests and measurements of special abilities 
2. 
and skills. The assessment of the comparatively 
more subtle and implicit' aspects of human personal- 
ity like attitude, interest, disposition, tempera- 
! ment, etc., was not seriously undertaken. It carne, 
however, to be gradually realised that the under- 
standing of the individual and the prediction and 
control of his behaviour could not be achieved unless 
.measures were devised for exploring also the 
emotional life of man. A new departure had, 
accordingly, to be made which finally led to two 
distinct lines of approach. (1) The first tended in 
the direction of still stronger ties with statistics, 
culminating in the methods of "factor- analysis" Which 
seek to order the complexities of human nature under 
a definite number of statistically determined 
elements of personality. The testing and rating 
scales of personality with their emphasis on the 
standardisation of test situations and quantification 
of individual responses with reference to the 
"average' tendencies of the group furnish its best 
illustrations. (2) The second carried to the 
extreme the emphasis on individual differences and 
stressed the irreducible uniqueness and incompara- 
bility of the personality. The exponents of this 
trend, mainly clinicians, are known for their 
distrust of mathematical concepts for the 
interpretation of human nature. 
of 
The questionnaire method personality study 
3. 
falls under the category of the rating and testing 
methods. In brief, it involves a series of 
questions which are combined into a single measuring 
scale. The questions relate to some particular 
aspect of personality, after which the scale is also 
named, like ascendance, aggressiveness, sociability, 
and so on. For scoring, a definite numerical weight 
statistically determined, is 'assigned to each 
question. The total score made by a person is 
interpreted with reference to the central tendency of 
the scores found for a representative sample of the 
population. 
Since the use of the questionnaire method 
extends also to many other branches of human enquiry, 
it might be useful to refer to the distinction 
proposed by Rugg.l According to him there are two 
classes of questionnaires : - (1) those eliciting 
information concerning facts objectively observable 
by the reporter and verifiable by others; and (2) 
those touching upon the ('subjective" materials 
relating to attitudes, inclinations, tendencies, 
thoughts, feelings, etc., of the person answering the 
questions. The personality questionnaires belong to 
the second group. Their aim is to provide informa- 
tion regarding materials which are given directly to 
the individual in self -knowledge. 
1 
Rugg, H.O. , Statistical Methods Applied to Educa- 
tion. P.41. 
4. 
The first questionnaire study of personal ity 
is represented by the Woodworth Personal Data Sheet. 
During the First Great War, Woodworth was called upon 
as the Chairman of the Committee for Emotional 
Fitness, to devise a method for diagnosing cases of 
unsuitability to stand the stress and strain of the 
war among the military personnel. He prepared a 
list of questions each on of which related to 
symptoms of emotional maladjustment described by 
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. The 
questions were answerable by checking "Yes" or "No", 
provided with each question. The checkings were 
interpreted as indications of the presence or absence 
of the conditions, embodied by the questions, in the 
person concerned. The entire set of questions was 
first applied to the Columbia College students and 
drafted men. Out of the total of 200, 116 questions 
proved in this preliminary try -out to possess fairly 
high discriminating value. These comprised the final 
set of questions which Woodworth originally named the 
Personal Data Sheet and which later came to be known 
as the 4°1oodworth Psychoneurotic Inventory. But 
before this questionnaire could be used in the array, 
the Armistice was signed and its value could not be 
ascertained in the intended situation. However, 
Hollingworth2 used it on the patients in the army 
2 
Hollingworth, H.L., The Psychology of Functional 
Neurosis. pp_u7_150, 
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hospital and reported some interesting results. The 
entire questionnaire is reproduced by him in his 
Psychology of Functional Neurosis. The following 
items and cited to illustrate its general characters - 
As a child did you like to play alone 
better than to play with other children? Yes No 
Is it easy to make you angry? Yes No 
Does it make you uneasy to go into a 
tunnel or sub -way? Yes No 
Do you think you must do a thing over 
several times before you drop it? Yes No 
Can you stand pain quietly? Yes No 
Do you feel a strong desire to steal 
things? Yes No 
The Woodworth Psychoneurotic Inventory 
stimulated one of the most prolific movements in the 
field of psychological measurements and soon a fairly 
large number of questionnaires appeared an the scene. 
r 
As T xler3 remarks, "A fair estimate of the number of 
published tests and inventories loosely classifiable 
under the heading of personality is close to 500." 
Revisions and modifications of the Woodworth Personal 
Data Sheet were undertaken by Matthews, Cadey, Laird, 
House and Chassell.4 Among the notable additions 
and extensions, we have the following:- 
3 Taxler, A.F. Techniques of Guidance, 
> l , pi 99. 
4 
Symond, P., Diagnosing Personality and Conduct, 
pp. 178 -184. 
X 
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Allport's5 A - S Reaction Study - a test for 
ascendance- submission. It consists of items which 
represent actual every -day situations of life. The 
subject is required to select from a few standardised 
choices the type of behaviour which most nearly 
characterises his own usual adjustment to each of the 
situations. The following. items will illustrate the 
nature of the test: - 
Nhen you see someone in a public place or crowd 
whom you think you have met or known, do you enquire 




Are you embarassed if you have greeted a stranger 
whom you have mistaken for an acquaintance? 
Very much 
Somewhat 
Not at all 
deidbreder's6 Introversion -Extraversion Test. 
Heidbreder prepared a list of 54 traits that were 
collected by Freyd from different sources, and used 
them as components of a rating scale of extraversion - 
introversion. The subjects were asked to check 
themselves against each trait by putting a minus or 
5 Allport, G. W. , "A test for ascendance -submission." 
Journ. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1928, 23, pp. 118 -136. 
6 Heidbreder, E., "Measuring introversion and extra - 
version." Journ. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1926, 21, 
pp. 120 -134. 
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plus or question mark as the case may be. Some of 
the typical items are: - 
Feels hurt readily; apparently sensitive about 
remarks or actions which have reference to himself. 
Is critical of others. 
Has ups and downs in mood without apparent cause 
The Thurstone7 Personality Schedule. The 
questions in this inventory represent efforts of 
various authors, like Woodworth, Heidbreder, Allport, 
to summarise in question form the principal character- 
istics of a neurotic personality as it has been 
described by numermus psychologists and psychiatrists. 
The items are similar to the Woodworth Psychoneurotic 
Inventory, except that the question mark is also 
added among the alternative choices, for example: - 
Do you get discouraged easily? Yes No ? 
The above questionnaires are intended to 
measure a single trait like neuroticism, ascendance - 
submission, etc. These have, accordingly, been 
described by Allport8 as "unit -trait" tests. Beside 
these there are "multi- trait' - scales which measure 
more than one trait by putting different "diagnostic 
weights" for different traits. As an example of thi 
scale we have the Bernreuter9 Personality Inventory, 
7 Thurstone, L.L., and Thurstone, T.1., "A neurotic 
inventory', Journ. Soci Psychol., 1930, 1, pp. 
3-30. 
8 
Allport, G.W., Personality, p. 328. 
9 Bernreuter, R.G., "The theory and construction of 
the personality inventory," Journ. Soc. Psychol., 
1933, 4, pp. 387 -405. 
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which has been the most widely used inventory and 
reported in countless researches. Using the 
differential system of scoring, Bernreuter provides 
measures for : - (1) Neurotic Tendency, Bl -N; (2)Self- 
sufficiency, B2 -S; (3) Introversion, B3-I; and (4) 
Social Dominance, B4-D. The following items are 
quoted from the inventory: - 
Yes No ? Do you often feel just miserable? 
Yes No ? Do you specially like to have 
attention from acquaintances when 
you are ill? 
Yes No ? Do you want some one to be with you 
when you receive bad news? 
Yes No ? Do you try to get your own way even 
if you have to fight for it? 
The method of factor-analysis gave birth to 
still other forms of multi -trait scales. When the 
inter- correlations between the responses to the 
component items of a questionnaire were factor - 
analysed, a number of independent factors was 
discovered, which had different loadings in different 
sets of items. By assigning, therefore, differenti . 
weights to the various iteg.s in proportion to their 
loadings in the factors concerned, the same question- 
naire could be used for measuring all of those 
factors. Flanagan10 applied the method of factor- 
10 Flanagan, J. C . , Factor Analysis in the Study of 
'Personality. 
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analysis to the responses to the items of the Bern - 
reuter and discovered two factors:- (1) Self - 
confidence - self - consciousness and '(2) Sociability - 
solitariness. He, accordingly, provided two 
additional scoring keys for the Inventory designated 
by him as Fl -C and F2 -S. 
Guilford and Martin11 and Guilford and 
Guilford12 have compiled three sets of questionnaires 
on the basis of factor-analysis:- (1) An inventory 
of factors S T D C R; (2) The Guilford -Martin 
inventory of factors A M I N; and (3) The Guilford - 
Martin personnel inventory. The general character 
of the questionnaire items is much the same as that 
of the questionnairesdescribed above and the 
responses also are provided in the alternative "Tes ", 
"No" and "?" form. 
Another personality inventory which deserves 
mention on account of its departure from the usúal 
form is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory. l3 It consists of 550 statements, each 
11 & 12 Guilford, J.P. , and Martin, "The construction 
of the Guilford -Martin inventory of factors 
G - A - M- I - N', Journ. App. Psychol., 
29, 1945, pp. 298 -300. 
Guilford, J.P. , and Guilford, R.B., "Personal- 
ity factors D, R, T, and A". Journ. Abn. 
Soc. Psychol., 1939, 34, pp. 21 -36. 
"Personality Factors N and G.D." Journ. 
Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1939, 34, pp. 239 -248. 
Hathaway, S.R., and McKinlay, J.C. , Manual fo 
the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory. 
13 
10. 
printed on a separate card. The subject is asked to 
sort all the cards into three categories : - "true", 
"false, and "can not say". quite obviously, these 
responses are mere verbal substitutes for the 
customary "yes", "no", "?". This inventory also, 
like the Bernr_ euter, Guilford- Martin and other multi - 
trait scales, is designed to provide scores not only 
on one trait but "on all the more important phases of 
personality". There is one special feature of the 
inventory. It provides "validity scores" also 
which function as a check on the dependability of the 
total score obtained by a person. A few examples may 
be quoted from the inventory: - 
My memory seems to be all right. 
Once in a while I feel hate toward members of my 
family whom I usually love. 
I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be. 
At times I have worn myself out by undertaking 
too much. 
As we noted above, there are numerous other 
published and unpublished inventories. But most of 
14 
them are modelled after the same fashion. As Vernon 
observes, "It is probable that a hundred or more of 
such tests have been published. But the great 
majority are simply modifications or extensions of 
three prototypes : - goodwort1sPersonal Data Sheet, 
14 
Vernon, P.E., The Assessment of Psychological 
'4ualities by Verbal Methods. r 67. 
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Freyd- ileidbreder's Introversion -Extraversion, and 
Allport's Ascendance- submission Test''. They possess 
the same common character. In general, alternative 
choices in the form of "yes", "nor' and " ?" , or their 
verbal substitutes, are supplied and the checkings on 
them are given literal .interprdRtion. Thus, for 
example, if the subject answers "yes" to the question: 
"As a child did you like to play alone rather than 
with other children ?" his response is taken on its 
face value and is treated to indicate the fact that 
this condition was actually characteristic of him 
during his childhood. Or, if a person says "No" to 
the question: "Are you absent -minded ?" he is taken 
in fact to be free from this defect. Accordingly, 
a person is labelled as introverted, for instance, 
because he responds more often by checking "yes" 
against those questions which describe the trait of 
introversion, and "no" against those which represent 
the opposite condition of extraversion. But apart 
from this literal rendering of the questionnaire 
responses, it is also possible to interpret them 
"symptomatically". That is to say, the answers may 
be used merely to indicate how the various groups of 
persons - vocational, normal, abnormal, social, 
racial, etc. - respond to a sdt of questions, without 
considering whether the assertions or denials are 
representative of the actual conditions and traits of 
12. 
the persons tested. As Cattell15 remarks about this 
mode of interpretation, "Here one simply correlates 
the response with some outside performance and uses 
it as an index or symptom of that performance, 
without regard to its literal meaning ". Similarly, 
Eysenck16 suggests, "If we look at the behaviourial 
act of underlining "yes", rather than "no" without 
necessarily drawing any conclusions as to the motives 
or underlying reasons which may have prompted this 
reaction, then we are dealing with a purely objective 
type of response which may or may not be of importanc 
in the study of personality." Strong's17 Vocational 
Interest Blanks have been prepared on this basis, 
The responses are not interpreted as that one 
occupational group has a greater liking, for example, 
for fishing, dislike for hunting and indifference to 
philately, than another occupational group; but that 
one group has a significantly greater tendency to 
respond by checking "like" against certain items and 
"dislike" against certain others. But apart from 
Strong's work, this purely behaviourial interpretation 
has been seldom attempted. As Cattell18 observes, 
15 Cattell, R.B., Description and Measurement of 
Personality, p. 344. 
16 Eysenck, H.J., Dimensions of Personality, p. 61. 
1'7 
Strong, E.K., J.R. Vocational Interests of Men and 
'Jomen. 
18 
Ibid, p. 344. 
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"This audaciously empirical but non -naive use of the 
questionnaire is rare." 
7e illustrated above some notable personality 
questionnaires and described their general character. 
Besides those, there are other questionnaires which 
have been-designated in the literature on mental 
measurements as "attitude" questionnaires and 
"interest" questionnaires. These too are to be 
included under the general name, personality 
questionnaires, as personality covers every aspect of 
human life and behaviour. Nonetheless, we have 
decided to use the expression "personality 
questionnaire", in this study, in a restricted sense, 
that is, as applying only to the type of questionnaires 
whose examples we have cited above. ge have a 
precedent for this usage in a somewhat similar treat- 
ment su ggested in the classification of the standard 
questionnaires by ,Symond, Taxler, Cattell and others. 
It is necessary to distinguish this type of 
questionnaire from the attitude and interest 
questionnaires. In order to achieve this end, it 
may be useful for us to quote, at the outset, 
examples from some typical attitude and interest 
questionnaires. 
The following is an example from Vetter's19 
9 Vetter, G.B., "A measurement of social and 
political attitudes and related personality 
factors", Journ. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1930, 35, 
PP. 149 -189. 
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measurement of social and political attitudes. He 
lists five opinions defined by him as reactionary, 
conservative, liberal, radical and neutral under each 
of 36 situations or objects like confiscation of 
wealth, question of birth contról, question of 
divorce, the socialization of medical care, the 
nordic race, etc. , and requires of the subject to 
express his attitude to each one of them by checking 
against the opinion with which he is "most in 
sympathy":- 
Minimum Wage Laws. 
(1) There should be no interference whatever 
with the laws of supply and demand in the deter- 
mination of wages. The state should fix or limit 
them. 
(2) The minimum wage laws should go further than 
to guarantee to heads of families a wage sufficient 
for the bare necessities of life. 
(3) The only wage regulation desirable is a 
minimum wage, sufficient for a decent living and 
guaranteed to every person willing to work. 
(4) Wages should be completely uniform except 
for specially skilled and talented persons who are 
so urgently needed that they must be given 
increased pay. 
(5) Wages should be made uniform. for all men and 
women, from president to charwoman. 
15. 
As another example of attitude test, we have 
Cason's20 "Annoyance Test". It consists of a list 
of 217 items embodying situations or stimuli which 
evoke "annoyances, aversions and irritations". Each 
item is to be graded on a five -point scale containing 
the following descriptions:- (a) extremely annoying, 
(b) moderately annoying, (c) slightly annoying, (d) 
not annoying, and (e) have not been in the situation. 
Some of the typical items are: - 
(1) To see a person picking up his nose. 
(2) To see a public love making. 
(3) To see a person wearing very cheap jewelry. 
(4) To hear water dripping from a faucet. 
Among interest questionnaires we may refer to 
the Strong Vocational Interest Blanks and Allport- 
Vernon Study of Values. The special feature of the 
Strong Interest Blank21 is that it was standardised 
in "terms of the interest of the persons Successfully 
employed in the occupations", for which it provides 
scoring keys. The items in the Blank consist of 
lists of occupations, school subjects, amusements, 
activities, etc., for each of which the subject 
expresses his liking, disliking, or indifference. 
20 Cason, H., 19An annoyance test and some research 
problems," Journ. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 1930, a5, 




The Allport- Vernon Study of Values22 
comprises a list of situations corresponding to 
Spranger's description of the six types of values: - 
(1) theoretical or interest in the discovery of truth; 
(2) economic or interest in the useful; (3) aesthetic 
or interest in form or harmony; (4) social or 
interest in and love of people; (5) political or 
interest in power; and (6) religious or desire for 
comprehension of, unity. with, the cosmos as a whole. 
The following items are reproduced from the scale: - 
Assuming that you are a man with the necessary 
ability, and that the salary for each of the 
following occupations is the same, would you prefer 
to be: (a) mathematician, (b) sales manager, (c) 
clergyman, (d) politician? 
If you were given certain topics on which to 
write an essay, would you choose: (a) the role of 
church -going in religion, or (b) the defects of our 
present educational system? 
Je take up next the problem concerning the 
basis of the distinction between the personality 
questionnaires (used in the restricted sense) and the 
attitude or interest questionnaires. We may suggest 
offhand that personality questionnaires are those 
which provide measures for "personality traits" like 
22 Allport, G. W. , and Vernon, P.E., "A test for 
personal values," Journ. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 
1931, 26, pp. 231 -248. 
17. 
ascendance -submission, extraversion -introversion, 
etc., while the attitude and interest questionnaires 
are those which furnish a quantitative description of 
"attitudes" and "interests" respectively. But the 
question remains how the "personality traits' are 
distinguished from "attitudes" or "interests"? Tn 
order to answer this question, we look for the 
meanings of these terms and the basis of their 
distinction in the work of some contemporary writers 
on the psychology of personality. 
Allport bases his formulation of the "trait' 
concept on the observed consistency and, relative, 
stability of behaviour and experience. Iie thinks 
that consistency and recurrence of behaviour can not 
be explained on the basis of the stimulus-response 
bond theory -of behaviour, for no identical group of 
stimuli can be repeated in the literal sense. When 
Ian individual acts in the same manner on d; fferent 
occasions, he does so because the groups of stimuli 
presented on these occasions have the same personal 
significance for him. This fact leads Allport to 
conceive of "generalised tendencies" within the 
organism which render diverse objects and situations 
encountered by an individual equivalent for him in 
spite of their inherent differences and evoke in him 
responses having the same general character. These 
generalised dispositions', Allport calls "traits ". 
18. 
Thus "a trait is a generalised and localised neuro- 
psychic system (peculiar to the individual) with the 
capacity to render many stimuli functionally equi- 
valent, and to initiate and guide consistent (equi- 
valent) forms of adaptive and expressive behaviour".2 
Allport at first points to the fundamental similarity 
between "traits" and "attitudes" as "underlying 
dispositions within the latent mental organization of 
each individual ". Nevertheless, he thinks that 
"attitudes" can be demarcated from traits on the 
ground of being "bound to object or value "; traits 
have no definite objective reference. He maintains, 
further, that "attitudes" may be either "specific" or 
"general", while traits are only "general". But 
since Allport is opposed to the view that attitudes 
are "specific habits" and refers them essentially to 
"generalised systems" within the organism, it seems to 
be rather misleading to'treat them as "bound to 
definite objects", or to think of a distinction 
b e [,weep "specific" and "general" attitudes. The 
conception of a "specific attitudes" amounts to a 
concession to the "stimulus- response bond" theory of 
behaviour. It seems that Allport really means to 
suggest that attitudes are less general in their 
objective reference than traits. As he says "the 
more numerous the objects that arouse an attitude, 
3 Op. cit., p. 295. 
19. 
the more clearly does the attitude resemble a trait. 
The more an attitude is specific and stimulus- bound, 
the less does it resemble a trait ".24 But such a 
distinction is purely quantitative and difficult to 
determine for it raises the problem as to how general 
an attitude should be in order that it might not be 
confused with a trait. We do not notice any special 
formulation in the work of Allport regarding the 
concept of "interest ", since he refers to this term 
rather incidentally. 
Murray prefers the term "need", instead of 
trait, for he seeks to lay greater emphasis upon the 
"concrete individuality of every episode of a human 
being" which may or may not recur in the life of an 
individual, and aims, accordingly, to "formulate a 
single man - environment event". 
25 
He finds "need" 
to be more suitable for this purpose, since a need 
may be a temporary happening or a persistent 
disposition, but a trait essentially implies con- 
sistency, recurrences or repetitions. It seems 
hardly possible to make out what Murray precisely 
means by "need". In some places his use of the term 
suggests the same general significance which is 
possessed by Bergson's concept of the "elan vital "" or 
Jung's conception of "libido" . Thus, he calls a 
5Op. cit., p. 293. 
Murray, I3. A. , Explorations in Personality, p. 712. 
20. 
need "an organic potentiality, or readiness to 
respond in a certain way under given conditions;" 
latent attribute of an organism"' . 26 But when pro- 
ceeding with his classification of needs, he seems t 
give the utmost specification to the concept and 
introduces such odd expressions as "need blamavoid- 
ance" , "need harmavoidance" , "need infavoidance" , 
"need noxavoidance" , and so on. One is reminded of 
the confusion that Freud introduced in his treatment 
of "instinct " which he identified with the "general 
energy of the psyche" and at the same time attempted 
to classify under various heads, tat king of "part- 
instinct", "instinct-components", etc. Nonetheless, 
:Freud at least posed some definite categories like 
."aim, "object', "source", etc., under which he 
ordered his formulations regarding instinct. But 
Murray impresses his readers not only with the 
essential "fluidity" and "dynamic nature " of needs, 
but also with the flexibility and transitional 
character of the expressions he uses to describe needs. 
Thus, he says, "need is the force within the organism", 
"an organic potentiality', and also, "need is the 
:process which follows the stimulus and precedes the 
acton21 response ",27 equating, in this manner, the 
"latent disposition" and the "need-activity'. 
Similarly, "need is a disequilibrium which stresses 
26 Ibid, p. 61. 
27 
Op. cit., p. 45. 
21. 
toward equilibrium" , 
28 
and also "every need 
out of a disequilibrium " 9 (the italics are 
Likewise, he talks of "adience vectors" and 
vectors" as "modes of satisfaction of need" 
arises 
mine). 
" ab i e nce 
,30 but 
also proposes a distinction between "allient and 
abient needs . 
31 His uses of the terms "attitude" 
and "interest" are equally ambiguous. He says, "the 
word attitude seems to indicate a state intermediate 
between subjectification and objectification". "It 
is an 'obvious readiness' to act in a certain way." 
"Attitudes make up the Berm of a personality.''32 It 
is hardly possible to make any definite sense out of 
these phrases. It seems to us that Murray's chief 
contribution lay in his methodological plan for 
research in personality; his conceptual scheme, which' 
is our object of interest in this study, produces the 
impression of a confusion worse confounded. 
Cattell33 defines trait ° as a collection of 
reactions or responses bound by some kind of unity 
which permits the responses to be gathered under one 
term and treated in the same fashion for most 
purposes". Whatever behaviour manifestations present 
any form of unity or interrelationship deserve, 
28 
Ibid, D. 67. 
29 
Ibid, p. 91. 
30 Ibid, p. 102. 
31 Ibid, pp. 79-80. 
32 Ibid, p. 113. 
33 Op. cit., p. 61. 
22. 
therefore, the name of a trait. A classification of 
traits, accordingly, rests upon the type of unity 
represented. Cattell thinks of various forms of 
trait- unities, two of which are cond.idered more 
important for the purposes of personality description: 
(1) dynamic trait unity, and (2) environmental mold 
trait unity. (1) Dynamic trait unity is determined 
by the unity of the goal to which the behaviour mani- 
festations are directed. When the goal is innate or 
"biological", the trait unity is called an "erg". 
When the goal is acquired, it is called a "metanerg". 
Attitude and interest are subsumed under "metanerg". 
(2) Environmental mold unity exists when the "unity 
is that of a common effort or purpose from the stand- 
point of society or physical environment". Subse- 
quently, perhaps, Cattell notices the defect of this 
classification in calling only the first type of trait 
unities as dynamic or goal directed, and includes the 
environmental mold unities under the "metanerg". 
Metanergs are then treated by him as "secondary 
dynamic traits" acquired under the influence of the 
environment. "Attitudes" which are classed under 
"metanergs" are taken to be similar to "sentiments", 
since both involve "consciousness of objects to which 
they are directed". "Interest" is used in a very 
general sense as accompanying the functions of all 
neuropsychic structures. "An individual is interest- 
ed in things to which he attends, whether the 
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attention be connected with attraction or aversion, 
with sentiments, attitudes or complexes, with ergs or 
metanergs, with material or subjective objects. "34 
We find that Cattell's analysis of the meaning of 
trait , attitude , or interest , does not make for any 
clear cut distinction between them, since all 
attitudes are traits and all traits when active 
i}a.volve interest. We do not expect, therefore, to 
apply his formulations to any advantage in bringing 
out the distinction between the different forms of 
questionnaires. 
We find that among the contemporary writers 
on the subject, Angyal's formulations regarding the- 
fundamental variables of personality offer a 
relatively adequate working plan under which we can 
order the three types of questionnaires and bring out 
their main features without much violence to their 
conventional structure and mode of classification. 
Angyal35 proposes to derive all human activities, 
rather all processes of life, from a fundamental 
tendency in the organism, "the trend towards autonomy" 
which is opposed by the "trend towards heteronomy" 
which is the characteristic pattern. of the environ- 
ment., The dynamic relationship of the two factors, 
the organism and the environment, the subject and the 
object, Angyal calls the state of "biospheric 
34 Op. cit., p. 202. 
35 Angyal, A. Foundations for a Science of 
Personality. 
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tension", which exists in the "biosphere " - the field 
of all biological events. The "biospheric tension" 
lies neither in the subject, nor in the object, but 
"between them". The psychological experience of the 
biospheric tension, Ang al36 calls "interest". 
Interest 'r is the experience of a significant biologi- 
cal relationship which is between the subject and the 
objecta . Any biospheric occurrence may be viewed 
either from the side of the organism or from the side 
of thé environment. 'then viewed from the side of thé 
organism it brings to light the various differentia- 
tions of the general tendency of the organism - the 
trend towards autonomy. These Angyal calls "drives" !I 
On the other hand, when the biospheric occurrence is 
viewed from the side of the object, it brings into 
relief the "valences" of the environment, its 
features as causes of attraction and repulsion, 
facilitation and obstruction, likes and di slikes. 
beeping in mind Angyal's representation of the 
organismic total process " as involving the subject 
and object "poles ", al ong with the dynamic relationship 
obtaining between theca, we can formulate a basis for 
the classification of the three types of questionn- 
aires. 'le can say that they all deal with the same 
processes and the difference between them is that of 
emphasis only. In the personal ity questionnaire the: 
behaving and experiencing subject is pushed into 
36 Op. cit., ¡op. 126-127. 
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prominence and his moods, temperament, needs, traits, 
style of behaviour, etc., are brought into the focus. 
The reference to the object is minimised and 
questions are asked which call upon the subject to 
reflect on his own "inner' states. The attitude 
scales, on the other hand, push into relief the 
objects or situations to which the individual's 
tendencies are directed, with the demand for 
attraction or repulsion, approach or withdrawal, love 
or hate, which the object or situation makes upon the 
subject. That is why psychologists have generally 
considered an objective reference as characteristic 
of attitudes. Discussing the methods of measuring 
attitudes, Droba37 observes, "Attitudes refer to a 
rather definite set of phenomena, having a definite 
specified object of reference". On this ground he 
excludes from his treatment of the measures of 
attitudes "studies concerning traits without a 
definite objective reference, such as introversion, 
ascendance, aggressiveness". Similarly, discussing 
the nature of attitudes, Droba38 remarks, "One of the 
indispensable components of an attitude is the 
objective reference. It is a concrete goal toward 
37 Droba, D.D., "Methods for measuring attitude," 
Psyoh.ol. Bull., 1932, 29, pp. 308 -323. 
38 Droba, D.D., "The nature of attitude," 
Journ. Soc. Psychol., 1933, 4, pp. 4'1'1 463. 
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which an attitude is directed. It is a point with 
reference to which a man becomes disposed so that he 
can act for or against it whenever the appropriate 
motive presents itself ". The reference to objects 
throws into strong relief the P1valences" of the 
objects, their "demand qualities", their aspects of 
"opportunity" and "contravention", "facilitation" and 
"obstruction ". The testee is accordingly required, 
while answering an attitude scale, to express his 
annoyances, his preferences, his acceptance or 
rejection, etc. , in respect of specific objects or 
definite situations. 
The °interest "e inventories push into the 
focus the subjective representation of the "biologic_ 
relationship", the "biospheric tension", that obtains 
between the "subject" and the "object". In other 
words, they stress the affective aspects of activitie 
or responses, actual or potential, in regard to an 
accepted or rejected object. For example, interest 
in an occupation or hobby as measured by an interest 
inventory, stresses the affective reactions of the 
subject, expressed in liking or disliking, not to 
objects or situations, but to the patterns of 
activities or performances which comprise that 
occupation or hobby. As Strong39 observes, 
"Experimentally, an interest is a response of liking, 
39 Op. cit., pp. 6 & 7. 
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an aversion is a response of disliking". "The 
response of liking - disliking is to objects in 
terms of the activities or response -tendencies 
involved." (The italics are mine.) The stress on 
the side of activity is the basis of the very close 
connection that has often been pointed out between 
ability and interest. The former is a capacity for 
an ordered set of responses which ensures success in 
a given situation. Interest is attraction or 
repulsion for the same set of responses. 
We should bear in mind that the distinction 
we have proposed between personality questionnaires 
and attitude or interest questionnaires is true only 
in a very general sense, for, in fact, a good deal of 
overlapping exists between them. Items of the type 
that should belong only to one form are actually 
encountered also in the other. 
As we have mentioned above, the problem we 
have set ourselves for this study, applies, in 
strictness, only to the personality questionnaires. 
Our subsequent discussions would, accordingly, be 
centred round the personality questionnaire alone. 
CHAPTER 2. 
RELIABILITY and VALIDITY. 
An instrument of measurement should be 
reliable. By its treliability is meant that it 
should measure consistently what it measures, that is 
if repeatedly applied in the same circumstances it 
should yield identical or about identical results. 
By its validity is meant that it actually measures 
what it purports to measure. The reliability of a 
mental test is indicated by the amount of its self - 
correlation. Its validity is measured by the amount 
of its correlation with some outside criteria of the 
variable measured by the test. There are three 
methods for examining the reliability of a test.1 
(1) The split -half method, that is, finding the 
correlation between the sums of the scores on the 
alternate 'items of the test. In other words, the 
test is divided into two sub -tests, one containing all 
the "odd" items and the other all the "even"' items. 
The scores made by the same group in the two halves 
are then correlated. From the correlation between 
the two halves is predicted the correlation of the 
1 Ferguson, G.A., The Reliability of Mental Tests, 
pp. 7 -9. 
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total test with itself by the Spearman,-Brown Formula.2 
(2) The "test-retest' method, or repetition of the 
same test. The test is applied to the same group 
after an interval of time sufficiently long to 
minimise the effect of transfer from the previous 
administration of the test. The coefficient of 
correlation between the score made in the two 
applications of the test is treated as its index of 
reliability. (3) Application of parallel forms of 
the test. Two equivalent forms of the same test 
comparable in content and difficulty are applied to 
the same group either in immediate succession or with 
a limited interval of time and their correlation 
coefficient is taken as the measure of each other's 
reliability. Virtually, the three methods boil down 
to one, namely, correlating the scores on two tests 
which are either identical or contain comparable 
items. The test -retest method has one important 
point of difference from the split -half or equivalent - 
forms method. The interval of time separating the 
test administrations may bring about numerous varia- 
tions in the subjective and objective settings of the 
two testing periods. These might cause variability 
in the testee's responses and, thus, lower the 
magnitude of the correlation coefficient. For the 
same reason, test- retest reliability is, generally, 
expected to be lower than the split -half reliability, 
2 G rreti, I3.:J. , Statistics in Psychology and Educa- 
tion,'p. 390. 
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though it is seldom lower than the parallel -forms 
reliability, since the devising of equivalent forms 
with different components items and still comparable 
in difficulty and content has, in strictness, been a 
feat difficult of accomplishment, specially, in the 
field of personality testing. 
There has been disagreement on the point, 
namely, which method yields the most satisfactory 
result. We are not required to enter into the 
controversy. So far as personality tests are 
concerned, few parallel forms of the same test have 
been attempted and so the comparison lies between the 
j 
split -half and the test -retest methods. In the 
writer's opinion, each of the two methods has its 
usefulness, since they do not tell exactly the same 
story. So far as consistency of responses is 
concerned, the split -half method yields certainly the 
most reliable result, as the scientific need for the 
constancy of the conditions in which the comparable 
1sets of responses are made is fulfilled only by this 
method. Advocating the split -half method, Anastasia 
reL_arks, "The effects of variation in the subjects 
during even the short period of the test tend to be 
equalized by the temporal arrangement of odd and even 
items. This method seems, therefore, to give most 
nearly the reliability of the measuring instrument, 
3 Anastasi, A., "The influence of practice upon test 
reliability," Journ. Educ. Psychol., 35, 1934, 
pp. 321 -335. 
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free from extraneous changes." But, on the other 
hand, it is quite reasonable to expect that 
consistency of responses judged from a single 
application of a test may be the result, wholly or 
partly, of some backgrolind influences acting within 
the organism or operating upon him from the outside, 
e.g., incidence of fatigue, nervousness, lack of 
interest lack of incentive, etc, , which might not 
recur in future administrations, and may thus give a 
spurious split -half reliability to the test. As 
Neprash4 points out, "In the use of this method, 
there exists always the possibility that a persisting 
factor may be biasing the responses to all questions 
in a constant direction with the result that, though 
all of the responses, and consequently the total 
score, may appear highly reliable and valid, the 
contrary may actually have been the case." The 
personality tests are still more fallible in this 
respect. They seek to measure those aspects of the 
personality which are highly complex and subtle, 
involving implicit processes "within" the organism. 
Further, the dependence of the test responses upon 
the special circumstances in which the measurement is 
made has been repeatedly stressed and is an important 
vitiating factor - the responses might vary with the 
4 Neprash, S.A. , "The reliability of questions in the 
Thurstone Personality Schedule." Journ. Soc. 
Psychol., 7, 1936, pp. 239 -244. 
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variation in the circumstances. Hollingworth5 has 
said that many of the so- called traits of temperament 
"refer not so much to traits of individuals as to 
conducts of particular human pairs, or character- 
istics of human nature under special circumstances". 
It is important, then, to use a measure of reliabilit 
which shows the test's consistency despite a change 
in the external and internal influences operating 
upon the testees. This can be achieved by the test - 
retest method. To bring out the special feature of 
the test - retest reliability, over and above the mere 
consistency of responses shown by the split -half 
method, we may call the former a measure of stability 
or constancy of response, the determination of which 
is specially important for ensuring successful pre- 
diction. Hollingworth6 found considerable variation 
in the response to the Woodworth Personal Data Sheet 
before and after the Armistice, a fact which brings 
into strong relief the part played by the background 
factors that may remain undetected in a single 
administration of a test. 
There is another question connected with the 
problem of test reliability, namely, what magnitude 
of correlation coefficient is to be accepted as a 
satisfactory index of reliability. For our guidancell 
5 Hollingworth, H.L., Judging Human Character, p. 121. 
6 
Do. The Psychology of Functional 
Neurosis.p_ 127. 
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we may safely adopt Kelley's7 answer to this question. 
He maintains that when a test is to be used for group 
measurement purposes a reliability coefficient of .50 
or higher is needed. When the test is to be used 
for individual measurement purposes a reliability co- 
efficient of .94 or higher is needed. We will 
observe in the sequel that while for most personality 
tests a reliability coefficient of more than .50 has 
been quoted, in few cases, within the writer's 
knowledge, a reliability co- efficient as high as .94 
is reported. The acceptance of Kelley's criterion 
might disappoint some devisors of personality tests 
who are inspired by the hope that their creations 
would be suitable for making individual diagnosis as 
well. The writer thinks that this expectation is 
due to excessive faith that has been put in the 
perfection of mental test methods. In fact, it is 
not possible to claim even of the most skilfully 
devised intelligence tests that they can predict in 
individual cases beyond a very limited measure of 
success. Less so with regard to the aptitude tests, 
as Hull8 remarks, while discussing the "index of 
forecasting efficiency', that for differential 
prognosis a correlation of .70 to .80 between a test 
battery and its criterion can alone be of "decided 
7 Kelley, T.L., Interpretation of Educational 
Lieasureurent, pp. 210 -211. 
8 
Hull, C.L. 9 Aptitude Testing, , .275. 
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value, but is rarely found", and that a correlation 
"above .80 is not obtained by present method of 
aptitude testing'. How can this claim be, possibly, 
substantiated with regard to personality tests? We 
may conclude, therefore, that personality tests are 
valuable, if at all, as measures of group trends and 
can be assessed only as such. This should give no 
basis for the impression that their use is limited to 
their being mere research tools, as some psychologists 
think. Group differentiation is of no less practic . 
importance than individual diagnosis. For example, 
in industrial selection, the cost and labour of 
individual personal assessment may be considered to b 
out of proportion to the advantages accruing there- 
from. The method of group differentiation which 
gives a rough and ready idea of the dominant 
tendencies and traits of segregated groups may, then, 
serve the purpose better. Or, to adjust the 
relations of the workers to the management, it mey be 
useful to have a general idea of the attitudes, 
interests, ideologies and purposes of the workers as 
a group. We can think of still higher sociological 
purposes to which the knowledge regarding the 
dominant trends of masses of people - nationalities, 
races, etc., could be turned. We have decided, 
therefore, in agreement with the consensus of opinion 
held by psychologists, that personality questionnaires 
are to be taken as measures of group tendencies and, 
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hence, for the evaluation of their reliability a 
correlation co- efficient of .50 or more, as proposed 
by Kelley, is sufficient. Viewed in this manner, 
personality questionnaires have a considerably high 
reliability, as shown by the following co- efficients 
of reliability quoted for some of the representative 




Woodworth Personal Mathews 
Data Sheet 
Allport's Ascend- Allport 
ance- Submission 
Test 










Thurston's Per- Neprash 
sonality Schedule 
Bell Adjustment Bell 
Inventory 
Method 
Split -half .90 
Split -half .74 
Test -retest .78 
Split -half .90 
Split -half N .79 
Split -half S .67 
Split -half D .74 
Test -retest I .90 
Test- retest D .92 
Test- retest S .91 
Test- retest N .92 
Test -retest .74 -.91 
Split -half .80-.8 
The validation of a mental test is more 
difficult than finding its reliability, because we 
are required to find a suitable outside criterion vtI: 
which the test has to be compared. This criterion, 
strictly speaking, should express the function of the 
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same variable as that underlying the responses in the 
test which is to be validated. For this purpose, it 
is necessary to identify the ability or trait the 
test is measuring and then to look for other 
restricted area of responses wherein too the same 
ability or trait is at work. In other words, we 
should strive to know first what a test measures and 
then determine what other patterns of reaction are 
influenced by that what the test measures. Only, 
after these desiderata have been fulfilled that we 
can start with the work of validation itself. But 
the first requisite is itself too difficult to be 
supplied, namely, what the test measures, specially 
in the field of personality testing. The mere fact 
that a test is labelled as measuring a certain named 
variable, like "extraversion", for example, does not 
answer to our need. These terms remain ever 
undefined and seldom mean the same thing to two 
psychologists. For instance, the reactions sub - 
subm.ed under "extraversion" according to one test 
designer, do not find a place under it according to 
another. We find ,Eysenck9 labouring under the same 
difficulty when he notices that according to the 
results obtained by him "neuroticism" and "intro- 
version" are independent traits, while according to 
others they are identical. Or, when he finds that 
9 Eysenck, H.J., Dimensions of Personality, pp. 51 -53. 
37. 
"sociability" has been, of necessity, included under 
"extraversion" by one group of personality psycholo- 
gists, but has no place under the latter according to 
others. We encounter the same difficulty in the use 
of such terms as "adjustment', "emotional maturity", 
etc. , which have no fixed meanings in the minds of 
even those who use them to describe their tests. To 
obviate this defect, some psychologists prefer the 
so- called operational definitions of personality 
variables which no doubt achieve definiteness and 
freedom from ambiguity, but are worthless as defini- 
tions, serving, as they do, as mere short descriptio 
of the hundred and odd items composing the test. 
Further, the stress these definitions put 
upon the peculiarities of the component test items 
and the unit responses thereto, makes them so relativ 
to the specific situations represented in the test 
that in their case the discovery of a criterion 
measuring the same reaction patterns but comprising 
different situations remains a still remote possi- 
bility. It seems evident to us, therefore, that no 
test of personality can be amenable to the process of 
validation in the strict statistical sense, as it is 
hardly possible to determine the criterion against 
which it can be validated, far less so in the case óf 
the personality questionnaires. 
Beside the strict method of validation against 
a criterion, another method which has been frequently 
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tried for validating personality questionnaires is 
that of "internal consistency". It was first used 
by the Thurstonesl0 in the course of their standardi- 
sation of the A- --Re ct-ion - Scale. According to this 
method the individuals scoring in the upper and lower 
extremes of the distribution of scores to the total 
test are set in separate groups and the percentages 
of the alternative responses, for instance, "Yes ", 
"No" and " ?" , made to each item by each group are 
computed. If an item shows a considerable differenc 
in the percentages made by the two groups, it is 
presumed to possess a high discriminating value and 
the "Yes" er "No" response, as the case may be, in 
respect of which the largest difference is shown, is 
alone assigned a numerical weight in the scoring. 
For example, if forty per cent. of the high scoring 
individuals respond to a question by checking "yes" 
and only five per cent. of the low scoring individual 
respond in the like manner, that question is retained 
in the final selection of the test items. On the 
other hand, if an item is checked "Yes" or "No" as 
frequently by the two groups, it is eliminated from 
the list, having notdifferential value. An alterna- 
tive method is to find the correlation between the 
answers to each item and the total scores, or to any 
pair of items, and to eliminate those items which fail 
10 
Thurstone, L.L., and "A neurotic inventory," 
Journ. Soc. Psychol., 1, 1930, pp. 3i. -30. 
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to correlate significantly with others or with the 
total. Thus, the items which are finally retained 
are internally consistent, they "hang together", and 
the test is considered valid on this account. But 
the method of internal consistency can not, reason- 
ably, be trdated as a method of test validation. It 
can only determine that the items composing a test ar 
highly sensitive to differences between the persons 
to whom the test is applied, or that their responses 
always go together and, therefore, represent the 
function of the same variable. But this only 
guarantees the efficiency of the test as a measuring 
instrument; it does not throw any light on its 
validity, as it does not determine, by itself, the 
particular field in which one may profitably employ 
the test for prediction of behaviour. As Ellisll 
observes, "Internal consistency of a questionnaire 
demonstrates, at best, that it is a reliable test of 
something; but that something may still have little 
or no relation to the clinical diagnosis for which 
the test has presumably been designed." Ellis also 
doubts the correctness of the statistical assumptions 
underlying the use of the technique of internal con- 
sistency. He refers to the findings of Jackson and 
Ferguson who have questioned whether it gives even a 
true test of reliability, and of Rundquist and Stella 
11 Ellis, A., "The validity of personality 
questionnaires," Psychol. Bull. 43, 1946, 
pp. 385 -440. 
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who have pointed out its dangers as a validation 
procedure, and have emphasised the difficulty of 
obtaining suitable degrees of separation in the 
original criterion group selected for item analysis". 
Similarly, Murphy and Murphy12 point out that the 
validity established by internal consistency seldom 
holds beyond the standardisation group. The unity 
demonstrated by the technique is between the given 
question and the original list of questions and does 
not constitute proof of coherence or "occurring 
togetherness" of the traits themselves. Hence, 
though the internal consistency of personality 
questionnaires is naturally quite high, as the 
technique forms a part of the standardisation process 
its use as an index of the validity of the question- 
naire is open to grave doubts. 
Still another method which has played the 
major role in the validation of many personality 
questionnaires is the so- called method of clinical 
validation. This method is an extension from the 
field of ability and aptitude testing. Intelligence 
tests, generally, and measures of special abilities 
and skills, particularly,' have been validated by the 
estimation of their power to predict success within 
the sphere of performances which they involve. If a 
test has been found to discriminate between groups of 
12 
Murphy, G., Murphy, L., and Newcombe, T., 
Experimental Social Psychology. 
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persons known, on other grounds, to be successful and 
unsuccessful in a given set of activities, that is, 
the scores made by the two groups are significantly 
different, then any person who scores high on the 
test is expected to achieve greater success in the 
activities concerned than those persons whose scores 
are comparatively low. Obviously, in order to 
ensure the test's ability to predict success, the 
criteria of success must be some definite and 
objective indices like saving in time, increase in 
production, etc.13 When personality questionnaires 
were first devised they were offered as tests of 
emotional adjustment and it was, accordingly, 
supposed that a questionnaire would be valid if its 
scores could mark out the successfully adjusted 
person from the unsuccessfully adjusted and, within 
the latter, could set apart persons showing the 
various degrees of unsuccessful adjustment. And, 
since abnormality of behaviour has been considered to 
be the expression of lack of adequate adjustment, 
successful adjustment was thought to be tantamount to 
normality of behaviour. The val idiL,y of personality 
questionnaires was, accordingly, sought to be 
determined by estimating its power of discrimination 
between the normal and the abnormal, and, more 
specifically, its capacity to yield a differential 
13 Hull, C., Op. cit., p.375_76. 
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diagnosis of persons suffering from the various 
psychopathological syndromes. Numerous investiga- 
tions have been made to examine the validity of the 
various personality inventories by this method, but 
the results are far from satisfactory. Supeaç, 4 
Patterson15 and Ellis16 have made very exhaustive 
reviews of the literature related to the validity of 
personality questionnaires. The first two have 
confined themselves to the investigations conducted 
in connection with the Bernreuter Personality 
Inventory, the results of which apply equally well to 
all similar measurements. The third reviewer has 
considered also some of the other personality 
questionnaires. Siperquotes a number of studies 
some of which support the power of the Bernreuter 
Inventory to make differential diagnosis, while other 
run counter tb it. At the end of his survey, Soper 
remarks, "When the data are examined in detail, they 





"The Bernreuter Personality Inventory. 
A review of research." Psychol. Bull., 1942, 
39, PP. 94-14. 
15 Patterson, C.H., "The relationship of the Bern - 
reuter scores to parent behaviour, child behav- 
iour, urban - rural residence and other back- 
ground factors in 100 normal adult parents." 
Journ. Soc. Psychol., 24, 1946, pp. 3-49. 
16 
Ellis, A., "The validity of personality 
questionnaires." Psychol. Bull., 43, 1946, 
pp. 385- l+W1o. 
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various groups of abnormal individuals, even though 
these differences are not so clear -cut as one would 
wish." The two other reviews, which came lone after 
Spc.& s, are unanimous in rejecting the claim of any 
personality questionnaire to serving as a satisfactor 
basis for clinical differentiation. Patterson refer 
to several studies which were. devoted to investigatin 
the power of the Bernreuter Inventory to discriminate 
between normals and various groups clinically diag- 
nosed as neurotic, psychotic, or maladjusted, and 
concludes that the "results are not entirely 
consistent". Ellis also quotes the findings of 75 
studies related to this problem and concludes that 
the majority of them show " either negative or 
questionably positive results ". 
There seems to 12e no element of doubt regard- 
ing the failure of the personality questionnaires to 
show a consistent record of clinical validity. No 
doubt the method of clinical validation also leaves 
much to be desired and it is quite possible that the 
apparent lack of validity of the questionnaire may be 
due entirely. to the defect of the method of valida- 
tion. Unlike occupational or Industrial success, 
successful adjustment in the emotional field does not 
show itself through any definite and precise 
objective marks capable of receiving quantitative 
expression. The concept of normality, as is well 
known, is purely relative and the distinction between 
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the normal and the abnormal, strictly speaking, is 
difficult to determine. There are hardly any 
symptoms of abnormality which ar$ not experienced by 
the so- called normal person as well, specially when 
the normal is compared to the psychoneurotic. It is 
only the psychotic pattern which shows such extreme 
deviations from the average, modes of reaction that it 
can present an easily identifiable picture. But the 
questionnaire method, as we will see later, depends 
for its efficacy, above all things, on the ability of 
the subject to possess insight or self- knowledge, 
which the psychotic notoriously lacks. It follows, 
therefore, that when a personality questionnaire is 
administered to two groups segregated on the basis of 
clinical diagnosis as normals and psychoneurotics, it 
may be difficult for the normal to deny in himself 
the conditions which point in the direction of abnor- 
mality, and, conversely, possible for the psycho - 
neurotic to express possession of those conditions 
which falsify the verdict of clinical diagnosis. As 
one study reports, when the Bernreuter Personality 
Inventory was applied to a group of normals and to a 
group of psychoneurotics, the normals made more 
neurotic scores than the psychoneurotics. The write: 
has tangible reasons to believe that among the set of 
serious minded introspectively inclined university 
students who have been usually asked to serve as the 
control group for the purpose of clinical validation 
45. 
of nuestionnaires on the basis of normal - abnormal 
differentiation, a fairly large percentage believe 
that they suffer from internal emotional inadequacies 
and lack of satisfactory social adjustment, a notion 
which might influence their checkings of the 
questionnarie items in the unfavourable direction. 
That is why personality test holds out a great 
temptation to these young men; the incitement is the 
opportunity to verify this disconcerting notion 
regarding themselves. And that is what also makes 
them so much concerned about knowing the results of 
the testing. 
There may be another reason also for the failure 
of clinical validation on the ground of differential 
diagnosis, namely, the imperfection of the method of 
clinical diagnosis. The, syndromes of mental 
diseases have such an amount of overlapping that 
any system of nomenclature is bound to break down 
in actual practice. The result is that the 
classes or categories under which the various groups 
of patients may be placed are quite likely to be very 
artificial and thus may, reasonably, fail to conform 
to the classification suggested by the variations in 
the questionnaire scores. Moreover, the diagnosis 
of a case of mental disease, as falling under one 
category rather than another, is relative to and 
dependent upon the insight and typical experiencesof 
individual psychiatrists and, consequently, disagree- 
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ment on this matter among the members of this pro - 
fession is a very common occurrence. In order to 
obviate this possibility, clinical validation has been 
sought to depend upon agreement on diagnosis which is 
to be secured by comparing the diagnostic ratings on 
the group concerned made by a number of experienced 
psychiatrists. But few attempts on this line have 
been reported in connection with the clinical validat- 
ion of personality questionnaires. 
Allport -7 strikes at the very foundation of 
clinical validation by dissenting with the prevalent 
view that originated from Kretschmer18 that the 
abnormal is just an exaggeration of the normal. 
According to this view, it was expected that the 
normal and the abnormal could be assigned places on 
the same trait continuum, and, consequently, the 
quantitative expression of the distance between their 
positions was supposed to function as the index of 
their possession of or freedom from pathological 
conditions. In fact this belief inspired the 
excessive trust in clinical validation es one of the 
most adequate methods of testing the validity of 
personality scales. Allport maintains, on the 
contrary, that the mentally diseased personality is 
functionally quite different from the normal. He 
observes, "Is the normal personality simply an 
17Allport, G.W. , 'Personality, pp. 73-76. 
18Kretschmer. 
, E., Physique and Character. 
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undistinguished edition of the mentally diseased ?' 
We do not hold this view in reference to organic 
conditions. There is no continuum of states from 
cancer to no- cancer. The patient either has a 
malignant growth or else he hasn't; there are no 
intermediate conditions. Similarly, a diseased 
mind is in many respects functionally quite different 
from (and not merely an exaggeration of) the normal 
mind." Likewise, Supe l9 commenting on the failure 
of the Bernreuter Personality Inventory to discrimin- 
ate between the normal and the abnormal, remarks, 
"But this can be expected of the inventory only on 
the ground that the normals and the abnormals are on 
a single continuum.... The inventory may be adequate 
only to distinguish between normal persons and normal 
persons with abnormal tendencies ". If Allport and 
Suer are right, then this is another ground for 
rejecting the clinical method of validating personality 
questionnaries. 
Other methods of validation using the 
technique of group differentiation with reference to 
behaviour problems, personnel problems, social 
groupings, occupational groupings, etc., have met with 
similar fate as the method of clinical validation. 
There is one method which has appeared to offer a 
more satisfactory result, namely, validation of 
19SnpEht' D.E., Op. cit. 
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personality questionnaires against one another. 
But the weakness of this method also has been clearly 
brought out by Kuznet20 in respect of the Bernreuter 
Personality Inventory, which holds for other 
questionnaires as well. He found that the Bernreuter 
cònsists almost wholly of the items that constitue 
the other tests that have been used in validating it. 
The number of common items range from 50 with the 
Thurstone Neurotic Inventory to 31 with. the .Allport 
A-S Reaction Study. The common items were found to 
determine over 70 per cent. of the variance of the 
total scores on the neurotic tendency and the self - 
sufficiency scales, and on the average 40 per cent. 
of the variance of the total on the introversion - 
extraversion and the ascendance - submission scales 
of the Inventory. These findings indicate that "the 
high validity of co- efficients obtained by the 
Bernreuter are to a large degree spurious." A glance 
at any two personality questionnaires readily brings 
to one's view such a number of common items that any 
evidence of correlation between the questionnaires 
becomes more an index of reliability than of validity. 
.11is21 has collected the reports of numerous 
studies on the validity of personality questionnaire 
using various methods and got a grand total of 259 
PO Kuznets, G. , "An analysis of Bernreuter Personality 
Inventory ". Psychol. Bull., 1934, 31, p.585. 
210n. cit. 
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investigations. On sifting the results of each, he 
finds 80 positive er mainly positive, 44 questionably 
positive, and 135 negative or mainly negative. He 
concludes, "Obviously this is not a reliable record 
for the validity of paper and pencil personality 
questionnaires. " Patterson 
22 
takes a very liberal 
estimate of validation as that indicated by the 
correlation of a given instrument of measurement with 
any other variable. He, accordingly, correlates the 
3ernreuter with a. number of variables "including such 
background factors as age, education, intelligence, 
age of marriage, duration of marriage, income, urban- 
rural residence, ratings of the parent -child behaviour 
of mothers, and child behaviour and personality ". 
He does not get any conclusive result and remarks. 
"The fact that the Pernreuter is unable to discriminate 
these differences and substantiate these relationships 
must be taken as an indication of its lack of 
validity ". What holds of the Bernreuter Personality 
Inventory is equally applicable to the other 
questionnaires, since they have a common kinship. 
The questionable validity of personality 
inventories stands in stark contrast to their 
"notoriously high" reliability. Viewed statistically, 
this result is not very curious as the relation 
`-'P Op. cit. 
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between reliability and validity is not symmetrical 
or reversible. A test, in order to be valid., must 
be reliable, s.ir_ce its correlation with the 
validating criterion depends upon its reliability 
and that of the criterion. If either of them fails 
to yield a consistent result, any comparison between 
them is idle. But a. reliable test may not be valid. 
That is, it may give consistent results and at the 
same time its results may not be the function of the 
variable which the test purports to measure and, 
therefore, fail to correspond with any other criteria 
of that variable. A question naturally arises: 
Does this account of the statistical relationship 
between reliability and validity tell us the complete 
story which covers also the psychological significance 
of the relation? We can answer this by posing another 
Tuestion: ',ghat does the reliability of a. test 
psychologically signify? When we measure a test's 
reliability, say by the split -half method, the two 
halves actually stand as two separate tests which are 
compared to one another. The items composing the 
two tests are naturally different, as no item is 
duplicated in the total test. But the responses 
made by the group concerned to the two halves are 
consistent - subjects scoring high on the one score 
high on the other - which is indicated by the high 
positive correlation coefficient. Such a conformity 
is possible because each person, in the group, 
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responds to a set of items composing one half in the 
same manner as to that composing the other half. 
Psychologically we can express this as: a certain 
group of items in either half provoked, despite their 
distinctness, the same tendency of response in the 
testees. Hence it follows, the reliability of a 
test does not merely show the comparability of the 
total scores on the two halves of the test, but it 
also indicates the operation of an underlying 
tendency in each subject which accounts for his 
similarity of responses to the two . havves. As a 
matter of fact, we can lay down a general principle 
that consistency of behaviour, in whatever situation, 
if repeatedly shown, always gives a clue to a "habit 
of response" characteristic of the person concerned. 
Likewise, when a test shows consistent results, this 
fact proves that there is something "deep- seated" 
in the persons taking the test which is provoked to 
function every time similar groups of test situations 
are presented. As Stagner23 remarks, "It is 
difficult to see just how a high reliability could 
result without some underlying consistency which 
caused. the individuals scoring high on one portion. of 
the test to do likewise on another ". Allport24 also 
expresses the same fact when he says, "Reliability of 
a many- itemed scale is prima facie evidence for some 
23 
24 
Stagner, R. , Psychology of Personality, p. 125. 
Allport, G. W. , Prsona.lity, 2.257. ,r°' 
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kind of generality in conduct ". As a matter of fact, 
the search for reliability is stimulated by the need 
to discover, thereafter, the basis underlying the 
stability of responses. We do not ascertain a test' s 
reliability for nothing, but to ensure that the test 
has the power to excite some persistent and enduring 
"pattern" of reaction in the individual testees, that 
the responses to the test items are not governed by 
superficial and variable factors, or chance influences, 
but there is an underlying unity which so organises 
the great variety of the test situations and the 
responses that follow as to lend to them the same 
'functional significance, or, as ,Allport25 very aptly 
puts it, to render them dynamically equivalent. 
This unity is not determined. by any ',objective" 
similarity in the stimuli provided by the test items, 
for, objectively considered, that,is, divested of its 
"meaning" to the testee, each item is distinct from 
another. Allport26 has very conclusively proved, and 
so we need not dilate this point, that consistency of 
behaviour can not be interpreted as long as we look 
for the interpretartion to the objective stimuli; 
neither similarity of stimulus, nor the supposition 
of "identical elements" within stimulus fields ", can 
account for consistency of response. It seems 
evident, therefore, that persistence of the same 
25 
Ibid, p. 280. 
26Ibid, pp. 248-268. 
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behaviour, despite the indefinite variability of the 
situations, evokation of a common way of reaction to 
the various aspects of the environment, are definite 
indications of enduring trends in the personality 
which the dynamic psychologists have called "traits ", 
"needs ", "attitudes", etc. These are systems of 
response tendencies whose expressions are not 
confined to particular reactions, but cover highly 
"generalised fields of responses ". 
Since the reliability of a test is determined 
by some enduring trait in the personality of the 
testees , a given coefficient of reliability provides 
a clue to the possession by the individuals concerned 
of a "generalised. trend" or pattern" of behaviour. 
A test of high reliability, then, is not to be thrown 
out if its validity fails to be proved. For, its 
reliability augurs that the search for its validity 
would not be endlessly defeated. As Lentz27 
observes, "Reliability study is conceivable as a step 
in the direction of validation, since the absence of 
reliability necessitates the absence of validity, 
and the presence of reliability makes validity 
possible ". In fact, the failure to prove the validity of 
a reliable test does not amount to its actual lack of 
validity; it merely shows the limitation of the 
res .-earth. As the test indicates "some" enduring 
27 Lentz, T.F. , "The reliability of the opinionnaire 
technique studied intensively ". Tourn. Soc. 
Psychol. , 5, 1934, pp. 338 -364. 
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element in the personality of the testees from whom 
its reliability has been obtained, the matter of its 
validation rests with the discovery of some area of 
responses, other than those tackled in the test 
situations, in which the same underlying disposition 
is brought into play. The determination of this 
area is possible, for the disposition. resides in the 
persons and not in the tests; its manifestations 
must extend. to the actual life of the persons. 
We may conclude, therefore, that every reliable test is 
valid in a general sense, it indicates an underlying 
trait of the testees; it may be invalid in a special 
sense, if it fails to correlate with the variable 
against which we elect to validate it. In other 
words, any reliable test possesses validity, since 
its variance must correspond to that of some other 
variable of behaviour, as implied. by its consistency, 
but its validity may not be proved. to us, since that 
variable may have been hitherto undetermined. We 
notice, therefore, a reciprocity of relation obtaining 
between reliability and validity, when viewed psycho- 
logically. Not only is a valid. test reliable, but 
also a reliable test is valid in the sense of the 
measure of a "true" psychological disposition, though 
it may not be valid in the restricted sense as the 
measure of an alleged function. 
The reliability of personality questionnaries 
can also be interpreted in the same manner. The 
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subject makes the same composite seores -- to two 
ha1vles of the questionnaire, or, during its repeated 
applications, because of the functional equivalence 
of its component items, because they excite in him 
the same generalised tendency, put into operation the 
same pattern of behaviour. The principle of 
"functional equivalence" is reflected in the 
selection of the questionnaire items and the system 
of scoring the questionnaire responses. In devising 
the personality scale, the experimenter selects a 
wide variety ofitems, but the selection is not random. 
He uses only those items which his psychological 
experience and insight suggest to be functionally 
connected with the variable he is proposing to 
measure and he .assigns weight in the scoring to those 
reponses alone which he deems to be the alternative 
modes of expression of the same behaviour. For 
example, he thinks that situations of a certain kind - 
are most likely to evoke dominant or submissive 
behaviour. He substitutes verbal representations for 
those situations and assembles the former as a scale 
for measuring dominance -submission. Considered in 
abstraction from the measured traits, the situations 
are dissimilar and disconnected, but they are unified 
and treated as "generally the same" because they 
function alike in evoking the same generalised 
tendency. The responses too, considered in them - 
selves,may be diametrically opposite as "Yes" and 
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"No ". But in scoring, they may be treated 
similarly because as expressions of the same tendency 
they are equivalent. As A11port observes, "The 
welter of stimuli to which the individual is exposed 
fall for him, as it were, into constellations, every 
member of which is effective in producing some 
response. Correspondingly, the responses he makes, 
throughout infinitely varied, are not as diverse as 
they appear at first sight, for many of them are also 
equivalent in their personal significance. Thus for 
a man with a disposition to be polite innumerable 
environmental occasions are equivalent in their power 
to arouse this particular determining trait, and at 
the same time the polite gentleman finds innumerable 
ways of expressing his dominant trait (equivalent 
responses)." If in devising a personality inventory, 
the experimenter is not at fault, that is the scale 
he has prepared gives a consistent result on account 
of the fact that the items are rendered equivalent 
for the testees because they evoke the alleged trait 
within them - the trait or tendency intended to be 
measured, then the test responses are definite 
indications of the trait and the scale provides its 
"true" measure. Persons differ in their total scores 
in the inventory because of the differences between 
them with respect to the "degree of generalisation" of 
28 
Op. cit. , p. 281. 
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the measured trait. "The degree of generatlisation 
of such a disposition ", as Allport29 puts it, "is 
measurable by the range of equivalence ". It "varies 
inversely with the degree to which stimuli and 
responses are discriminated". Putting it more 
simply, if the trait is highly organised in a given 
individual, which means that it possesses a high 
degree of generalisation, then all items which are 
psychologically expected to be rendered equivalent by 
the actuation of a given trait are actually ma.e so 
and the score obtained by him is the maximum possible 
in the test. If, on the other hand, the trait is 
poorly integrated in a. certain individual, the area 
of equivalence is likely to be narrow or limited for 
him; only a few items would be rendered equivalent 
and, therefore, responded to in the expected manner. 
In respect of the remaining items, there would be 
specific responses to the specific items which would 
neutralise each other like unsystematic chance 
influences. The result will be, comparatively, a 
much lower score for that person. The experimental 
results of the Character Education Enquiry conducted 
by Harts --horne and May, 
30 
which have been so often 
quoted in their favour by the exponents of the 
"stimulus- response bond" theory of behaviour, can be 
29 Ib i d , P.280. 
30 
8ymond, P.M., Diagnosing Personality and Conduct, 
_ap. 303-318. 
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interpreted in the like manner. Hartshorne and May 
failed to identify any "generalised trait" of honesty 
and other character qualities, and concluded that 
such alleged traits are groups of specific habits 
rather than general traits. Their experimental 
results have shown them that a child that was honest 
so far as stealing money was concerned did not prove 
to be honest when subjected. to the test of truthful- 
ness. nut, as Allport31 and Stagner 32 have argued, 
this inconsistency in the child's responses indicates 
only a lower level of organisation of his traits and 
does not disprove the existence of a. trait. In 
other words, then a test of honesty, which comprises 
items referring both to stealing as well as untruth- 
fulness, is administered. to a child who has not 
achieved a higher level of organisation of his habits, 
he will respond to the "stea_ling1P items in one way 
and to the "lying" items in another. The test will 
indicate within him the functions of two distinct 
-patterns of behaviour which due to the lack of 
development, defect of training, or absence of 
appropriate environment, have not been integrated into 
one. On the other hand, to an adult with an 
integrated trait of honesty, both types of items will 
be functionally equivalent and his responses will show 
a uniform consistency all through the scale. 
31 Op. Cit. , pp 251-255. 
32 
Op. cit., pp 153-158. 
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OF SELF-ESTIMATE. 
A proposed test of personality will show 
validity if the assumed trait or principle of 
behaviour that influenced the formulation of the test 
is the actual counterpart of the underlying dispositio.l 
that works in the responses of the testees. On 
the other hand, if the test fails to show validity 
but is proved at the same time to possess a high 
reliability, as is the case with the personality 
nuestionnaires, then we may presume that the consis- 
tency of the score ma.-de in the test is not the 
function of the alleged disposition, but of some 
unknown factor in the personality. The test items 
stimulate this factor and its operation renders 
certain items equivalent for the respective testees 
and evokes in them equivalent responses. With 
respect to such a scale, we are entitled to hold that 
its component items are not the measures of the 
variable for measuring which they were selected. We 
are, then, led further to the conclusion that 
personality questionnaires profess to measure one 
thing, but actually measure something else, for all 
of them show a high reliability against the background 
of a low validity. If that is so, then the devisers 
of the personality questionnaires have, one and all, 
suffered from a gross error of judgment; they have 
posed their tests as measuring something other than 
59. 
ERRORS OF SELF-ESTIMATE. 
A proposed test of personality will show 
validity if the assumed trait or principle of 
behaviour that influenced the formulation of the test 
is the actual counterpart of the underlying disposition 
that works in the responses of the testees. On 
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posed their tests as measuring something other than 
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what it actually measures, the latter being altogether 
unknown to them. But this assumption seems to be 
unwarranted_ in face of the fact that some of the 
notable questionnaires, a few of which we have 
mentioned in the preceding chapter, have been devised 
by really able psychologists. They did not belong to 
the category of slip -shod investigators to have 
defined the traits they intended to measure according 
to one principle, and selected the materials for 
their measuring scales after another. In truth, 
they have invariably used their definition of the 
trait they proposed to measure as the criterion for 
selecting the materials that constituted their tests. 
When Woodworth, for instance, prepared his Personal 
Data Sheet, he did not bring out a mere collection 
of items selected ad hoe and decreed arbitrarily to 
be indicative of neurotic tendency. In fact, he 
constructed his items out of thè numerous symptoms whic 
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists have laid 
bare in describing neurotic conditions. The same 
can be said of the other questionnaires. There can 
be no doubt, then, that the items really represent 
situations that call for the activation of the alleged 
trait. If a man is habitually "troubled with the 
idea that people on the street are watching him ", he 
can not but be judged as extremely self -conscious. 
Or, if some one is found usually "reluctant to meet 
h 
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the most important person present ", there can be no 
two opinions about his lacking an ascendant disposit- 
ion. There seems no legitimate reason, therefore, 
to believe that the personality questionnaires 
betray any real divergence between the suggested 
variable they are meant to measure and the choice of 
the situations intended to .represent it. The real 
defect may then lie in another direction, namely, 
the discrepancy between the suggested situations and 
the responses of the testees. We have already 
described the method used in the personality 
n.uestionnaire. The test items are verbal representat- 
ions of actual life situations and the subject is not 
asked to respond to the situations as such but to 
express his opinion regardiing his usual adjustment 
to the various aspects of his environment which are 
portrayed by the test items. accordingly, when the 
testee responds to a question by checking this or 
that answer, his responses arse not taken in their 
rights as the acts of checking against fives" or "No ", 
as the case may be. They are interpreted as expressions 
of his opinions on his typical adjustment to the varios 
situations encountered in real life, the ways in which 
he actually meets them.It is quite likely that these 
estimates of his behaviour may not present a true 
picture of how he would really behave if the actual 
situation were presented. There is no guarantee that 
the opinion duplicates the fact. The reliability of 
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the test scores can not offer such a guarantee. There 
may be some dispositions at work during the time the 
subject is answering the questions, other than the 
alleged trait, which consistently bring about the same 
kind of divergence between the fact and the statement 
about the fact all through the scale. As Neprashl 
points out, referring to the split -half method of test -{ 
ing reliability, quoted also earlier, "There exists 
always the possibility that a persisting factor may be 
biasing the responses to all questions in a consistent 
direction with the result that, though all the respon- 
ses, and consequently the total score, may appear 
highly reliable and valid, the contrary may actually 
have been the case. " How this comes about will be 
subsequently elaborated by us in greater detail, for 
this is going to be our main problem. We can mention 
in passing that the same set of opinions, more or 
less, are expressed by the subjects in regard to 
similar items in the two parts of the test or on its 
repeated applications, irrespective of what their 
responses have actually been, hence the high level of 
consistency shown by the test. But since the 
possibility remains that the variability in the 
expressed opinions of different subjects may not 
1 
70147014 S.. A. "The reliability of questions in the 
Thurstone Personality ,Schedule ", Journ. Soc. 
Psychol. , 7, 1936, pp. 239` -244. 
63. 
reflect the varieties of their actual adjustment, a 
comparison of the responses with other criteria of 
adjustment shows utter lack of correspondence. As 
Lentz2 has remarked, the reliability co- efficient 
answers only the question: "Will he" (the subject) 
"give the same opinion under similar circumstances on 
a later occasion ?" There are other questions 
intimately connected with the evaluation of 
questionnaire responses, namely, "Has the subject 
sincerely expressed his opinion" Will the subject 
behave overtly consistently linith his expressed 
opinion? Does the subject really have an opinion on 
this subject and does he know what it is ?" It 
follows that the lack of validity of questionnaires, 
other than being assigned to a defect in the content 
of the test items, can be alternatively interpreted 
as being due to the lack of consistency between self - 
estimated adjustment and actual adjustment. In 
other words, it maybe due to the lack of reliability 
of self- estimate of personal attituc and conduct due 
to the ner.sistent operation of some constant factors 
of distortion. That it is possible for such factors 
to be at work in personality measurements is borne 
out 'by the inherent difference between personality 
questionnaires and tests of abilities. This has 
2 
Lentz, T.F. , Jr. , " Reliability of the opinionnaire 
technique studied intensively by the retest 
method." Journ. Soc. Psychol., 5,1934. 
pp. 339 -364. 
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been very clearly brought out by Symond.3 He says, 
"In taking a test, one is aware that he is being 
tested and. bends his energies accordingly; on the 
other hand, he does not take a questionnaire, he 
answers it. In answering a questionnaire the issue 
is not whether a person can answer the questions; but 
whether hé will answer the questions truthfully. In 
a test we look to the difficulty of the questions and 
are interested in the speed with which they are 
answered.....,.In a questionnaire we eliminate difficult. 
by making the questions as easy and simple as possible 
and give the person as much time as he wishes to 
answer. We place the emphasis on truthfulness of 
response. In answering a questionnaire one may 
alter his answers at will, allowing them to portray 
one or another picture of the situation to suit a 
particular purpose. Tests, in short, are designed to 
find out what a person can do, while questionnaires 
are designed to find out what a person has done and 
will do or what he thinks or feels or believes." 
The divergence between expressed opinions on 
personal behaviour, attitude, thought, or, belief and 
their real character has been indicated in numerous 
investigations _related to the evaluation of judgments 
on self, and the tendency toward the desire to make a 
favourable impression has been found, persistently, 
3 
Symonds P., Diagnosing Personality and conduct, 
P.122. 
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to influence these judgments. Holi.ingworth4 
remarked in as early as 1922, 'But perhaps the most 
important result of this enquiry is the definite 
evidence that self -estimates are misleading and that 
this traditional method of judging character lacks 
the accuracy that its practice suggests," Commenting 
on the value of personality questionnaires, he 
observes that the method of personality inventory "is 
essentially that of self- estimation, and the 
liability of self -estimates to distortion we have 
already had occasion to consider ".5 In the same 
year Knight and Franzen6 reported the results of an 
experiment in which they had 110 junior students in 
university rate 34 interests, "ranging from the 
essential to the trivial, in order of importance to 
themselves, to the ideal junior and to the typical 
junior ". They found a higher association between 
"what the students believe they are and what they 
would like to be than what they believe they are and 
what their fellow students believe they are ". 
Similarly, Shen, commenting on the resultslof an 
experiment in which 28 persons were required to rank 
themselves and one another with respect to eight 
different traits, remakrs that "we tend to over- 
4 Hollingworth, H.L., Judging Human Character, p.59. 
5 Ibid, p.185. 
6Knight, F.B. and Franzen, R.H. , "Pitfalls in rating 
schemes," Journ. Educ. Psychol., 13, 1922, 204 -213 
Shen, E. "The validity of self -estimate ", Jounr. 
Educ. Psyychol. , 16, 1925, p.105"3107. 
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estimate ourselves in most traits and underestimate 
ourselves in few ". Likewise, Thorndike, as quoted 
by Symond,8 has said, "Adults even as well trained as 
college seniors and even in the simplest matters of 
present objective facts, such as are involved in the 
questions: "How tall are you ?" and "What is the 
circumference of your sister's head ?" make gross error. 
The errors increase in number and amount when the 
report requires memory; increase further when the 
fact is a. report of subjective condition; and 
multiply like bacilli when it involves the general 
drift of a series of experiences." 
9 
Frank donducted an enquiry concerning the 
comparative of of 
the Bernreuter Personality Inventory. He classified 
the items, on the basis of their obtained responses, 
under three heads: (1) positive, i.e., those which 
were answered "Yes" by 75 per cent. or more of his 
subjects; (2) negative, i.e. 
75 per cent. or more; and (3) 
those answered "No" by 
neutral, the remaining 
items. He noted that the positive items reflected. 
behaviour that is socially approved and the negative 
items that which is sociallyd.isapproved. When he 
examined the shift in the responses from one administr- 
ation of the inventory to another, he found that 
8 Op cit. , p. _144. 
9 Frank, B., "Stability of questionnaire response ", 
Journ. Abn. Soc. Paychol. , 30, 1936, pp. 320 -324. 
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the, so- called, neutral items "showed not only the 
highest index of change, but also a significantly 
high average change per person ". In other words, the 
responses to the "positive" and "negative" items 
were relatively much more stable. He concludes on 
his findings, "The question arises as to what extent 
agreement of response and stability of response is a 
function of the crystallisation of convention and 
social practice and what part knowledge and judgment 
of socially approved practices play in the motivation 
of questionnaire responses ". This conclusion lends 
support to the suggestion we have made above that the 
stability of response to the questionnaire items is 
not the work of the trait purported to measure, hut 
of some unknown disposition that imparts functional 
similarity to a set of items and thus makes for the 
similarity of responses to them. It appears in this 
experirhent that the responses to the "Positive" and 
"Negative" items are influenced by the persistent 
craving for social approval and repulsion for social 
disapproval, respectively, and, hence, undergo less 
change; the responses to the "neutral" items are 
unaffected by these urges and therefore show the 
largest measure of change. 
Dudyeha10 reports a number of investigations 
10 Dudyeha, r.J., "Self- estimate and dependability ", 
Journ. Soc. Psychol. , 12, 1940, pp. 39 -53. 
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on the punctuality and dependability of college 
students. In one of these, he undertook to examine 
the relation between "self- estimate and dependability ". 
For this purpose, he classified his subjects, on 
ground of careful observation of objective behaviour, 
into the dependable and the non - dependable groups. 
He then gave the total group a questionnaire calling 
for their attitudes towards dependability in various 
situations. He found that "the dependable students 
do not answer the questions in a favourable manner and 
the undependable in an unfavourable manner, but that 
both tend to mark the favourable answers, except that 
the dependable students, in some questions at least, 
mark the less favourable answers ". Here again, we 
note the divergence between expressed opinion on 
personal behaviour and objective behaviour. 
As is expected, this tendency to fake 
responses is very clearly shown when it is in the 
interest of the subject to make flattering scores in 
order to gain some ulterior purpose. As Bernreuter11 
has pointed out, "If you are responsible for selecting 
individuals for jobs, I think you will very little 
benefit from personality trait tests as they are now 
devised. The reason is that most of the tests 
depend upon complete co- operation of the individual; 
11 Bernreuter, R.G., "The present status of Personalit 
Trait Tests ", The Education Record, Supplement 
13, 21, 1940, pp. 160 -171. 
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and practically every test of which I am aware is in 
a form that enables an individual to give you 
inaccurate information, if it is to his benefit to do 
>o ". Schott12 applied the Thurstone Personality 
Schedule to 130 applicants for professional positions. 
His results showed "the alleged weakness of the self - 
rating scale and the scores proved unreliable as 
an index of the degree of emotional adjustment because 
the subjects obviously were concerned only with making 
a good impression and accordingly their scores are 
better measures of spphistication than the degree of 
emotional stability ". Bennett and Gordon13 report 
similar results from the administration of the Bern - 
reuter Inventory to a group of nurses at the time of 
their selection and subsequently after they had 
completed a six -month period of probation. They 
found that the mean scores obtained by the group on 
the four traits of the Bernreuter had shifted from 
the first tó the second administration and that the 
shifts were uniformly in the undesirable direction. 
The authors comment on this discrepancy, "If these 
students answered without falsification upon the 
second administration of the test, it is possible to 
12 Schott, B.L., "Personality tests in clinical 
practice ", Journ. Abn. Soc. Psychol., 32, 1937, 
pp. 236 -239. 
13 
Bennett,, G.K. , and Gordon, H.P., "Personality test 
scores and success in the field of nursing," 
Journ, Appl. Spychol., 28, 1944, pp267 -278. 
1 
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conclude either that they felt less secure and stable 
after surviving a probationary period, or, that at 
the time of the first examination, they were attempt- 
ing to answer the questions in a way they thought woul 
be most acceptable to the school to which they were 
applying." They further observe, "In the case of the 
students who are tested as a part of the selection 
process there is an apparent tendency to modify 
their responses in a favourable direction. 
This tendency in itself may conceivably be one of the 
causes of the generally poor validity of paper and 
pencil personality inventories." 
The tendency to fake responses is not in 
evidence only when the questionnaire is used for 
selection purposes. In fact, numerous studies have 
shown that the liability to distortion is revealed 
even when the subject does not find himself placed at 
a disadvantage if his scores point in the unfavourable 
direction. In order to inspire complete confidence 
regarding freedom from any responsibility for the 
.scores, a number of investigators asked their 
subjects not to sign their names while answering a 
pers- onality questionnaire. For examp'e, Knight and 
Franzen14 report data from three experiments in each 
of which the subjects were told specifically not to 
14 
Knight, F. g. and Franzen, R.H. , "Pitfalls in 
rating schemes, Journ. Educ. Psychol., 13, 1922, 
pp. 204-213. 
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sign their names. But in each case the results 
"illustrate a naive over- rating of one's self, or 
'putting the best foot forward' proclivity, or of 
underestimating one's fellows ". The authors conclude 
that in these errors of self -estimate "no conscious 
desire to cheat any one else could have operated 
greatly ". It seems probable, therefore, that the 
subjects are unwittingly influenced by the tendency 
to falsify their questionnaire responses, since it is 
present even when they. are given the opportunity of 
revealing themselves without disclosing their 
identities. Some investigators report contrary 
results. For inst ̂ nce, Olson15 applied the WoodWorth 
Personal Data Sheet to the same groups of subjects 
once under anonymous condition and then under 
signature and found that they reported more 
symptoms when they did not sign their names. But 
this result does not prove anything beyond this that 
the anonymous condition was more favourable to the 
makirg of frank responses; we can not conclude that 
the responses made under this condition were truthful 
in the sense of approximating to the actual attitude 
and behaviour of the subjects. Spencer16 also used 
15 Olson, WW., "The waiver of signature in personal 
reports ", Journ. Appi. Psychol. , 24, 1936, 
pp. 442 -4511 
16 Spencer, D., "The frankness of subjects on 
personality measures ", Journ. Fduc. Psychol. , 
29, 1938, pp. 26 -35. 
4 
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this technique in applying a questionnaire on 
"personality conflict ", though, unlike Olson, he did 
not use the control condition. He asked his subjects 
not to sign their names 9nd "convinced them that their 
papers could not be identified ". In addition, he 
required. his subjects to indicate, after they had 
answered the questionnaire, how they would have been 
affected had their signature been called for, by 
checking against: (1) I would have left some of the 
questions unanswered; (2) I would have answered. some 
of the questions untruthfully; (3) I would have answ 
ered truthfully but resentfully; (4) I would have 
willingly answered truthfully. He four that 21.90 
per cent. checked (1)) 8.90 per cent. checked (2) , 
12 per cent. checked (3), and 43.20 per cent. checked 
(4). The mean "conflict score" of those who 
confessed to the temptation to answer some questions 
untruthfully (2) was the highest, while that of those 
who checked against (4) was the lowest. Spencer 
concludes, "Therefore it is inferred that had the 
instrumentTeen taken under signatures, not only 
would a larger number of the subjects have resented, 
evaded and falsified some of the items, but such 
deceptions would have been greatest among those 
having the greatest amount of conflict. In short, 
the purpose of the instrument - the measurement f 
conflict - would have been invalidated ". But 
Spencers conclusion seems unwarranted to as for 
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there is no evidence to show how far the opinions 
expressed byythe subjects regarding the truthfulness 
or untruthfulness of their answers, in the hypothetica 
situation of being called upon to disclose their 
identities while responding to the questionnaire, 
agreed with what they would have actually done. It 
appears to us that Spencer has committed the logical 
fallacy of petitim principii by taking for granted 
what he is required to prove. He seems to argue to 
the truthfulness of self -ratings made under anonymous 
condition on the evidence of the subjects' own 
expressed opinions regarding the likely character of 
their réactions under signature. But the question 
remains, what guarantees the truth of these opinions? 
Moreover, Spencer's results, instead of supporting 
his contention, may be taken to go counter to it. 
He discovered that those subjects who obtained highest 
conflict scores also confessed to the temptation to 
distort or falsify their responses had they been 
asked to sign their names. On the other hand, those 
who made the lowest conflict scores, and these formed 
the largest group, professed perfect invulnerability 
to any such temptation. Does it not show that a 
fairly large percentage were victims of the tendency 
to make flattering responses even in the anonymous 
condition2 For, it may be suggested that this group 
which endeavoured to create the impression of an 
unstinted regard for truthfulness, checked the 
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questionn aire items in a more favourable manner sand, 
thus, obtained the lowest conflict score. On the 
other hand, the group which frankly admitted its 
liability to untruthfulness in the hypothetical con- 
dition was not deterred from answering some questions 
in the unfavourable manner and, consequently, 
obtained the highest conflict score. We have still' 
another reason to suspect Spencer's conclusion. He 
has pointed out in defence of the technique that 
analysis of the responses made by the subjects 
revealed that they gave "unfavourable" answers 
relating to many confidential matters in sufficiently 
large percentage. But he used no control group, one 
which were aksed to sign their names. It is difficult, 
then, to determine as to what extent the occurrence 
of unfavourable responses was due to the care taken 
in impressing upon the subjects that their answers 
remained unidentified. We feel justified, therefore, 
in taking the view that the anonymous condition does 
not ensure truthfulness of the responses, for we have 
reasons to believe that the distortions are not always 
brought about wittingly. 
Other investigators also support our view 
that the falsrification of questionnaire responses is 
not necessarily a deliberate contrivance. It may 
come about writhout the subject consciously desiring 
to do so. Thus, Lastell and Bennet17 make a similar 
17 Lastell, H.R. , and Bennet, E. , "A comparison of 
scores on two measures oÇ personality ", Journ. 
.ibn. Soc. Psychol. , 28,, pp. 459 -461. 
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observation on their results of the administration of 
the Bernreuter Personality Inventory to a group of 
college students. They remark, "A weakness of the 
questionnaire method that was brought up repeatedly 
'by the students who assisted with the experiment 
involved the accuracy of report on the items of the 
auestionnaire. This is the inaccuracy or error of 
judgment that may arise (1) from conscious protection 
of sensitive personality areas with consequent under- 
statement of painful admissions, (2) from unconscious 
protection of these sensitive areas with consequent 
understatement, and (3) from too great awareness of 
minor weaknesses of personality with consequent over- 
statement. Numerous tudents felt that one or mare 
of these factors had decreased the accuracy of their 
reports even thoughithey were in co- operative 
sympathy with the experiment". Similarly, Feder and 
Baer,18 while searching for the cause of the divergenc 
between Questionnaire scores and clinical diagnosis, 
entered into extensive discussions with their subjects, 
after the latter had taken the Bernreuter Personality 
Inventory. They observe, "An interesting point made b 
many of the subjects warms the fact that they themselve 
were not conscious of the occurrence of certain behavi 
on their parts and, therefore, gave, without at all 
18 Feder, D.D., and Baer, L.B. "Acomparison of test 
Records and clinical observations of personality 




intending to, a .picture of their behaviour that often 
did not square with that which was objectively observe 
by their associates. " 
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DETERMINANTS OF ERRORS of SELF -ESTIMATE. 
An excursion into the nature of the relation 
between reliability and validity of questionnaire 
responses suggested to us that their low validity, 
despite a high reliability, is due to the errors to 
which the self -estimates of personality are 
generally, and often unwittingly, exposed. We also 
noted that these errors are systematic. That is why 
they do not affect the consistency of the responses. 
In other words, they indicate the operation of some 
underlying disposition, or dispositions, which 
persistently influence the subjects' responses from 
an unknown area of the personality. We describe 
these influences as "errors" because they bring about 
à distortion of what the subjects' responses would 
have been had: the variable that is intended to 
measure been alone at work in producing their 
responses. Our next task is to undertake a quest of 
these dispositions, determine their character and de- 
limit the precise sphere of their influence. We 
begin, for this purpose, with an enquiry into the 
nature of self- estimate which, leading through a 
consideration of the sources of its inaccuracies, 
will finally take us on to the determination of the 
dispositions that underlie them. 
Self- estimates are judgments by the individual 
on his own self. They are judgments about one's own 
78. 
thoughts, feelings, beliefs, conduct, ideals, 
aspirations, likes and dislikes, aptitudes,abilities, 
skills, etc. Like all judgments, they are offered 
as truths, statements about facts, not as imaginative 
constructs and autistic creations. They are acts of 
inference which derive from evidence based on past 
experience. The individual making a self -estimate 
searches his mind to determine how he has thought, 
felt and behaved in some past situations, so that 
these might give him an indication of how he is going 
to think, feel or behave in some future situation. 
As we have already pointed out, the questionnaire 
does not provide the subject to act in a concrete 
given and judge, thereafter, how he 
acted. It suggests verbally to him a hypothetical 
situation and calls for an estimate of his behaviour 
in that situation on the ground of his experiences of 
similar situations. The subject can accomplish this 
task only if he can succeed in recalling situations 
from his past life and also what his reactions to 
them have in general been. For this, among other 
things, he should possess in the main two capacities: 
(1) He should have been able to observe his responses 
when they actually occurred in situations similar to 
those suggested, and (2) He should be able to recall 
them - which presupposes his ability to retain their 
memoty trades - in order to make a judgment in their 
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light at the time of answering the questionnaire. 
Observation of one's own behaviour is not as 
easy a matter as it looks amt first, specially, when 
the behaviour does not involve only its overt motor 
components, but also the underlying subjective pro- 
cesses like intention, inclination, ideas, attitudes, 
etc. These latter are the materials one tries 
cheifly to tackle in introspection and the difficulties 
of introspection are too well known. These difficulti 
multiply indefinitely when one's introspection is not 
limited to the observation of some of the gross 
segmental aspects of sensations and images which 
dominated the so- called structural psychology for 
some time, but seeks tó grasp also the emotional 
and conative patterns of the personality for which 
Aveling coined the expression: the ''orectic factors ". 
It is the orectic factors which are mainly salvaged 
by the personality inventories - the impulses which 
overtake a person in a given situation, the motives 
which incline him in one didtion rather than another, 
the moods which colour his thoughts, the sentiments 
which tie him to this or that object, the emotions 
which overpower his wits and paralyse his actions, 
the feelings which spur him on or deter him from a 
given course of activity. It requires a special 
gift to apprehend these elements, the gift of self- 




Contemporary writers on psychology of 
personality have !designated the power of self - 
knowledge as the capacity for "insight ". "The term 
is an extension of the psychiatric usage according to 
which a mental patient who knows that he (and nôt 
everybody else) is suffering from disorientation and 
aberration, is credited. with insight. Also in the 
domain of normal personality insight means freedom 
from self- deception. "1 Allport reminds us not to 
confuse this usage of the term with the meaning given 
to "insight" by the Gestalt psychologists in 
connection with their treatment of "learning" or with 
its common meaning, i.e. "clear comprehension ". He 
uses another expression, "self- objectification" and 
considers "insight" as its correlative. By self - 
objectification Allport means the capacity to view 
oneself in perspective, with that attitude of detach- 
ment and relative freedom from bias which character- 
ises an onlooker who is trying to view disinterestedly 
the behaviour of other persons, or more properly, a 
physical or chemical process in the outer world. It 
is the capacity to draw the line between the self as 
2 
1 Allport, G.W. , Personality, p. 220. 
2 Ibid, pp. 220 -225. 
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the observer and the self as the object of observation 
to have a "complete sense of proportion concerning 
one's own qualities" and to be "able to perceive their 
incongruities and absurdities in other than their 
customary frame of reference ". A person who 
can attaiijsuch a level of self -objectification does 
not merely behave but also knows that it is his 
behaviour with the total setting of impulses, desires, 
emotions and thoughts under which it actually occurs. 
He possesses a, relatively, adequate consciouensss of 
himself with all the stirrings and drives of his 
personality, his inferiorities, jealousies and unsocial 
tendencies. Murray3 uses the term "objectivity" to 
indicate the same process. He maintains that a 
person endowed. with "objectivity" is "impartial, 
detached, disinterested, tolerant, understanding ". 
"He is aware of and responds to the conditions that 
actually exist. He observes the plain facts, 
clearly differentiates between what is subjective 
(within his self) and vhat is objective (outside his 
self), is conscious of his inner feelings and 
inclinations and regards them with an impartial eye. 
He observes behaviour accurately and makes reliable inferences 
as to the probable inner states of other people. He h 
true insight and is able to interpret the motives 
of his acquaintances reasonably well." Itappears 
3 
Murray, H.A. Explorations in Personality, p.221. 
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that Murray extends the meaning of "insight" to cover 
also the capacity for estimating the abilities and 
traits of other persons - to make accurate judgments 
about others as about oneself. 
That insight plays an important part in deter- 
mining the accuracy of self -estimate has been stressed 
s 
many a time by psychologists. Thus Symond4 gives 
three reasons why questionnaires are more reliable for 
adults than for children, the first one being "their 
superior a bility to observe and introspect". 
Similarly, Allport5 pointing out the defects of the 
questionnaire method, remarks, +Another serious 
limitation is the fact that virtually all paper and 
pencil questionnaires may be falsified by the subject 
if he chooses to do so, or if he is deficient in 
intelligence or insight. " Likewise; Cattell6 maintain 
that "the observations by questionnaire live in a 
world of their own condition edby systematic errors ". 
One of the sources of errors, he suggests, is "lack 
of self- knowledge on the part of the subjects - i.e. 
lack of correct appreciation of their own behaviour ". 
It is difficult to determine what is the 
precise character of insight. At first sight, it 
5 
4 Symond!, P., Diagnosing Personality and Conduct, p.158 
5 Op. cit., p. 381. 
6 Cattell, R.B., Description and Measurement of 
Personality, pp.342 -343. 
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appears to partake of the nature of a cognitive 
ability since it seems to resemble what Spearman? 
enunciates as one of the three "ultimate qup,lita.tive 
laws which prescribe how new cognition is ever 
possible ". As he says, "Of these laws the first may 
be formulated by saying that a person has more or less 
power to observe what goes on in his mind. He not 
only feels but also knows that he feels; he not only 
strives but knows that he strives; he not only knows 
but knows that he knows." But Spearman is not very 
clear about what he really means by this, so- called, 
"power of self -comprehension ". We can not decide 
whether he meant by it only the capacity of self - 
consciousness, the knowledge of oneself as the 
knowing, thinking, feeling subject, or also the power 
of self -knowled ge - the ability to comprehend the 
- contents of one's experience at a particular moment 
of consciousness., In the latter case, Spearman's 
very classification. of the three laws of neogenesis 
breaks down. As Wyatt8 points out, the law of 
comprehension of experience can not have a separate 
basis from the second law, namely, that concerning the 
"eduction of relation ", for comprehension of 
experience implies the cognizing of relations between 
7 Spearman, O., Abilities of Man, p.164. 
8 Wyatt, H.G. , Psychology of Intelligence and Will, 
pp. 81 -85. 
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the items of experience. Wyatt has, further, shown 
a gross inconsistency between Spearman's theoretical 
formulation of the laws of neogenesis and his 
statistical findings. These laws embody the 
functions of "general intelligence" or "g`" which 
Spearman statistically proves to be the irreducible 
unitary factor safturating all cognitive processes. 
But how cari he talk of three c ualittive laws of 
neogenesis and also insist upon the qualitative 
sameness or uniqueness of "g "? As Wyatt observes, 
"The statistics point to a single factor, the 
analysis to three ". In view of this element of 
vagueness, therefore, which characterises Spearman's 
formulation of the laws of neogenesis, we do not feel 
justified in identifying the capacity of insight with 
his "power of self -comprehension" and determining its 
nature in the light of the psychological character 
assigned by him to the latter. 
We may possibly view insight as akin to 
Wedeck' s9 "psychological 'bbility ", "an ability to 
judge correctly the feelings, moods, mtivations of 
individuals ". We can not get at these directly; in 
order to judge their "expression ", "it is necessary 
to understand personality; and this understanding, 
according to McDougall, Spearman, Bain and others, is 
9 Wedeck, J., "The relationship between personality 
and psychological ability ", Br. Journ. Psychol. , 
37, 194-7. 
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reached in terms of the judge's experiences of 
himself. To assess correctly the personalities of 
a wide variety of people, the judge must have 
attained a high degree of complexity, as well as 
insight into his own motives; he would need tó have 
a high 'psychological ability'." It follows that, 
since to judge correctly about others one should have 
insight into his own experiences, "psychological 
ability" is a function of insight or at least the two 
are very closely connected. In order to determine 
whether "psychological ability" involves simply 
"'general intelligence' or also a special ability or 
factor ", Wedeck devised eight tests involving 
identification of tendencies, emotions and traits 
portrayed by pictorial representations or character 
sketches, discrimination between true and false 
utterances and solution of problematic social 
situations. He intercorrelated the scores in these 
tests along with those in three non- verbal and four 
verbal tests of "gr and subjected the correlation co- 
efficients to a method of factor- analysis earlier 
suggested by Spearman in his Abilitites of Man. 
He discovered three factors: (l), "g ", which 
saturated all tests, (2) "V" or verbal factor which 
loaded all except the three non- verbal tests, and (3)41" 
which loaded two of the verbal tests and six of the eight 
proposed tests of "psychological ability ". Four of the 
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Matter, all of which were pictorial representations, 
were more saturated with "Y" than with "g" or MT". 
Wedeck concludes that these "mast be regarded as 
providing almost as good a measure of "y"as the non - 
(verbal tests provide a measure of 'g'." He tries to 
'explain the common loadings of "v" and "V" in two 
of the verbal tests and all of the tests of psychological 
ability by referring to the "emotive, orectic, affectivé- 
conative, or non -symbolic" function ofianguage. He 
maintains that his subjects' scores in the "lj " test do 
not merely indicate their amounts of the psychological 
ability but also their degrees of "affectivity or 
emotivity ". 
Wedeck's results do not seem to be very 
satisfactory in view of the fact that the" "V'rfactor 
has high loadings in only three out of the eight tests 
of psychological ability and 0 loadings in two of them, 
which he explains as due to the "use of an admittedly 
complicated rating scheme ". The three highly "Y " 
saturated tests are very similar in content, being 
pictorial representations of some transient moods or 
feelings or more enduring tendencies. That being so, 
their high saturation with "f"' may be alternatively 
explained as due to "overlapping specifics ", rather 
than any "special ", or better, "group" factor (Wedeck 
refrains from the use of this expression, which is, 
nonetheless, implied in the discussion of his results) 
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f "psychological ability ". His data, then, fail to 
establish the existence of "psychological ability" 
functioning in the correct judgments "regarding the 
feelings, moods, motivation of individuals" and 
involving, bes -ide the factor of "general intelligence ", 
a special factor, called. "Wby him. The only result 
which Wedeck succeeds in establishing is that the 
hypothetical ability involved in judging attitudes 
and motives of individuals must consist, among other 
possible components, of the function of general 
intelligence, since all his proposed tests of "psycho- 
logical ability" are uniformly saturated with "g ". 
In a much earlier study, Vernon10 has taken 
up a more comprehensive and systematic investigation 
of the characteristics of a good judge of oneself and 
of others. He noted. some "definite indications in 
the work of other investigators, which he used in 
organising his own research. He says, "We know that 
he" (rater of other people" must be well acquainted 
with the ratee, but not too intimate with them.....; 
and we know that the more intelligent are better-able 
to rate intelligence, etc. ; i.e. , that there is some 
relation between the possession of a. trait and the 
ability to judge it. Goodness of self- estimation, 
10 Vernon, P.E. , "Some characteristics of the good 
judge's of personality ", Journ. Soc. Psychol., 
4, 1933, pp . 42 -58. 
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we also know from Allport' s , Hol7 ingworth' s and 
Jackson's work, correlates with raters' ''Intelligence', 
t'insight' , 'sense of humour', and negatively with 
'conceit' ". In his own investigation, Vernon, used 
a very wide variety of situations calling for the 
assessment of qualities and traits of oneself as well 
as of others. To examine the correctness of these 
assessements, he employed both "subjective ", - "con- 
formity to group opinion" - and "objective" criteria, 
thouu;h some of his "objective" criteria do not really 
seem euch to the writer as they involved scores on 
the "Study of Values ", "paper- and -pencil test of 
'Extraversion- Introversion ", "musical questionnaire," 
etc., which, determined byJthe subject's opinion on 
himself, were no less 'subjective than the opinion of 
others about him. Perhaps, when Vernon conducted 
his investigation, the subjectivity of the question- 
naire method was not pushed into as strong relief as 
it is today. He also tried to determine the 
characteristics of his judges in the three areas, 
namely, intellectual, social, and artistic, whose 
bearings on the goodness of judgments on personality 
were indicated in previous researches. 
Vernon's results do not indicate any general 
factor of "intuitiveness ". "The remarkable lack of 
agreement between different tests of judging person - 
slity suggests that, in an ordinary sample of the 
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population, we are not justified in assuming the 
existence of a general trait of 'intuitive ability'." 
Further, "A judge may successfully judge A' s 
'intelligence', but fail on B's, or he may rate A's 
or B's 'sociality' correctly, but give very poor 
ratings on their 'efficiency'. His judgments depend 
on his whole past experience with A and B, or with 
other people who were like or unlike them in respect 
to intellectual, social and efficient activities, 
also on the total situation at the moment of judging." 
It will be noted that this conclusion is not very 
pertinent so far as judgment on self is involved; 
the inherent "intimacy" or "closeness" of one's own 
personality contrasts with the intrinsic "foreign - 
ness" and "distance" of other personalities which 
raise much too high the premium on the "specificity" 
of the contact and "context of experience" in the 
correct assessment of others. Vernon established 
some positive results also which have a more direct 
bearing on our problem. He found uniform association 
between rating and test of intelligence, rating on 
insight, and rating on the sense of humour, on the one 
hand, and goodness of judgment on self, on the other. 
He observes, "The good self- raters are characterised 
by sense of humor Good self- raters moreover possess 
superior abstract intelligence. They are neither 
superior nor inferior in TE.eneral. artistic level". 
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Another11 invebtigation has demonstrated a 
close relation between lack of insight and liability 
to projection. We postpone its consideration tá a 
detailed examination in the sequel in connection with 
our own measure of projection. 
We note to our disappointment that the above 
discussions do not take us any'headway so far as the 
determination of the nature of "insight" is concerned. 
The question whether insight is in intellectual 
ability or an intuitive function, an innate endowment 
of the organism or an acquired capacity, the unique 
possession of some individuals or a common "continuum "]] 
of personality admitting of individual differences, 
remains unanswered. Nevertheless, we have been able 
to secure some definite indications concerning the 
more common correlates of insight. Possession of 
insight goes together with ,tsuperior abstract 
intelligence" and "sense of humour ", and is negatively 
associated with liabilityto projection. Thus, 
Allport12 observes, "Psychologists know that there are 
certain correlates of insight, qualitites that people 
of good insight possess. For example, those who are 
aware of their own objectionable qualities are much 
less likely to attribute them to other people, that 
is they are less given to projection than are those 
11 Sears, R.R. , "Study of projection ", Journ. Soc. 
Psychol. 1/936, 7. pp. 151-163. 
12 Op. Cit. p.222. 
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who lack insight. Also, people of good insight are 
known to be more intelligent than the average." "But 
the most striking correlate of insight is the sense 
of humor." As a measure of insight, A1lport -3 
commends the relation between rating by self and 
rating by others, a criterion which has been frequently 
employed but because of its "subjective" taint has 
seldom produced reliable results. As we will be 
noted below, our own use of this method has also 
proved it to be equally inconsequential. 
We have indicated above that besides one's 
limited. capacity for Itself- observation ", which has 
been generally described as "lack of insight ", there 
may be the defects of memory, its unfaithfulness, 
which have equally adverse effects on the reliability 
of his self -estimates. The subject has to recall 
his customary conduct or attitude in regard to the 
situations portrayed by the questionnaire items. 
But he may or not be successful at that. He may have 
omitted some important aspects of his behaviour, 
because his memory failed him, and altered or 
modified others. Bar.tlett,14 in his pioneer work 
on 
remembering, has described the various forms of 
unwitting distortions to which memory is subject, like 
13 Ibid. p. 221. 
14 Bartlett, F.C., Remembe oing. 
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"omYlission ", "substitutiön ", "rationalization ", 
"imoortati.on ", etc. , which are brought about under 
the influence of "affective attitudes ", "preformed 
tendencies ", "individual and common interests and 
feelings ". These elements of distortion involve 
memory as a rule, as Bartlett15 .remarks, "Even when 
material is arranged in a short series, is small in 
bulk, and simple in objective structure, and when is 
so given that an observer knows that he will be asked 
to describe it later, remembering is unwittingly 
affected by unwitting transformations: accurate 
recall is an exception and not the rule ". Bartlett 
maintains that memory is a process of "active 
construction" which does not merely bring about a 
transformation of the materials contributed from the 
original experiences, by altering, tra.nspos.-ing, and 
rebuilding them, but also by "inventing" and 
"importing new material from a. different setting ". 
For the purposes of recall, present perceptions are 
not merely fitted into already formed apperception 
systems, but the "process of fitting is an active 
process, depending directly upon the preformed 
tendencies and bias which the subject brings to his 
task. "16 The influence of the emotional patterns 
on 
memory, which has been made for so much in recent 
15 Op. cit. p.61. 
16 Ibid, p.85. 
93. 
works on memory, specially after the lead given by 
Freudian Psychology, has received its recognition by 
Bartlett also. He observes, "Material which is a 
direct or an indirect stimulus to pre- formed interests 
is sure to reappear. Probably the affective tone 
accompanying the arousal of such interests is an 
important factor here. The affect is certainly not 
always pleasing. On the whole the results indicate, 
that, if the interesting material is pleasiní;, the 
change is in the direction of elaboration and. develop- 
ment; if the affect is displeasing, distortions are 
most likely to occur. "17 But, above all, Bartlett's 
chief contribution lay in the strong relief into 
which his researches have pushed the social influences 
on remembering that prepared the way for the shift of 
emphasis in social psychology from the innate factors 
within the organism, which were much too inordinately 
stressed. by McDougall, to the environmental f-ctors 
operating upon the individual as the member of a group. 
The interpretation of the experimental data which 
Bartlett has described in the first part of his 
book markedly points to the conclusion that "both the 
manner and matter of recall are often predominantly 
determined by social influences. In perceiving, in 
imaging, in rememberin groper, and in constructive 
work, the passing fashion of the group, the social 
17 Ibid. p.90. 
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catchword, the prevailing approved general interest, 
the persistent social customs and institutions set 
the stage and direct the action.i18 Further, "What 
is initially outstanding and what is subsenuently 
rememberer9 are, at every age, in every group, and 
with nearly every variety of topic, largely the 
outcome of tendencies, interests and facts that have 
had some value stamped upon them by society. "19 
These social determinants are "liable to lead- to an 
inventive and to a constructive type of remembering 
20 
which may disturb the accuracy of recall." 
Bartlett's researches go a long way to stress 
the dynamic character of all remembering, but do not 
provide any usable conceptual framework which could 
be applied to the interpretation of the wide variety 
of transformations that memory of necessity undergoes. 
His work is more of the factual character and though 
he seeks to formulate a theory of remembering, the 
latter merely reiterates the organisational character 
of the memory processes. Moreover, his researches 
dealt, directly, with the recall of objectively 
observed materials, and only indirectly apply to , the 
recall of introspective contents, i.e., the 
recall, 
not of the impressions received from objects 
or 
18. Op. cit. , p. 244. 
19 Ibid, p. 253. 
20 Ibid, p.264 
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situations, but also of the feelings, attitudes, 
ideas, impulse kvoked within the subject by those 
situations. These latter are more directly tackled 
by Freudian Psychology, which on this account merits 
R more special mention. 
Freud noted, in the course of his earlier 
clinical work, the intimate relation between psycho- 
pathological formations and the disturbances of the 
memory function which subsequently resulted in his 
formulation of the concept of repression as the 
"corner stone" of psychoanalysis. Repression has 
been described by Freud as a process of "active" 
forgetting brought about by a situation of conflict 
between antagonistic tendencies within the organism. 
The conflict arises, most commonly, from the incom- 
patibility between the social standards of morality, 
religion and culture, which every individual builds 
uplin thtb course of his development, and the pressing 
internal demand for the immediate pleasureable 
gratification of crude, primitive, asocial impulses 
which, like "the sunshine and the climate ", form the 
common heritage of mankind. Any situation of life 
may provide the occasion for this cónflict, but, 
according to the more orthodox psychoanalytical 
tenbts, the strongest conflicts have arisen in the 
infancy of an individual and these provide the schema 
for all later conflicts. Biologically, the 
most 
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appropriate way of resolving a similar conflict due 
to outer stimuli making antagonistic demands upon the 
individual, is the so- called abient or avoiding 
reaction to one of the contending stimuli. But when 
the scene of the conflict is one's own mental life, 
the avoidance amounts to a turning of consciousness 
away from the conflicting mental content, as one 
turns his back on a disgusting spectacle. This 
turning of consciousness away from one's own tendency, 
desire, thought, emotion, etc., has been called 
repression. It is the process of withholding for a 
certain mental content its access to consciousness. 
Since the repressed contents are intrinsically 
opposed to the cultural standards, their emergence 
into conscioúsness persistently exposes the individual 
to the danger of conflict. Hence, the act of 
repression is not a temporary makeshift, but a 
permanent measure which precludes the repressed 
content ever from the possibility of future conscious- 
ness. The result is that the memory of that content 
together with its associated experiences is lost and 
the possibility of its recall is nullified. But 
why, one may ask, is the impulse, attitude, desire, 
or thought precluded from the possibility of recall 
when its mere emergence in consciousness would not 
necessarily drive a person to a socially undesirable 
course of conduct? All conscious ideas or desires 
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are not translated into action; many may only be 
entertained and inhibited. The answer given by 
Freud is that the emergence of the undesirable idea 
causes a sense of "shame, loathing and disgust" to 
the individual and would accordingly be painful to 
him. To avoid the pain, the idea is permanently 
withdrawn. 
Further elucidation of the process of con- 
flict, the occurrence of shame and disgust, and the 
agency of repression, led Freud to consider the 
'structure of the psychic personality. He conceived 
of a tripartite division within the psyche which he 
called the Id, Ego and the Super Ego.21 & 22 The Id 
is the reservoir of the primitive, anti -social or 
asocial, instinctual inherited drives and is governed 
exclusively by the need for immediate pleasureable 
gratification. The Ego is the system of controlling, 
organising, and adaptive functions of the personality. 
It is governed by reason and is kept, through the 
perceptual system, into close touch with reality. 
Consciousness is an attribute of the Ego functions. 
The Super ±go is the precipitate of the social 
authorities that have loomed largely during the 
infancy of the individual and comprises chiefly of 
inhibiting influences operating against the freedom 
21 
Freud, S., Ego and the Id. 
22 
Freud, S., New Introductory Lectures on Psycho- 
analysis: The Anatomy of the Mental Personality, 
pp. 78 -106. 
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of the Ego. Its principal functions, accordingly, 
are to observe and punish the Ego. It demands of 
the latter an unhesitating allegiance to an obsolete 
and irrational code of morality and culture which was 
imposed upon the individual as a child and was sub- 
sequently incorporated within his psyche as a part of 
the Super Ego system. The Super Ego's punishments 
are meted out to the Ego not only for the latter's 
actual misdeeds. To the Super Ego, an intention is 
tantamount to action, and its penal exacerbations 
ensue even when the Ego allows an "objectionable" idea 
to cross consciousness. These are experienced by the 
Ego as excruciating feelitgs of shame, loathing and 
disgust - the feeling of guilt. The Ego's resort to 
repression is to avoid this suffering to itself. 
It, consequently, permanently guards against the 
emergence of its "undesirable" inclinations, 
attitudes, longings, impulses and their associated 
memories. Thus, the individual's inability to recall 
those aspects of his past behaviour that are socially 
undesirable and morally or ethically despicable, is 
explained by Psychoanalysis to be the result of 
repression. 
But repression is not the only influence that 
wrecks the memory process. There are other functions 
which operate not in the deletion of the contents of 
past experience, but in their alteration and dis- 
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figurement. These have been designated as the 
defence mechanisms of the Ego. As we have seen, the 
Ego resorts to repression to defend itself against 
its exposure to the criticism of the Super Ego. It 
cam secure the same result by hoodwinking the Super 
Eo, i.e., by disguising and disfiguring the undesira- 
ble impulses past recognition. The most common way 
of doing this is the "dream work' with its use of 
symbolic expression and the various mechanisms which 
work to transform the "latent unpalatable content" 
into the "manifest" surf ace formation of the dream, 
those of dramatization, condensation, displacement 
and secondary elaboration. 
23 
Another example of the 
detour adopted by the Ego to avert the offence of the 
Super Ego is found in the so- called psychopathologies 
of every day lif e,24 the various parapraxes like 
slips of pen, slips of tongue, etc. Dream -work and 
the parapraxes occur on the normal plane. But other 
means of defence adopted by the Ego handicap the 
individual in his day to day adaptations of life. 
These are the so- called symptoms of abnormality - the 
psychoneurosis and the psychoses. 
The various mechanisms of defence, which 
operate both at the normal as well as the abnormal 
levels of behaviour, have not been very clearly 
classified by the Freudians and sometimes it is 
3 Freud, S., Interpretation of Dreams. 
24 
Freud, S., Psychopathologies of Everyday Life. 
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difficult to determine their precise implications. 
Some of the principal ones are : - Displacement, 
condensation, undoing, isolation, reaction- formation, 
projection, rationalisation and identification. A 
consideration of these will show that they all 
operate in the same general direction, namely, the 
,effacement or disfigurement of some original undesira- 
ble mental contents or their replacement by another 
which is more satisfactory and "acceptable ". Thus 
"displacement "25 functions in "transvaluation" of 
mental contents. An element that was originally 
Iprepotent but "unacceptable" "surrenders to another ", 
that wa's trivial and insignificant in the economy of 
the individual's mental life, its "wholewolume of 
cathexis ". The latter attains an urgency and 
importance which originally belonged to the former, 
and is pushed into consciousness as such. Similarly, 
condensation, 26 which is one of the very common 
methods of distortion and is encountered more 
frequently in dream- a.nilysis, operates in presenting 
to consciousness an image which shares the character- 
istics of a host of distinct and disparate ideas and 
perceptions fused on grounds of very trivial 
similarities. Condensation is the principal 
mechanism behind much of the "inventiveness" of 
27 
recall. Likewis e, reaction- formation functions in 
25 Freud, S., Collected Papers, Vol. II, p.33. 
26 Freud, S., Interpretation of Dreams, p.269. 
27 Freud, S. , Collected Papers, Vol. II, p.48. 
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the reversal of an impulse, attitude or idea into its 
opposite, as, for instance, when the attitude of 
repulsion, hatred or egoism may show itself in 
exaggerated attraction, love, or altruism. Reaction - 
formation is a process of self -deception and its 
purpose is to hide from a person his own unacceptable 
tendencies. Undoing and isolation also serve 
similar functions. The first one consists in the 
tendency to treat an event of one's own life as though 
it had never happened. In "undoing" the memory of 
an unpleasant experience, instead of being transformed, 
or substituted, is altogether done away with. 
"Isolation" deprives an unpleasant memory of its 
"affective cathexis " and robs it-of its associative 
connections. For instance, the obsessive ceremonials 
which the compulsive neurotic is called upon to 
repeat appear to him, because of the process of 
isolation, meaningless sequences of behaviour, in 
spite of their compelling character. In projection,29 
;there occurs a replacement of internal perceptions or 
'feelings by external perceptions. "An internal 
perception is suppressed, and instead its content 
after undergoing a certain degree of distortion, ^nters 
consciousness in the form of an external perceptive ". 
The external world is invested with one's own 
28 Freud, S., Inhibitions, Symptons and Anxiety, 
pp. 73 -76. 
29 Freud, S., Collected Papers, Vol. III p.452. 
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undesirable attitudes and tendencies, because their 
recognition in oneself causes the feelings of guilt 
and shame. Rationalization30 is the process of 
attributing an acceptable motive to a behaviour whose 
real motive is concealed from consciousness. It 
operates as a "screen' over the undesirable 
tendencies of a person and thus facilitates their 
inaccessibility to consciousness. Unlike the other 
mechanisms, identification is not only a contrivance 
for defence. According to Freud, 31 it provides the 
: "motif" for the formation of the Super Ego. Freud 
describes the Super Ego as "the precipitate of 
abandoned cathexis " . He thinks that the passage 
into the ° latency period" is marked by the renuncia- 
tion of "object- cathexis"' - the parental love- object, 
which is followed by the "internalisation" of the 
latter within the psyche. This process, he calls, 
"secondary identification" as distinguished from the 
earlier primary one which prompts the child to 
imitate the pmrrent of the same sex in order to "step 
into his shoes". As a result of "identification" 
and "internalisation" or " introj ection" , the Super 
Ego occupies in the psychic system the position that 
was previously vested in the parental authority. 
Identification also explains why in the course of 
30 Freud, S., Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 330. 
31 Freud, S., Ego and the Id., pp. 34-53. 
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development, the diverse social influences, effects 
of training, education, etc. , which are at first 
encountered in relation to the outer situations, are 
gradually entrenched within the personality and 
determine the habitual conformity of the individual's 
behaviour to the cultural standards of his group. 
The consideration of the Ego's relation to 
the Super Ego and of the mechanisms of defence 
utilised by the former, shows clearly that the defence 
mechanisms are centred, one and all, in the need to 
maintain the social and cultural standards which no 
longer operate upon the adult individual, generally 
speaking, as outer demands, but as endopsychic forces 
that beacon to him what is "acceptable" and what is 
"unacceptable" and drive him to seek the former and 
avoid the latter. In other words, the need for 
social conformity appears to be fundamental about the 
defence mechanisms; or, their raison d'etre is the 
fulfilment of the urge, engendered in the course of 
development, to avoid infringement of the social, 
moral, ethical and cultural values organised within 
the psychic system. 
The need for "social conformity" as a pre - 
potent force in personality organisation has been 
generally recognised by psychologists. Thus Angyal32 
32 
Angyal, A., Foundations for a science of Personal- 
ity, Chap. VI, "The trend toward homonymy," 
pp. 157 -207. 
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points out "The integration of the individual into 
the social group, the assimilation of its culture, 
of its written and unwritten codes are just as 
essential for the personality development and 
personality organisation as any of the physiological 
function ". Angyal calls this tendency which leads 
the individual to transcend his "autonomous" demands 
- that drive him to achieve "domination of the 
surroundings" - and seek union with larger "super - 
individual units ", as the "trend toward homonomy". 
"The trend toward. homonomy - the tendency to conform 
to, unite r-1ith, participate, and fit into super- 
individual wholes - is a powerful motiating force in 
". The Inomonous trend does drive the 
individual merely to adjust himself to the cultural 
patterns of the group as "outside " factor.. ̂,it also 
brings about the assimilation and integration of the 
cultural standards within the organism. "They become 
internal factors, a part of the person. The person 
thus acquires an individual culture, his personal 
standards and definitions of doing things in the 
proper and improper ways.g This organisation of the 
cultural patterns within the individual, Angyal thinks, 
"roughly corresponds to what in psycho -analysis 
is Galled the 'super -egos ". It seems to the writer 
to correspond as well to what McDougall33 calls the 
33 McDougall, W. , Energies of Men, pp. 232 -235. 
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"sentiment of self- regard" and Allport34 designates 
as "the desire for self- esteem ". Similarly, Murray35 
refers to a group of needs in the individual which 
are directed toward securing "social approval ", 
recognition and status, and avoiding humiliating 
circumstances, loss of esteem and. prestige. He, 
thus, speakd of the need to "excite praise and 
commendation. To demand respect. To boast and 
exhibit one's accomplishment. To seek distinction, 
social prestige, honours or high office ". He sets 
on the other side the complementary "need" for 
"inviolacy" - to avoid situations of humiliation, 
failure, shame and rebuke, the lowering 
respect", the desire to preserve one's "good name ", 
"to be immune from criticism ", to conceal humiliating 
facts and disfigurement. 
Turning to our task, we have noted Bartlett's 
emphasis upon the influence of the cultural patterns 
on the "manner and matter of recall ". We have also 
seen how according to psycho -analysis the need to 
confòrm to the social standards engineers the various 
mechanisms of defence that disturb, very conspicuously, 
the memoty functions, if the "overt" compliance to 
these standards is not easily accessible to 
the 
individual. And we have marked likewise that 
the 
34. Op.. cit. pp. 169-173. 
35. Op. cit. , p. 81. 
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"need for social conformity' , or "the trend toward 
homonomy ", has received common acceptance from psycho- 
logists, in one form or another. de look now for its 
bearing on our own problem - the reliability of self- 
estimates in regard to personality questionnaires. 
It seems likely to us that those persons who tend to 
make flattering responses to the personality 
questionnaires and thus portray a more agreeable 
picture of themselves, not only for the experimenter 
but also for their own view, are influenced by the 
need for social conformity which due to the peculiari- 
ties of their development has adopted for its fulfil- 
ment a rather unusual channel of expression. In- 
stead of prodding them on to seek the more tangible 
ways of attack upon "reality' and achieve success in 
overt behaviour, it has suggested to them a more 
facile method of attaining satisfaction by resorting 
to the world of imagination and phantasy, a method 
that retains its attractiveness for them in virtue of 
its proved value during their infancy. It works in 
two ways. Firstly, by its great potentiality for 
diminishing the power of "reality testing", it 
facilitates the shutting out from perception and 
memory of those attitudes and tendencies which offend 
cultural and social standards. It, thus, preserves 
the individual's personal integrity and self -esteem, 
despite his occasional lapses in the socially 
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unacceptable directions. We are reminded of 
Nietzsche's very pregnant aphorism: 91my memory says 
'I have done it'. My pride says 'I could not have 
done it', and remains inexorable. eventually my 
memory yields." But mere denial or repudiation by 
the individual of certain trends and activities does 
not always contribute to his sense of personal value, 
which, as we noted above, is inextricably woven with 
social worth and status. We find, therefore, the 
second may open to him, namely, substitution of the 
repressed blemishes and falterings by fantastic 
representations of his abilities and prowess which 
attain such a strength and vividness as to claim the 
factual value possessed by images of real happenings. 
!e call this process imaginative compensation. We 
use the term "compensation' in the Atli erian sense, 
which always signifies the restoration of a state of 
inferiority, defect or insufficiency by a condition of 
superiority, power and self -sufficiency. Since we 
presume a similar process at work in the "falsifica- 
tion" of the questionnaire responses, we choose to 
call it by the same name. We anticipate a possible 
objection, namely, the ;'falsification" may not 
necessarily work in the favourable direction. Some 
persons give evidence of a marked tendency to put 
themselves on the debit side, to under- estimate their 
- abilities and magnify their disabilities. But we 
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find this direction of the "reversal" to be very rare, 
as compared. to the inverse tendency to screen one's 
"unacceptable" desires, inclinations, thoughts and 
actions and paint oneself in the most attractive 
colours. Every investigation, within the writer's 
knowledge, ha.-3 shown a preponderance of the latter 
tendency, whatever the character and composition of 
the group studied.. Thus Hollingworth35 remarks,-- 
which can be supported by scores'of other studies, 
some of which we have already quoted in our earlier 
discussions concerning the tendency to "fake" responses 
"traits which kr4 should on the whole characterize as 
'.a.mirane'traits are over- estimated.; traits 
ordinarily classed as 'reprehensibb' are under- 
estimated." Our own results also consistently point 
in the same direction. Our reason for calling this 
process "imaginative" is quite evident. As we have 
noted, the person who'tfakes" questionnaire responses 
does nót seek compensation in the world of reality, 
for otherwi se he would not have been motivated to 
"falsify" the -responses that is, to credit himself 
,ith dualities and virtues the opoosite of which are 
true of him as a matter of fact, unless he was doing 
so wittingly and deliberately which is not, generally, 
the case when a subject's co- operation has been 
ensured.. Tt is his access to the avenues of fan- 
35 Follingworth, F.L. , Judging Fuman Character, o.52. 
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tastic gratification, which brings about in the 
individual the suspension of the function of reality - 
testing and makes it possible for such make- believes 
to flourish. 
In conclusion, our enquiry has led us to 
think of two main determinants of the inaccuracy of 
self -estimates. (1) Lack of insight or deficiency 
of the power of introspection or self- observation. 
A person may not possess insight arid, therefore, his 
recollections in the questionnaire situation may lack, 
definiteness, clarity and detail, and, thus, become 
readily amenable to distortion. (2) Need for social 
conformity. A person may unwittingly suppress 
certain facts about himself which are inconsistent 
with the ideals of conduct and propriety that he 
applauds, and, therefore, their recognition may 
expose him to a sense of social insecurity by 
"frustrating the trend toward homonomy" , the trend to 
furthering "supra- individual" ends and purposes. Or, 
his memory, more faithful to his need for preservation 
of personal integrity than to the claims of reality, 
uiay substitute images of thoughts and deeds which 
conform to the standards of efficiency and rectitude 
consciously professed by him. The first process we 
have named "denial" or "repudiation', though we could 
as well designate it as repression, as has ordinarily 
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been done. We prefer the first term bec<use the 
suppression of "unacceptable facts" in aswering 
questionnaires may be both witting or unwitting, but 
repression is always treated as an unconscious proce,s, 
while 'repudiation" may be conscious as well. The 
second process we have called "compensation" 
(imaginative), for reasons stated above. Further, 
we think that the two processes require to be brought 
nut more specially than merely subsumed under the 
need for social conformity as we have done in the 
above classification. They are more important for 
our purpose than the need itself, since they deter- 
mine the manner of its expression in which we are 
mainly interested. Had the need for social conform- 
ity of necessity adopted these channels of expression, 
the statement of the need would imply them also. But 
the need may also be fulfilled by resorting to overt 
activities which are directed to achievement of success' 
in the real world. Subjects for whom this mode of 
expression is customary, may not show any considerable 
influence of either "repudiation" or "compensation ", 
while answering a questionnaire. It is only those 
subjects who have no or little access to the 
"explicit ", motor avenues of satisfaction and resort 
to the "implicit" imaginative channels provided in 
phantasy life, that might utilize the mechanisms of 
"compensation" and "repud nation" while reacting in 
the questionnaire situation. Also, these two 
processes though stemming from the same source, may 
not necessarily be combined, so that a person's 
reactions to self- inventories may be affected more 
prominently by the one than the other. Hence, we 
set them as two separate variables, a treatment which 
is subject to confirmation by our experimental 
findings. Thus, we may lay down, finally, three 
variables to account for the falsification of 
questionnaire responses. (1) Insight. (2) Repud- 
iation. (3) Compensation (Imaginative). 
In the second part of our investigation we 
deal with the methods we have adopted for measuring 
the variables we have theoretically postulated and 
determining how far they are to be taken on empirical 
grounds as systematic factors in the personality 
which influence the questionnaire responses of some 
persons to the extent of affecting their accuracy. 
As we will see, to this end we have assembled on 
'logical grounds a set of measures of each variable 
and subjected their results to the test of associa- 
tion. 
CxAPIER 3. 
Aim and Method. 
Our theoretical enquiry led us to postulate 
three fundamental factors which may be presumed to 
affect the reliability of self -estimates, specially, 
in the questionnaire situation. de decided to call 
them: (1) Insight; (2) Tendency to Compensation; 
(3) Tendency to Repudiation. Our next task was to 
determine how far our theoretical assumptions were 
supported by empirical observations. In other words, 
how far we had tangible evidence of an objective 
character to carry us to the inference of correspond -¡ 
ing real tendencies or dispositions of the organism 
which manifest themselves in a regular, unified and, 
hence, predictable manner. The term "real" is used 
here not in the metaphysical or the crude phenomenal 
sense, but as equivalent to "fact' as used in science. 
A "fact" in science is an ordered system of originally 
discrete and disconnected observations of natural 
events. At a higher levi of scientific generalisa- 
tion, fact" means the very principle of generalisa- 
tion and the expression "scientific facts" stands for 
conceptual unities or uniformities applicable to 
certain classes of experiential data; electrons and 
ions are facts in this sense; they are realities 
which are never to be delivered in sense perception. 
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Accordingly, when one talks of "real' dispositions in 
:the personality, he means unities or patterns which 
set order, uniformity and stability in the otherwise 
dissimilar, ever- changing, transient responses of the 
organism. Such unities are not, obviously, to be 
encountered at the level of overt behaviour. They 
are only to be inferred from the sequences of 
behaviour manifestations. The basis of this 
influence is, as Cattelll suggests, "covariation" of 
"operationally remote segments of behaviour ". "The 
unity of a set of parts is established by their 
moving, i.e., appearing, changing, disappearing 
together, by their excercising an effect together, 
and by an influence on one being an influence on all." 
The quantitative representative of this "going- 
togetherness" is the statistical concept of correla- 
tion, which, iL its turn, is a mathematical statement 
of the logical method of "concomitant variation". 
Hence, Cattelll adds that "a unity can be detected 
from the fact that the constituent behaviour elements 
in a trait covary. That is to say, if we take a 
number of different individuals and measure them with 
respect to the elements A, C, K and T, the person who 
has a lot of A will also have a lot of C, K, and T, 
while the -person who is low in K will also be low in 
1 Cattell, R.B., Description and Measurement of 
Personality, p. 71. 
2 ïbid, p. 72. 
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A, C, T. In other words, scores in A will correlate 
highly with C, K, and T scores." But it is possible 
for A, C, K and T to consist of very similar elements 
of behaviour. If this be the case, then evidence of 
covariation between them would not indicate a real 
"unity' of behaviour, or, what Allport calls, "a 
higher level generalisation', or Stagner calls "a 
high order habit". In order to furnish sufficient 
evidence for such inference, the elements should in 
themselves be highly dissimilar. As Cattell3 
remarks, "Our practical standpoint has been in the 
first place that a unity exists when parts appear 
together, change together, and mutually influence one 
another, when viewed in different contexts and from 
different angles." This again reminds us of the two 
forms of the method of concomitant variation, namely, 
(1) which presents the variable each time in the same 
set of accompanying circumstances, and (2) which 
involves instances of the variable under diverse or 
charging circumstances. The inconclusiveness of the 
evidence afforded by the first form is well known to 
any student of logic. 
In order to apply the test of covariation to 
the factors postulated by us, we were required to 
discover and devise several sets of situations which 
did not have the same contents and which called for 
3 Ibid, p. 93, 
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diverse operations from the subjects. In other 
words, we had to devise sets of measures of each 
variable, which had different component items and 
also involved dissimilar types of responses. The 
assumption was that if the results of the variant 
measures presented an adequate evidence of inter- 
relationship, then we could infer that the trait or 
variable underlying them was a persistent, stable and 
unified element of the personality. 
To achieve our aim we formulated a number of 
paper and pencil tests for each variable. The con- 
tents of the tests were different, so were the 
responses called for by them, except that majority of 
'them involved self -ratings by the subjects. At firs 
our procedure may appear highly erroneous, since the 
main point we have tried to make in our earlier 
discussion is the inherent subjectivity and consequent 
unreliability of the self -rating technique, the 
personality questionnaire serving as its most con - 
spicuous exaaple. How could we, then, be justified 
in using the same technique in examining our hypo- 
thesis concerning the factors underlying the unrelia- 
bility of self- estimates? Our answer is that the 
outer form of the technique should not beguile us 
into mistaking its real r_ature. The fact that two 
measuring devices are apparently similar does not 
testify to their real identity, for the nature of 
a 
scale is determined by the "evidential value :one 
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ascribes to the resultinE scorest.4 If the responses 
of a self -inventory are interpreted as statements 
about the real conditions of tue subjects, their real 
attitudes, thoughts, inclinations and behaviour, that 
is, accepted at their face value, the measurement is 
tainted with subjectivity and liable to extreme 
errors. But the responses can also be interpreted 
as units of overt behaviour manifested in standard 
objective reactions - like underlining or encircling - 
to the elements of a given defined situation. In 
this case the same scale is converted into a measure 
of objective behaviour very similar to laboratory 
experiments. Our method came under the second 
category. de assembled in a test materials of a 
certain defined character, for example, a number of 
desirable and undesirable trait -names, and asked our 
subjects to check themselves against each (Appendix 
VI ). Instead of interpreting the checkings 
as indications of the presence or absence of the 
traits concerned in a certain subject, we treated 
them as indicative of the subject's habit of assigning 
more or less of the undesirable traits to himself. 
Thus interpreted, our tests are similar to the 
measure of the strength or weakness in a rat, for 
instance, of the habit of avoiding an obnoxious 
stimulus, indicated by the number of times the 
4 
mysenck, H.J., Dimensions of Personality, p. 61. 
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stimulus is avoided in an experimental set -up. It 
may be remarked here that the analogy does not hold 
in strictness, for the undesirability of a trait is 
a matter of subjective evaluation which may vary with 
individuals. Therefore, when for scoring we count 
the number of checkings on undesirable traits, the 
units used for this purpose are not homogenous, or of 
the same hind, as the electric shock, for example, 
which the rat encounters each time is is placed in 
the experimental situation. Consequently, it may be 
urged, our measures are not as objective as claimed. 
But we will see in the sequel that the evaluation of 
our items as desirable or undesirable, for instance, 
is so highly conventionalised as to leave no room for 
disagreement among our subjects with regard to the 
respective characterisation of the items as such. 
Our units of measurement are not open, therefore, to 
the charges of heteroseneity or lack of objectivity, 
which pre - eminently fit the personality inventories. 
;e feel justified, thus, in claiming for our method 
the maximum degree of objectivity that can be achieved 
for any method operating within the confines of a 
paper-and,-pencil set -up. There was only one 
exception to our general procedure, namely, the rating 
'method which we used in determining the self -other 
ratio as a measure of insight (Appendix IV) . 
Our measuring devices are not only objective, 
they possess another peculiarity. They are 
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disguised" measurements which are so devised that 
the subject can not get at the purpose for which they 
are used by the experimenter. Such disguised 
measurements are specially adapted to obviate the 
defects of self -ratings. As Symond observes, It is 
probable that disguised questionnaires are more valid 
than those which are straightforward in their 
approach. The straightforward attack partakes too 
much of the nature of a test and permits the pupil to 
control his responses to fit his purpose. The chi s- 
guised questionnaire, in which the pupil is told he 
is doing one tiling, but in which the items are so 
selected that the result yields a measure of something 
else, is the ideal situation for measuring conduct. "5 
ie have already noted, self - ratings are invariably 
attended with the risk of the subject's making a false 
estimate. This risk is maximum in the subjective 
questionnaires- the personality inventories - which 
are interpreted as true statements about the subjects' 
attitude and conduct. The subject is thrown on his 
guard, wittingly or unwittingly, not to give himself. 
out without reservation. This risk is minimum, on 
the other hand, when the situation of the test is so 
devised that the limiting circumstances apply not to 
the real design of the experiment but to its osten- 
sible and fictitious purpose. Accordingly, though 
we used the self -rating method, the 'variable which 
5 
Symond, P. , Diagnosing Personality and Conduct, 
P. 143. 
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'was intended to be measured in our scales was corn,- 
pletely covered over by the sort of camouflage which 
involved the direction as well as the outer form of 
our tests. Its expression in the tester's responses 
was thus iam :une from the effect of the inhibitory and 
distorting influences to which the self -ratings are 
generally subject. For instance, when we asked our 
subjects to rate themselves on some common lapses of 
conduct (Appendix IX), their attention was diverted from 
.the main purpose of the measurement by the emphasis 
on the desired accuracy of their judgments, the 
secrecy with which their responses were to be treated, 
etc., the result being that the subjects thought that 
information regarding their conduct and disposition 
in the suggested situations was solicited and were, 
presumably, motivated by the need for the exercise of 
discretion. By no stretch of imagination could they 
surmise our real but concealed lach of concern and 
indifference to the picture of their personality that 
their ratings contrived to put up. In fact, the 
greater the reservation they used in giving out the 
truth about themselves, the more their responses ful- 
filled our objective. de got confirmation of this 
view by actual enq ecies from some of our subjects, 
after they had been through the tests. ;'fie found 
invariably that they were ignorant of the real 
purpose of the experiments and accepted them under 
the garb in which they were presented. 
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:!e find Allport6 discouraging the use of the 
disguised method. He says, 'scales are usually given 
a misleading title that veils their true purpose from 
the subject; or irrelevant questions ("jokers") may 
be introduced to throw the subject off guard. A few 
scales are so elaborately disguised that their basis 
'of scoring lies entirely beyond the subjects' power 
of comprehension or control. But these deceptions 
often interfere with the validity of a test, and on 
the whole work much better with children or stupid 
people than they do with alert adults for whom the 
tests are usually designed". He further adds, "Much 
better than reliance on deceptive tricks is a straight, 
forward effort to secure honest and unstinted co- 
operation from the subjects." Perhaps, Allport has 
made short of the distorting influences which operate 
upon many subjects in spite of their conscious desire 
and effort to co- operate with the experiment. :Ie 
can .not, also, see eye to eye with him in his limit- 
ing the efficacy of the disguised method to its use 
among children or mentally deficient persons. In 
fact, the concealment of the purpose of the measure- 
ment is to be commended not only with respect to the 
paper and pencil personality tests but also in 
certain cases when objective measurements in the 
laboratory are involved. Test sophistication has 
always been noted as a notorious factor .lowering 
the 
Allport, Cz.i. Personality, p. 450. 
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efficiency of almost all experiments in psychology. 
Even tests of ability in which the individual can not 
exercise, to his advantage, much control over his 
responses, have been noted to be vitiated by sophis 
stication. Sophistication disturbs, more conspicu- 
ously, measurements in the emotional field, whatever 
the method of measurement applied, ranging from the 
"scientifically imperfect" and "subjective" methods 
of clinical appraisements of personality to the most 
"perfect', "objective" observations in the controlled 
set -up of the laboratory. Those subjects who know 
about the purpose, for instance, of the Rorschach, or 
airray's Thematic Apperception Tests, can hardly be 
of much use in examining the diagnostic values claimed 
for these instruments. Similarly in the field of 
laboratory experiments, if a person is aware that a 
certain set -up is intended to measure, for instance, 
"suggestibility', or "frustration tolerance', or 
"level of aspiration", perhaps he would prove most 
unfit to serve as a subject for the experiment. It 
follows that in all such experiments, iamespecti ve of 
the age or mental level of the subject concerned, the 
intention of the experimenter has to be most 
cautiously guarded. 
:urray7 emphasises the efficacy of the dis- 
guised method to the extent of including its recommen- 
dation among the principles that were adopted in 
7 Lurray, I3. A. ,Explorations in Personality, p. 
28. 
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organising the experiments reported by him and his 
colleagues. He says, "The subject's mind should be 
diverted from the true purpose of an experiment. 
This is usually accomplished by announcing a plausible 
but fictitious objective. If a subject recognizes 
the experimenter's airs, his responses will be modi- 
fi ed by other motives; for instance, by the desire 
to conceal the very thing the experimenter wishes to 
observe." 
The group included in our investigation was 
comprised of the psychology students of the First 
Ordinary Class of the Edinburgh University. The 
total strength of the class was two hundred and fifty. 
The tests were given on four days, one hour each, at 
a week's interval. The groupings of the tests for 
the res- oect;ve periods were made to afford ample time 
for each subject to complete the tests. The attend- 
' ance on the various days ranged between hundred and 
thirty -six and hundred and sixty -three, the average 
number being one hundred and fifty -five - one hundred 
and fourteen women and forty -one men. Keeping in 
view that the tests were not compulsory, the fairly 
large proportion of the attendance bears testimony to 
the interest the tests evoked in the students. 
The very select character of our sample and, 
specially, ecia the fact of our subjects being students of 
psychology, do not detract from the value of our work, 
as it might ordinarily be supposed. Rather, the 
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fact that our subjects being used to such testing 
programmes reacted to the tests less emotionally and 
less reservedly than is ordinarily expected, is turned 
to good account in view of the airs of our investiga- 
tion. If we succeeded in indicating the influence 
of the expected variables in a situation where the 
tests were taken more unreservedly, we could be 
assured of their operations in a random group with 
little or no psychological enlightenment, and which 
may plausibly be expected to take the tests more 
reservedly. As we have incidentally remarked above, 
while discussing our methods of investigation, the 
stronger the subject's defences against making a 
truthful unemotional response to the tests, the 
greater the chances of his betraying himself with 
respect to the looked -for variables. 
For scoring, we assigned equal weight to each 
item and thus computed a subject's score by counting 
the number of items checked by him. Our scores are, 
therefore, what have been described as "rav' scores. 
Cattell8 calls such measurements as "interactive', 
which are "the foundations of all others". He adds, 
"Here the measurement is ''raw' score, i.e., a perfor- 
mance reckoned in units of the physical world - e.g. 
seconds (reaction time); energy (blood metabolic 
rate) ; number of words recognized (scholastic test); 
number of friends visited in one week ('sociability'), 
8 
Op. cit., p. 148. 
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etc.". Our ourpose was only to ascertain the 
influence of the expected variables on the question- 
naire responses rather than to determine, more or 
less, definitely the amount of this influence, or to 
construct standardised scales for the measurement of 
these variables. Hence, it was neither worth while, 
nor permissible within the limitations of our under - 
taring to attempt a systematic conversion of the raw 
scores into the so- called "normative" scores, not to 
mention the number of measures we employed many of 
which were specially devised for the situation. 
To determine sex differences, we scored the 
answers of the two sexes separately. For testing 
the significance of the differences, we calculated the 
ratio of the obtained differences to the standard 
errors of the differences, generally described as the 
"critical ratio", or "t". Vernon9 has observed that 
i4it is customary to place very little reliance in a 
difference when its t is less than 2, or preferably 
3". Garrettl 
0 remarks, "For many years it has been 
customary for investigators to demand a critical ratio 
of 3 or more before a difference is regarded as sig- 
nificant. This extremely high standard sets up a 
confidence level which is probably not warranted in 
many experimental studies." e decided to take an 
9 Ver11o1Z, P.E., The ï,: easurement of Abilities, p. 95. 
10 
Garrett, H.E., statistics in Psychology and 
Education, p. 208. 
125. 
obtained difference as highly significant when t was 
3 or more and significant when it was 2 or more. We 
will note that the method of "critical ratio" is not 
admissible, strictly speaking, in case of some of our 
measures, for the distribution. of scores in those 
'measures is not normal. However, we did not get 
abnormal distribution in case of those measures that 
we had taken from standardised tests, like "self - 
rating on abilities " (Tables 31 and 33,pp.196 l -198) and 
"self- rating on lapses of conduct" ,(Table 53, p.z2'' ) 
Also, in case of many of those measures which we 
specially prepared for this research, the scores 
clearly tended to normal distribution, for instance, 
"self- rating on desirable traits, List 3 (Table 37, 
p.204), "self-ratings on undesirable traits, List 3 
(Table 58, p. ¿31), "interest in occupations of high 
social standing" (Table 46, p. 115) , and "repugnance 
scores" (Table 11, p.157 ) , though some of the dis- 
tributions were heavily skewed. On these grounds, 
it seemed possible to presume that a revision of the 
component items, refinement of the method of scoring, 
and the use of a random or unselected sample might 
have resulted in a normal distribution in respect of 
the remaining measures also. But it was not possible 
within the limitations of this enquiry, to decide this 
issue finally. Je, accordingly, presumed a normal 
distribution, in an unselected group, for those 
measures also in respect of which we obtained 
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apparently abnormal distributions. Nevertheless, Fre 
did not reel confident in applying the "product - 
moment" method of correlation for testing the rela- 
tionship between the various measures, the determina- 
tion of which formed the essential part of our 
enquiry. As Vernon observes, "Product-moment 
should be used whenever the variables to be compared , 
show reasonably normal distributions." We therefore 
12 
used the method of chi square for deciding whether 
'a statistically significant association existed 
between the scores made by our subject in the various' 
measures. 
For applying the chi square test, we used a 
2 x 2 table with salit at the median. The advantage 
of arranging the frequencies in a 2 x 2 table was that 
we could also get a definite indication regarding the 
positive or negative character of the association 
from the pattern of the algebraic signs of the 
differences between the obtained and expected fre- 
quencies shown in the four cells of the table. 
11 
Vernon, F.E. , Notes on Statistical ,íethods in 
Common Use in Vocational and Educational 
Research, III, Correlation_Jethods, p. 1. 
12 
Lindqui_st, E.F., Statistical Analysis in 
Educational Research, pp. 41-43. 
CJAPTER 4. 
iaeasuxes of Insight. 
The correlates of insight, as indicated in 
previous investigations (cf. p.90 ) , are (a) Intelli- 
gence, (b) Projection, and (c) Sense of humour. In 
addition, Allport suggests a more direct measure of 
insight as the ratio between what one tiiihks of 
himself and what others think= of him. In what 
follows, we have adopted a measure of each one of 
'these variables, except sense of humour, and deter- 
' 
?pined their interrelationships. ,/e could not 
succeed in discovering or devising a paper- and -pencil 
test of sense of humour that could be .taken by our 
subjects, like our other measures, in the form of a 
self -inventory, but could nonetheless be amenable to 
objective interprition by us. Tests of humour, 
that have been used in previous investigations do not 
afford any information regarding a person's actual 
reaction to the verbally represented situations of 
humour, except under the laboratory set-up, but only 
provide expressions of his opinion about his sense of 
humour or the various degrees of uhumourousnessh' of 
the situations depicted. These opinions, like all 
other subjective estimates are liable to the sane 




As a measure of intelligence, we used the 
zcores of our subjects in Group Test 33 of the 
National Institute of Industrial Psychology, which is 
administered every year to the Psychology Students of 
the First Ordinary Class of the University of Edin- 
burgh. Test 33 is a standard verbal test of 
intelligence of proved value. The test is comprised,) 
of five sub -tests: Opposites, Analogies, Mixed 
Sentences, Completing Sentences, and Reasoning, the 
general character of which is too well known to merit 
description. The test has been standardised for 
adult use. The quoted reliability co- efficient for 
the test is "9 or higher" .12a 
de could also use the scores in two other 
tests of intelligence that were applied to our sub- 
jects, during the course of our investigation, by the 
Applied Psychology research unit of the Medical 
Research Council. These tests were Test AH4 and 
Test AH5, verbal and non-verbal, respectively. Being 
very similar to the standard verbal and non- verbal 
group tests, these too need no special description. 
je used the scores in these tests as a check on the 
results of Test 33 as administered to our subjects. 
The f allowing Table shows the frequency dis- 
tribution of the scores in Test 33 made by the male, 
the female and the total groups:- 
12a 
Intimated by the psychologist in charge of the 
'lest Service Section of the National Institute 













































157.83 + 1.19 
ed. 161.56 155.63 159.81 
6.D. 15.26 14.87 15.03 
The following histogram is plotted from the 
distribution of the total group:- 
. .. ...... 
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4:1147111' 
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Table 2 shows that there is no significant 
difference between the Means or the S.D's of the two 
sex groups. The critical ratio in either case is 
less than 2. 
Table 2. 
Obt. Diff. Diff . t 
Means 2.31 2.57 0.9 
5.:0's 0.39 1.81 0.2 
Tables 3 and 4 show the frequency distribu- 





Male Female Total Group 
120-129 4 2 6 
110-119 7 10 17 
100-109 8 16 24 
90-99 9 18 27 
80-89 10 26 36 
70-79 2 16 18 
60-69 2 5 7 
50-59 2 
2 
N 42 95 137 
Mean 97.83 + 2.42 90.40 T 1.58 92.68+ 1.35 
s. D. 15.68 15.39 1.86 5 
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37.81 + 0.71 
8.09 
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The following histogram is plotted from 
Table 4:- 
In order to determine whether the distributions 
of scores in the three tests of intelligence conform 
to the normal curve of distribution, we estimated the 
degree of skewness of each. As is evident from 
Table 5A, the skewness is not significant in any 
case:- 
Table 5A. 
Test Sk. S.E. 3k. t 
No. 33 -2.38 1.63 1.4 
rì1I4 2.00 1.90 1.05 
A5 0.98 0.96 1.02 
The distributions of scores in the three tests, 
thus, approach closely the normal distribution. For 
computing their intercorrelation we, accordingly, 
used the Product Moment Method. Correlation co- 
efficients between Test 33 and the two other tests 










0.58 + .04 
0.61 + .04 
The amounts of the correlation. coefficients 
are fairly large and compare well with the validity 
coefficients reported for other standardised tests of 
intelligence. 
Since J'est 33 is a standardised test of 
reputed value and came out to be a fairly satisfactory 
measure even in our investigation, we could employ 
our subjects' scores in this test for the purpose of 
comparison with all the measures we used in this 
research, over and above the special use we made of 
it as a measure of insight. Accordingly, we will 
have frequent occasions to refer to the results of 
Test 33 in connection with the treatment of the 
results of our other measures. 
Projection. 
Projection is treated in psychoanalytical 
literature as one of the defence mechanisms which is 
brought into opi\e.ation by the Ego when it is exposed 
to the threat of Super Ego punishment for associating 
.itself with an unacceptable _Td tendency. As a 
'result of this process, as we have already quoted 
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from Freud. (p.101 ), the "internal" perception is 
transformed into an "external perception' and the 
"objectionable" idea or wish, instead of being recog- 
nised in oneself, is attributed to an external 
individual and attended to as such. Allport 3 
defines projection as "a type of self- deception by 
which a person ascribes his own secret thoughts, 
wishes and shortcomings to another person. If one 
castigates others, one is thereby saved from the 
painful duty of castigating oneself." Murray 
14 
uses 
the term in a wider sense as descriptive of "ego - 
centricity in perception, apperception and conception ", 
and calls it projectivity. He remarks, "The S 
(subject) projects into others his own wishes, fears 
and interests andpet theories," and further adds 
some of the "common signs" of "projectivity" which 
identify this process with all varieties of illusory 
perceptions and delusions encountered, generally, in 
pathological beha -our. The opposite of "projecti- 
vity", urray calls "objectivity" whicrr, as we have 
noted above, is similar to Allport's "self- objectifi- 
cation' . Stagner15 also gives a wide meaning to 
projection. He says, "Projection,_is the term 
apv)lied to behaviour in which the "self" is treated 







cit., p. 172. 
cit., p. 220. 
cit., p. 102. 
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respond to our own (subjective) ideas, feelings and 
beliefs as though they were the (objective) ideas, 
feelings, and beliefs of others." de do not feel 
justified in using 1"projection", in this wide sense. 
.ProjectionT' originated as a dynamic concept and to 
use it as a description for the installation of any 
"subjective" content into the external world treated 
as belon; ing thereto, would rob the concept of its 
dynamic setting. 
To avoid confusion, it seems necessary to make 
ourselves clear about the distinction between the use 
of the term "projection" in relation to the so- called 
"projection tests ", like Rorschach's ink blots or 
Murray's Thematic Apperception tests, and its use as 
a mechanism of defence. The projection test 
involves the use of a technique which brings about an 
unwitting upsurging of the unconscious repressed 
impulses of a person when he is called upon to give 
structure to an unstructured or partially structured 
material visually or auditorily presented. It evokes 
the externalisation of one's attitudes and disposi- 
tions through the agency of an externally presented 
'medium. The latter provides a "screen" on which 
one's hidden thoughts, aspirations, and interests are 
thrown and concretized. This process is similar to 
' "dream work", which also involves an externalisation 
of one's "la-tent' mental contents that are dramatized 
on a hallucinatory stage. Projection when used as a 
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defence mechanism involves a human medium which is 
invested with "unacceptable" qualities really 
possessed by the projecting individual but without 
his consciousness of possessing them. 
Turning to the experimental work on projection, 
we find that apart from the clinical investigations, 
there is, within the writer's knowledge, only one 
notable statistical treatment of projection which has 
often been quoted by psychologists, namely, Sears'16 
study of projection. de propose to examine this 
rather closely before we pass on to the measure of 
projection used by us. 
Sears opens his account with the definition of 
projection given by Healy, Bronner and Bowers as "a 
defensive process under the sway of the pleasure 
principle whereby the Ego thrusts forth on the 
external world unconscious wishes and ideas which, if 
allowed to penetrate into consciousness, would be 
painful to the Ego". Sears remodels this definition 
as: "A wish, attitude, or habit hierarchy which is 
not compatible with other attitudes or habits of an 
individual may be attributed by that individual to 
other persons rather than to himself providing he 
lacks insight into the fact that he himself possesses 
the trait in Question." Sears, then, advances a hypo- 
thesis that "any persistently motivated habit or 
16 
;Jears, R.]., " -.:5tudy of Projection," Journ. Soc. 
Psychol., 1936, 7, pp. 151-l63. 
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attitude may be projected if it is sufficiently 
reprehensible to be refused recognition by its 
possessor". To test his hypothesis, Sears selected 
out of 31 "obnoxious non- sexual" character traits, 
those which ranked highest when rated for reprehensi- 
bility by 36 students. These were the, so- called, 
"anal character traits" of stinginess, obstinacy and 
orderliness. The various gradations of each trait, 
ranging from one extreme to the other, were laid out 
on a seven -point rating scale. The descriptions of 
the positions on the scale do not appear to the 
- writer to be as precise and clear as necessary for a 
rating scale. Sears had 96 students rate themselves 
and their associates, in three groups of 37, 38 and 
22 each. Their ratings were converted into measures 
of three variables: (1) the degree to which each 
subject demonstrated a given trait, which constituted' 
his "true measure" of the trait; (2) the amount of 
the trait attributed by him to others; and (3) the 
presence or absence of insight with respect to his 
possession of the trait. Sears found no association 
in the total group between the amount of possession 
of a trait and that of its attribution to others. 
But when he split up the group on the basis of 
presence and absence of insight, he noticed a tendency 
for the group lacking insight to rate others as 
falling: in the same extreme of the distribution to 
which they themselves belonged, i.e., if their "true" 
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amount of a trait lay on the favourable side of the 
distribution, their average rating of others on that 
trait also fell on the same side. idore explicitly, 
persons rated obstinate by others, and, therefore, 
presumed to be such, had a tendency to rate others 
also as obstinate, and, conversely, those rated 
generous, tended to rate others as such. Projection, 
Sears concluded, therefore, operates in either 
direction and does not involve merely the attribution 
of unacceptable tendencies but also the attribution 
of desirable traits. 
Beside projection, Sears discovered another 
namic process" which he called "contrast formation" 
He noticed a negative relation between the possession 
of a trait and its attribution to others in the group 
having insight into their possession of that trait. 
llore explicitly, a stingy person knowing himself to be 
such, tended to regard others as generous, while a 
tidy person with the knowledge of the fact, showed a 
tendency to rate others untidy. This result seems to 
us to be very curious. Freedom from prejudice while 
appraising one's own qualities is not expected to 
deprive one of the capacity to the unbiased assessment 
of others' characteristics. As thrray17 points out, 
what 
. 
we have quoted also before, a person endowed 
With objectivity" is "impartial, detached, disin- 
terested, tolerant, understanding ". He "is aware of 
17 ïbid, D. 221. 
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and responds to the conditions that actually exist. 
He observes the plain facts, clearly differentiates 
between what is subjective (within his self) and what 
is objective (outside his self), is conscious of his 
inner feelings and inclinations and regards them with' 
an impartial eye. He observes behaviour accurately 
and makes reliable inferences as to the probable 
inner states of other people. He has true insight, 
and is able to interpret the motives of his acquain- 
tances reasonably well." Thus, according to Murray, 
a person endowed with insight, or "objectivity', 
manifests its possession not only in relation to his 
own personal qualities, but also when viewing the 
traits and abilities of other persons. Moreover, 
the occurrence of "contrast formation" is antagonistic 
to the function of insight, emen when considered with 
regard to oneself. For, we actually encounter such 
a process in one who is burdened with an exaggerated 
sense of his defects and disabilities - a highly 
emotion-laden person, which causes to magnify in hiss 
eyes the opposite virtues of others by way of 
contrast; a person according to whom whatever is 
enviable in >ersonality is "given" to others. Ors. 
we may have an opposite case of contrast formation in 
one for whom the insatiable need for self -glorification 
demands for its relief the perception of others as 
"tiny mortals" infected with an ineradicable perver- 
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sity and eternal damnation.18 Undoubtedly, neither 
type can be justifiably credited with insight. This 
curious result may be the outcome of some imperfection 
in Sears' investigation. As a matter of fact the 
article in which he reports his investigation suffers 
from the lack of some important statistics. He does 
not give us any idea regarding the distribution of 
the scores in the various variables that he uses. 
Most of the correlation co- efficients showing the 
association between the variables are of negligible 
size, while others, also being rather low, tell us 
nothing in the absence of a test of significance. 
Above all, the rating method notoriously suffers from 
numerous drawbacks and does not produce satisfactory 
I 
results unless treated with maximum caution. 
To examine the operation of projection, we 
devised a situation different from that of Sears'. 
As we have pointed out (p.116 ) our method of 
approach was more akin to the experimental objective 
type and, consequently, we were more interested in 
the behaviour of our subjects than the meanings that 
they put to their behaviour. The conception of the 
true measures' of a person's trait as determined by 
rating was naturally repugnant to our approach. 
Moreover, in spite of the wider meaning which has in 
18 
yreud, S., Collected Papers, Vo. III. 
.paranoia, op. 390 -415. 
A Case of 
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some cases been attributed to projection, we preferred 
to use this term in the more restricted sense. AS we 
have noted above, it seemed more plausible to us that 
projection is exemplified in attributing those traits 
to others whose possession in oneself is unconsciously, 
withdrawn from consciousness as it occasions to the 
Ego a sense of guilt and shame or loss of security 
and prestige. 
To secure a measure of projection we used two 
variables: (1) the attribution of traits to oneself, 
and (2) the attribution of traits to another person, 
each of which was further classified into: (a) the 
attribution of desirable traits to oneself, and (b) 
the attribution of undesirable traits to oneself, on 
the one hand, and (c) the attribution of desirable 
traits to other persons, and (d) the attribution of 
undesirable traits to other persons, on the other. 
For our material, we selected eighty trait nacres from 
the list prepared by Âllport and Odbert.19 4e were 
guided in our choice by two principles: (1) the trait - 
name was to be definite and easy to understand, and 
(2) synonyms were to be avoided, for which we asked 
the help of the staff of the psychology department of 
the University. The approved trait names were intro- 
duced with a simple straightforward direction 
19 
llport, G.','. , and Odbert, H.S., Trait -names, a 
psyçho- lexical study. Isychol. Monogr., 1936, 
47, PP.171- -211. 
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(Appendix I,). The subject wrote the names of two 
persons well known to him and also his own name. IIe 
was asked to check those two persons and also himself 
on each trait and to encircle the letter "0", printed 
against each name along with "2', , if he thought that 
one or both of the persons named possessed the given 
trait, and to encircle "O' if he thought that the trait 
belonged to himself as well. Thus, the subject was 
every time judging about his own possession of a 
trait along with its possession by another person. 
This situation appeared to us to be very favourable 
to the operation of projection, if projection 
characterised the individual concerned. 
Our list of trait names, to which we will sub- 
sequently refer as List 1, comprised of both desir- 
able and undesirable characteristics arranged in a 
random order. To identify the two types and set 
them apart for separate scoring, we had 24 post- 
graduate students rate them as (1) commonly treated 
as strongly reprehensible, (2) commonly treated as 
undesirable but not strongly reprehensible and, (3) 
commonly treated as desirable (Appendix II). There 
was perfect agreement between all raters with respect 
to the following desirable traits : - 
1. Affectionate. 13. Hospitable. 
2. Benevolent. 14. Just. 
3. Broad -minded. 15. Kind-hearted. 
4. Considerate. 16. Level- headed. 
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5. Congenial. 17. Open -minded. 
6. Courageous. 18. Public- spirited. 
7. Courteous. 19. .elf -reliant. 
8. Energetic. 20. Self- possessed. 
9. Frank. 21. Sincere. 
10. Generous. 22, Sociable. 
11. Good -humored. 23. Talented. 
12. Good -tempered. 24. Tolerant. 
25. Trustworthy. 
The remaining 55 trait names were rated as either 
undesirable or reprehensible, except 5 on which there 
was some disagreement. ,fie prepared another list 
containing these 50 undesirable or reprehensible 
trait names and added 50 new names possessing both 
desirable and undesirable character. This new list 
of 100 trait names, described as List 2, was presented 
to our subjects for checking against desirability, 
undesirability and reprehensibility. The purpose of 
this checking was twofold: (1) to determine, 
finally, the undesirable traits occurring in the first 
list; and (2) to ?ieagure the strength of the tendency 
to show "repugnance" to the undesirable traits as 
determined by the number of a person's "reprehensible'' 
checkings; it was intended to examine the relation 
of this tendency to the attribution of desirable or 
undesirable traits to oneself or to others. To 
attain precision, a simple description of each of 
the 
three categories was given. (Appendix III). 
The frequency of the "desirable", "undesirable "', 
and "reprehensible" checkings is shown in Appendix A. 
For comparison between the sexes, the frequencies 
have also been converted into percentages with the 
decimal values rounded off. As is evident from a 
glance at the table (Appendix A) , there is no 
remarkable sex difference in the characterisation of 
the trait names as desirable, undesirable, or 
reprehensible. 
The following 35 trait names which occur in 
both mists, were finally selected as undesirable 
names. It will be noted from. Table 6 that they have 
been checked as undesirable or reprehensible by more 
than 95 per cent. of our subjects, which amounts, 
practically, to total agreement. The 'Table also 
shows the frequency of the checking of each item 
separately under the categories of undesirable and 
reprehensible. Items checked reprehensible in 50 
per cent. of cases or more are marked with an 
asterisk. These are subsequently referred to as 
reprehensible items : -- 
: 
Table 6. 






i'rait Hanes f o f 7 f 1 70 
l . Applause- 
seeking 89 82 18 16 107 98 
:2. Arrogant 57 52 51 47 108 99 
3. Cliquish 90 83 19 17 
109 100 
145 . 
Á 7; f 
4. .Cola-hearted 60 55 46 42 106 97 
5. Conceited 60 55 48 44 108 99 
6. Cowardly 43 39 66 61 109 100 
K 
7. Degenerate 41 38 68 62 109 100 
8. Distrustful 62 57 46 42 108 99 
9. Envious 75 69 33 30 108 99 
10. Fault- finding 79 72 30 28 109 100 
11. Fickle 87 80 22 20 109 100 
12. Garrulous 88 81 19 17 107 98 
13. Hasty 101 92 6 6 107 98 
14. 'Hot- teapered 86 79 22 20 108 99 
4E15. Ill -mannered 39 36 70 64 109 100 
16. Improvident 92 84 13 12 105 96 
3(17. Insincere 44 40 65 60 109 100 
18. Irritable 86 79 23 21 109 100 
19. Lethargic 93 85 14 13 107 98 
H20. Lalevolent 25 23 83 76 108 99 
K21. Mercenary 54 49 54 49 108 99 
22. :Moody 96 88 10 9 106 97 
23. Over-critical 97 80 22 20 109 100 
24. Panicky 82 75 27 25 109 100 
25. 1,,uarrelsome 78 72 31 28 109 100 
26. Self-absorbed 96 88 10 9 106 97 
27. Sell- centred 71 65 37 34 108 99 
28. Selz -seeing 64 59 42 38 106 97 
29. Spitef ul 26 24 83 76 109 100 
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30. Tactless 95 87 14 13 109 100 
31. Timid 98 90 10 9 108 99 
K32. Treacherous 11 10 98 90 109 100 
33. Unpractical 100 92 7 6 107 98 
34. Unsympath- 
etic 78 72 31 28 109 100 
'i35. Dishonest 14 13 94 86 108 99 
Having determined our lists of desirable and 
;undesirable (includes reprehensible also) trait naives, 
we calculated the frequency of each item as applied 
to oneself and as assigned to others, as shown in 






































Affectionate 26 37 68 89 23 78 60 80 8 9 
2. Benevolent 22 50 58 51 22 60 58 61 0 -10 
3. Broad- 
minded 33 83 87 85 29 72 76 73 11 12 
4. Congenial 23 64 60 65 30 82 79 84 -19 -19 
5. Considerate 29 80 76 82 28 82 74 84 2 - 2 
6. Courageous 13 30 34 31 22 48 58 49 -24 -18 












8. Energetic 20 



















10. Generous 19 72 50 73 27 84 71 86 -21 -13 
11. Good - 
humored' 29 84 76 86 29 93 76 95 0 -13 
12. Good - 
tempered 30 67 79 64 30 86 79 58 0 -24 
13. Hospit- 
able 23 76 60 78 25 80 66 82 - 6 - 4 
14. Just 27 73 71 74 24 71 63 72 8 2 
15. Kind- 
hearted 21 77 55 79 23 87 60 89 - 5 -10 
16. Level- 
headed 21 58 55 59 35 74 92 75 -37 -16 
17. Open- 
minded 30 79 79 81 25 74 66 75 13 6 
18. Public - 
spirited 17 42 45 43 28 57 53 58 - 8 -15 
19. Self- 
reliant 25 58 66 59 26 67 68 68 - 2 - 9 
20. Self -po- 
ssessed 8 30 21 31 21 68 55 69 -34 -38 
21. Sincere 31 87 82 89 28 83 74 85 8 - 4 
22. Sociable 25 72 66 73 28 88 74 90 - 8 -17 
23. Talented 10 15 26 15 20 44 53 45 -27 -30 
24. Tolerant 23 81 87 33 24 79 63 31 24 2 
25. Trust- 
worthy 28 85 74 37 30 83 79 85 - 5 2 
Table 7 shows that both sexes judge themselves 
more often than others as affectionate, broad -minded, 
148. 
just, open- minded, and tolerant; and others more 
often than themselves as congenial, courageous, 
energetic, generous, hospitable, kind- hearted, level- 
headed, public-spirited, self -reliant, self- possessed, 
sociable, and talented. The male group rates itself 
and others equally often on benevolence, good- humor 
and good-temper; while the female group does so only 
on frankness. The differences between self -rating 
and rating others are in the opposite directions in 
the two sexes for " considerate; "courteoust' , "sincereu 
and "trustworthy" , though the amounts of the differ - 
ences are rather small. On the whole, both sexes 
tend to assign most of the desirable traits more 
often to others than to themselves; the female group 
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see.-zing 17 19 45 19 13 34 34 35 
11 -16 
2. Arrogant 4 7 11 7 20 22 53 22 -42 
-15 
3. Cliquish 9 11 24 11 13 34 34 35 -10 -24 
4. Cold- 
hearted 3 4 8 4 5 9 13 9- 5- 5 
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5. Conceited 13 20 34 20 15 34 39 35 - 5 -15 
6. Cowardly 4 14 10 16 3 7 8 7 2 9 
L7. Degenerate 2 1 5 1 3 8 - 3 1 
8. Distrust- 
ful 5 18 13 18 9 12 24 12 -11 5 
9. Envious 9 26 24 27 8 24 21 24 3 3 
10. Fault- 
finding 13 44 34 45 12 31 32 32 2 13 
11. Fickle 5 18 13 18 6 28 16 29 - 3 -11 
12. Garrulous 5 20 13 20 15 45 42 46 -29 -26 
'13. Hasty 8 33 21 34 13 22 34 22 -13 12 
14. Hot- 
tempered 4 23 10 23 8 17 21 17 -11 
K15. Ill- 
mannered 1 4 3 4 6 11 16 11 -13 -7 
16. Improvi- 
dent 7 11 18 11 5 10 13 10 5 1 
4E17. Insincere 2 3 5 3 8 21 21 21 -16 -18 
18. Irritable 10 38 26 39 13 22 34 22 - 8 17 
19. Lethargic 10 a4 26 24 10 14 26 14 0 -10 
4E20. Malevolent 1 1 5 -2 13 2 -13 - 1 
21. Mercenary 4 8 10 8 9 12 24 12 -14 - 4 
22. Moody 17 41 45 42 12 29 32 30 13 12 
23. Over- 
critical 14 41 37 42 9 20 24 20 13 22 
24. Panicky 7 26 18 27 10 21 26 21 - 8 6 
25. ,;uarrel- 
-16 - 6 some 3 9 8 9 9 15 24 15 
150. 
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26. Self- 
absorbed 13 26 34 27 11 19 
27. Self- 
centred 12 26 32 27 16 24 42 24 -10 3 
28. Self- 
seeking 6 9 16 9 8 15 21 15- 5- 6 
Spiteful 3 3 4 13 11 13 -11 -10 
Tactless 8 21 21 21 13 33 34 34 -13 -13 




3 .; 2. Treach- 
erous 3 2 8 2- 8- 2 
33. Unprac- 
tical 11 12 29 12 7 11 18 11 11 1 
34. - Uns n 
pat ietic 2 8 5 8 6 12 16 12 -11 - 4 
X35. Dishonest 2 2 3 1 8 1- 8 1 
Table 8 shows that both sexes tend more to view 
others 
as arrogant, cliquish, cold -hearted, conceited, 
fickle, 
Garrulous, ill -mannered, insincere, malevolent, 
mer- 
cenary, Quarrelsome, self -seeking, spiteful, 
tactless, 
treacherous, unsympathetic, than to consider 
them - 
selves as such; and, conversely, to view 
themselves 
as cowardly, envious, fault -finding, improvident, 
moody, over -critical, self - absorbed 
and unpractical 
than to assign these characteristics 
to others. Sex 
differences are shown in case of such 
trait names as 
degenerate, distrustful, hasty, hot -tempered, 
irritable, panicky, self - centred, 
timid and dishonest, 
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which are more often applied by the male 'TO to . 
others and by the female group to the s e! -Yes 
Similarly, more of the female group thin__ ot ers as 
applause -seeking and lethargic; on the othGr and, 
more of the male group consider themselves applause - 
seeking. Except for one trait, namely, cowardly, 
the male group tends to apply the remaimir _e.nre- 
hensible" items more often to others than to itself; 
the female group assigns 6 of the 9 "reprehensible" 
items more often to others, and the remaining three 
more often to itself. 
The ratings on the four variables; (1) desir- 
able traits attributed to self, (2) undesirable traits 
attributed to self, (3) desirable traits assigned to 
others, and (4) undesirable traits assigned to others, 
were scored separately. The score in each case was 
determined by counting the number of items checked. 
The following frequency distributions are tabulated 
for the scores on the four variables : - 
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The followinL; historams are plotted from the 
distributions for the Total Group, Table 9(a):- 
- 
Table 9(b). 
Undesirable Trait Naues 
',3core 
3. pplied to Self 4. Ap::lied 
Frequency 
Total 










16-17 1 4 
14-15 2 1 3 
12-13 1 5 6 
i4 
10-11 2 6 
8-9 5 12 17 1 
6- 7 7 15 22 
, 















































The following histograms are plotted from th(: 
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3oth sexes tend to assign more desirable as 
well as undesirable traits to others than to them- 
selves. 
The following Table shows tile significance of 
the differences between the Means and S.D's of the two 
sexes in each of the four variables:- 
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Table 10. 
Vari abl e Obt. 
Diff. Diff. 
t 
1. Desirable Self 
2. Undesirable Self 
3. Desirable Other 
4. Undesirable Other 
Means 1.48 0.90 1.6 
S. D's 0.28 0.64 0.1111 
Means 0.15 0.80 0.19 
S.D's 1.12 0.57 1.9 
Means 1.72 0.79 2.2 
S.D's 0.01 0.57 0.02 
Means 2.12 1.21 1.7 
S.D's 0.79 0.87 0.9 
Table 10 shows no significant difference for 
variables 1, 2, and 4 between the Means or the Stan- 
dard Deviations of the two sexes. The critical 
ratio amounts to less than 2 in every case. Table 10 
shows a significant difference for Variable 3 between 
the means of the two sexes. 
Analysis of the checkings on List 2 which con- 
sisted of 100 trait names, including 50 undesirable 
'items from List 1, showed 25 trait. names predominantly 
checked as desirable and the remaining 75 as undesir- 
able or reprehensible. We scored the "undesirable" 
and "reprehensible" checkings separately for each 
subject and computed their arithmetical means, which 
'were 48.88 and 24.98, respectively. We then subtrac- 
ted the total number of "reprehensible" checlings made 
by each subject from his total number of "undesirable". 
checkirs. Since about one third of the subjects had 
checked more traits as "reprehensible' than °undesir- 
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able", one third of the resulting differences also 
were-expected to be negative. To make all scores 
positive, we added 50 to the differences, with their 
algebraic signs retained. Thus, those subjects who 
checked more traits as undesirable, about two thirds 
of the total number, scored above 50, while those who 
checked more traits as reprehensible, about one third 
of the total number, scored below 50. Subjects 
sdbring high were taken to show lesser de ree of 
repugnance to the undesirable traits. On the other 
hand, subjects scoring low were treated as giving 
evidence of °' reater degree of repugnance. In other 
words, the latter were presumed to exhibit a greater 
"sensitivity" to the offensiveness " of an attitude, 
quality, or conduct, or psychoanalytically speaking, 
a " strong, super ego formation". Table 11 gives the 
frequency distribution of the "repugnance scores " 
obtained by a group of 109 subjects. The distribu- 
tions of the scores of the two sexes are also shovai 
separately in the Table:- 
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Table 12 shows that there is no significant 
difference between the Means or the S.D's of the two 
sexes. 
Table 12. 
übt. Diff. Diff. t 
Means 4.01 5.34 0.75 
S.D's 0,54 0.38 1.42 
L everting- to Trait List 1, we applied the 
Chit test of association to determine the relations 
between checking self and others in the following 
,combinations:- 
Table 13. 
Chi2 as p Sign N' 
1. Des. Self: 7.372 1 4.01 + 136 
2. Des. Other s 
1. Des. Self: 1 1.447 1 <.30>.20 + 136 
4. Undes. Others! 
3. Undes. Self: 4.112 1 <.05>.02 + 136 
2. Des. Others J 
3. Undes. Self: 10.657 1 4.005 + 136 
4. Uncles. Others. 1, 
Table 13 shows highly significant association 
between rating self and rating others on desirable 
traits as well as on undesirable traits. There is 
significant association also between rating self on 
undesirable traits and rating others on desirable 
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traits. The association in every case is positive. 
There is no significant association between rating 
self on desirable traits and rating others on 
undesirable traits. 
Now, projection consists of the process of 
ascription of one's own "unacceptable" tendencies, 
thoughts, desires, and habits to outer persons and 
the failure to recognise them as belonging to oneself. 
In our testing situation, projection was expected to 
be revealed by the attribution of an undesirable 
trait to others and its disregard in oneself. And, 
since a sufficiently large and wide assortment of 
traits was presented for checking, it was further 
expected that a subject's liability to projection 
would be indicated by the predominance of his 
checkings on others, with respect to the undesirable 
traits, over his checkings on himself, -the larger 
his amount of checking on others, the lesser his 
amount of checking on himself. A reference to 
Table 9(b) , p. 153, shows that the difference between', 
the mean checkings on self and the mean checkings on 
others is in the expected direction; the subjects 
tend on the average to assign more undesirable 
traits to others than to themselves. But as shown 
by Table 14, the difference is significant for the 
desirable traits only. 
160. 
Table 14. 
Ob t. 1.)11 J. . D 1:C f. t 
Des. Other - Des. Self 2.01 .53 3.8 
Undes. Other - Undes. Self 1.61 .65 1.8 
Trie test of association (Table 13) also does 
not fulfil our expectation, for the association is 
positive in every case: the tendency to check more 
undesirable traits on others is accompanied by a 
tendency to check more of those traits on oneself als6. 
But, the operation of projection demanded the 
association to be negative. Hence the 'oup as a 
whole does not furnish any evidence of projection; 
our findings rather point in the opposite direction. 
As we have noted above, Sears also failed to 
discover the operation of projection in his total 
group of subjects. He then split them into those who 
(possessed insight and those who lacked insight, and 
noticed that projection characterised the latter 
group. The criterion of insight that he used was 
the agz'eeïaent between one's admission of a trait in 
himself and its ascription to him by others. `ie 
have used this criterion as another measure of 
insight and its discussion will follow the account of 
projection. So, at this place, we proposed to 
employ our subjects' scores on Intelligence Test 33, 
assuming that those scoring in the upper half of the 
distribution possessed more insight, while those 
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scoring in the lower half possessed less insight. 
'Ie, accordingly, divided our total group of subjects 
into two sub -groups: (1) the more intelligent or 
more insightful group - those falling in the uper 
half of the distribution of intelligence test scores; 
(2) the less intelligent or less insightful group - 
those falling in the lower half of the distribution 
of intelligence test scores. The total number of 
subjects who had checked Trait List 1 and whose 
scores on Test 53 were also available was 103. Ve 
dropped the last three, thus reducing the number to 
100, for ease of calculation. 
Table 15 shows the means, ranges, and 
standard deviations of the ratings made on the four 
variables by the sub- groups (Frequency Distribution 
Tables - Appendix B) : (1) More insightful, and (2) 
.less insightful. 
Table 15 . 
(1) ::lore Insightful 
Group Iv.50 
(2) Less Insightful 
Group F.50 
Idean Range Cr- Mean RanEe O- 
1. Des. 16.74 2 - 23 4.71 16.62 0 -23 4.69 
Self T .67 '+ .66 
2. Des. 19.26 12 -25 3.30 13.58 4-25 4.40 
Others T .47 + .62 
3. Unde s . 6.74 0-23 5.33 5.54 0 -21 
4.57 
;Oelf T .75 T .64 
4. Uncles. 7.66 0 -19 5.67 7.14 0 -23 
6.01 
Others + .80 + .85 
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Certain marked tendencies are reflected in 
Table 15. Though the less insightful group, like 
the more insightful, attributes, on the average, more 
desirable traits to others than to itself, the extent 
i of the difference is larger for the more insightful 
soup, so that it may be maintained that the more 
insightful group shows a preponderating tendency to 
assign more desirable traits to others as compared to 
the less insightful group. Similarly, though con - 
trary to our expectation, the more insightful group 
'also, like the less insightful, applies more undesi- 
rable traits to others than to itself, the extent of 
this difference is in the reverse direction, that is 
smaller for the more insightful group, so that the 
less insightful group may. be presumed to show a pre - 
ponderance of the tendency to assign more undesirable 
traits to others than to itself. 3e also note that 
the difference between the two groups with respect to 
the attribution of undesirable traits to others is 
much smaller as compared to the difference between 
in the attribution of undesirable traits to self, 
which shows the greater tendency for the less insight -. 0 
ful group to assign more undesirable traits to others 
and less undesirable traits to itself. Nevertheless, 
as is evident from Table 16, which shows the di ffer- 
ences within the groups and those between the groups 
With respect to the various variables, the amounts of 
the differences, are not statistically significant 
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for the undesirable traits and, apart from indicating 
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Undes. Undes .,' 
Otherl Self' 
2.52 1.96 0.92 1.60 0.68 0.12 0.52 1.20 
0.82 0.91 1.10 1.06 0.78 0.94 1.17 0.99 
3 2.15 0.84 1.5 0.87 0.12 0.44 1.21 
The differences in range and standard devia- 
;Lion also, generally speaking, consistently indicate 
the same trend. Thus the lower limit of desirable 
traits assigned to others (Table 15) is smaller in 
magnitude for the less insightful group than for the 
more insightful, though the upper limit is the same 
for both. There is no difference in this respect so 
far as the attribution of desirable traits to self is 
concerned. Similarly, the upper limit of undesira- 
ble traits arolied to self is smaller in the less 
insightful group than in the more insightful group, 
'but, conversely, the upper limit of undesirable 
attributes aplied to others is lamer for the less L 
insightful, ;ïich, again, supports the tendency shown 
by the less insightful group to assign more 
undesir- 
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able traits to others than to itself. 
;le also classified for each sub- {group, the 
ratings made on a pair of variables by each member of 
the sub -group concerned according as falling in: (1) 
the lower half of the distribution of ratings found 
for the total group in a given variable, and (2) the 
upper half of the distribution of ratings found for 
the total group in the same variable. This resulted, 
ultimately, in four classes: A. Those falling in upper 
half in both variables; B. Those falling in lower 
half in both variables; C. Those falling in lower 
half in the second variable and upper half in the 
first; and D. Those falling in upper half in the 
second variable and lower half in the first. The 
frequency of ratings in each class or category was 
also converted into percentages for comparison 
between the sub -groups, as shown in Table 17. 
Table 17. 
N.50 (1)ore Insightful x.50 (2) Less Insightful 
Class I II III IV I II III IV 
Des. Des. Undes.Undes.Des. Des. Uncles. 
Self ;Self Self Self elf Self Self 
Des. ades.Undes.Des. es. 'Undes.Undes. 





A 13 26%12 24%19 33%13 26; 
B 16 32;,13 26%17 34%13 26 
10 20%11 22% 7 14;ó11 22% 
D 11 22%14 28% 7 14;13 265 
4 28%16 32;7)J12 24 % 13 26% 
5 30%14 28;15 30% 18 36% 
0 20% 9 18j 8 16% 12 24;ó 
1 22%11 22115 30% 7 14% 
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A = Upper half both variables. 
B = Lower half both variables. 
C = Upper half first and lower half second. 
D = Lower half first and upper half second. 
On comparing the pairs of variables in the 
corresponding columns for Group (1) and Group (2), we 
note some important indications which are consistent 
with our earlier findings. Column I does not show 
any remarkable difference between the two groups. 
In Column II, the highest percentage, 32%, of the less; 
insightful group assign larger number of desirable 
traits to themselves and of undesirable traits to 
others, while in the corresponding column for the 
more insightful group we note about equal proportion 
under all four categories. In Column III, 30% of 
the less insightful group assign more undesirable 
traits'to others and less to themselves, while only 
16% assign more undesirable traits to themselves and 
less to others. Contrasted with this we find in the 
same column for the more insightful group 14% 
attributin- more undesirable traits to others and 
less to themselves, and 14% attributing more undesir- 
able traits to themselves and less to others. In 
Column IV for the less insightful group, we find quite 
consistently, the reverse of Column II for the same 
group, namely, that the highest percentage, 36 %, 
attribute less undesirable traits to themselves and 
.less desirable traits to others. The corresponding 
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column for the more insightful group shows about equal 
proportion under each category. Thus the incidence 
of percentages in the various columns consistently 
indicates a dominant tendency among the less insight- 
ful group to assign more undesirable traits to others 
and less to themselves. No such tendency is indica 
ted for the more insightful group. 
The following table shows, for the sub -groups, 
the incidence of percentages in the upper and lower 
halves of the distribution of checkings on each 
variable made by the total group:- 
Table 18. 
(1) More Insightful (2) Less Insightful 
Group Group 


















Table 18 shows that for the less insightful 
group, the differences between the percentages falling 
in the two halves of the distribution with respect 
to 
variables 3 (Undes. Self) and 4 (Undes. Other) are 
in 
the expected direction; more of the self -ratings 
on 
undesirable traits fall in the lower half, 
while, 
conversely, more of the ratings of others on those 
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traits fall in the upper half. In other words, we 
note, once again, in the less insightful group the 
expected tendency to assign more of the undesirable 
traits to others and less of those traits to them- 
selves. 
The following Table gives the result of the 
,Chi2 test of association applied to determine the 
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Table 19 shows a highly significant associa- 
tion in the more insightful group between assigning 




traits in oneself. The association is positive, that 
is, the members of this group give clear evidence of 
a definite tendency to place themselves as well as 
others in the sane half of the distribution with 
respect to their ratings on the undesirable traits. 
No such tendency is manifested by the less insightful 
group as the Chi Sq. value amounts practically to zerá 
Besides this very significant difference between them,', 
Table 19 indicates also other contrasting tendencies 
of the two groups, though these are not as conclusive.' 
Thus, the less insightful group shows a positive 
association between attributing desirable traits to 
oneself and undesirable traits to ab'hers, while the 
more insightful group shows no such association, Chi 
Sq. amounting almost to zero. Further, the less 
insightful group shows positive association between 
attributing desirable traits to others and undesira- 
ble traits to self, without a!iy corresponding 
association shown by the more insightful group. 
The highly significant association demon- 
strated in the more insightful group between their 
extent of admission of undesirable traits in them- 
selves and the amount of attribution of those traits 
to others, contradicts Sears' contention regarding a 
"contrast formation" between the amount of a 
trait 
known by the individual to be possessed by 
him and 
that of its attribution by him to others. As 
we 
have noted above, Sears has concluded from his 
results, 
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that the more insightful group possesc .. a tendency 
to "perceive other personalities in contrast to their 
l' 
own". de have earlier expressed our surprise at 
this, on purely logical grounds (p.130409 and now note 
that our logical conclusion has been supported by our 
statistical finding. As additional evidence in our 
favour, we may mention the uniformly higher average 
ratings made by the more insightful group on all 
variables as compared to the less insightful (Table 
15, p. 161). 
The above finding also leads us definitely to 
the conclusion that the more insightful group is un- 
influenced by the tendency to projection. We ex- 
pected projection to express itself through a negative 
relation between the attribution of undesirable traits 
to oneself and the ascription of these traits to 
others. But the more insightful group shows a 
highly positive association between these variables; 
hence, its freedom from liability to projection. 
;Ihen we turn to the less insightful group, we 
find ourselves in a dubious situation. The group 
shows neither positive nor negative association 
between rating self and others on undesirable traits. 
`ae find, rather, a total lack of association which cah 
warrant, at best, only the presumption that the 
possibility of projection is not precluded in this 
group, unlike the more insightful group which provides 
a positive proof to the contrary. Je have earlier 
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marked certain tendencies in the less insightful 
group which point to the operation of projection, for 
instance, the general trend shown by this group to 
assign more undesirable traits to others, or to 
attribute less undesirable traits to itself (p4.62).66,4167) 
But in the absence of any definite evidence of a 
relation between these variables in the expected 
negative direction, these indications do not have 
much value. 
Though we have rejected Sears' notion of a 
"contrast formation" operating in the persons 
possessing insight, our result has shown a somewhat 
similar process characteristic of the less insightful 
1 
group only. As we noted above, the attribution of a 
Ì 
given amount of desirable or undesirable qualities to 
the self is reflected in this group by the ascription 
of a similar amount of qualities of the opposite type 
to others. In other words, our result suggests that 
persons with less insight tend to (a) underestimatd 
others while over - estimating themselves; or, (b) 
overestimate others while under- estimating themselves. 
e hinted at these processes while reviewing Sears' 
account of projection. But here again we need to 
rewind ourselves that our result is not very con- 
clusive and, therefore, shows only a general trend. 
Joreover, our criterion of insight differed from that 
used by Sears. 
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de turn. next to the question proposed above: 
whether the degree of repugnance shown by an individ- 
ual to unacceptable tendencies and habits, defined in 
our testing situation in terms of the number of trait.: 
names rated as "reprehensible", has any relation to 
his tendency to assign desirable or undesirable traita 
to himself or to others. In order to answer this 
question, we tried to determine the relation between 
the "repugnance scores" (p.756 ) made by our subjects 
and their checking themselves or others on desirable 
or undesirable traits, as indicated in Table 20. 
The association, in every case, is negative. 
Table 20. 
N = 100 Chit d.f P Sign 
Repugnance: Des. Self 1.966 1 <.20>.10 
Repugnance: Des. Others 1.442 1 4..30 >.20 
Repugnance: Urides. Self 0.040 1 ¿.90 >.80 
Repugnance: Uncles. Others 4.026 1 <.05>.02 
There is significant negative association between 
"repugnance score' and assigning undesirable traits 
to others, i.e., the lower the repugnance score made 
by a person, the larger the - number of undesirable 
traits attributed by him to others and vice versa. 
As we have noted, a lower repugnance score implies a 
higher "reprehensible" checking, or, in other words, 
a greater sensitivity to the "offensiveness" of 
undesirable tendencies. Hence our result shows 
that 
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persons more highly sensitive to the reprehensibility 
of unacceptable characteristics tend more strongly to 
view others as qualified by those characteristics; 
no such tendency is shown with respect to their 
viewing themselves in regard to the unacceptable 
qualities, the Chi Sq. amounting almost to zero. 
The two other Chi. Sq. values are not statistically 
significant, being below the 5 per cent. level, but 
nonetheless they also indicate a general trend among 
persons who are highly sensitive to "obnoxious" 
traits to attribute more desirable qualities to 
themselves as well as to others. 
As we have seen above, 109 subjects checked 
our Trait List 2. Of these 7 had not checked Trait 
'List 1. Out of the remaining 102, we dropped the 
last 2, reducing the number to 100. These were 
split uo into two sub - groups of 50 each, the first 
one falling within the upper half of the distribution 
of "repugnance score ", the second in the lower half. 
In other words, the first group was characterised 
with a lesser sensitivity to the "obnoxiousness" of 
undesirable traits, while the ec with a hi_iau 
sensitivity to the "offensiveness" of those traits. 
de called the second the "sensitive" group, and the 
first the "non,-sensitive"' group, using the term 
"sensitive" as qualifying a person's attitude 
with 
regard to socially undesirable characteristics. 
The 
following Table represents the means, standard 
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deviations and ranges of the distributions of ratings 
of self or others on desirable or undesirable traits 
separately for the two sub - groups (Frequency 
Distribution Tables - Appendix C):- 
Table 21. 
N.50 
( 1) ron-sensitive ( 2) 
N.50 
ve Sensiti
















Others + .57 + .60 
Undesirable 7.10 0 -23 5.52 5.58 0 -17 4.18 
Self z .79 + .60 
Undesirable 6.94 0 -23 5.79 8.02 0 -23 6.39 
Others + 83 + 91 
The above Table indicates some interesting 
points of differences between the two gToups. Group ¡ 
(1) is less liberal than Group (2) in ascribing 
I 
desirable qualities to self or to others, which is 
more conspicuously shown in the rating of self by 
Group (1) - the extent of the difference between 
Desirable -Self and Desirable -Other being larger for 
Group (1) than for Group (2) . The same fact is 1 
revealed on comparing the ranges and the standard 
deviations for the two groups. The lowest number 
of 
desirable qualities attributed to self by Group 
(1) 
is 0, and that assigned to others is 4; 
contrasted 
With this, t''ie minimum number assigned to 
others or 
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to self by Croup (2) is 6. Passing on to the 
undesirable traits, we find the contrast between the 
two groups emerging more clearly. Jhile Group (1) 
assigns almost equal number of undesirable traits, 
on the average, to itself and to others - the 
difference being only 0.16 - Group (2) assigns more 
of these traits to others than to itself - the 
difference being 2.44, which is also statistically 
significant as shown by Table 22, t being more than 
2. Similarly, the highest number of undesirable 
traits acknowledged by the sensitive group, Group (2) , 
is 17, as contrasted with 23 which is the maximum 
number of these traits applied to others. Group (1) 
shows no such difference. All these indications 
consistently poilt to the influence on tie ratings 
made by the sènsitive group, whether with regard to 
itself or to others, of its high sensitivity to the 
offensiveness of the undesirable traits, which deter- 
mines the group to overestimate others on these traits 
and underestimate itself. This influence seems to 
be evidently absent in the case of Group (1), as 
expected; the ratings made on the undesirable traits 
by this group are thoroughly balanced with respect 
tb 
self and others, t being only 0.1 (Table 22) . :7e 
may 'resume, therefore, that one's sensitivity to 
the 
offensiveness of certain personality traits functions 




Difference Athin Group Difference Between Groups 
Group (1) - Group (2) 
i = 50 N 
Des. Other Uncles. Other 
- .des. ̀ pelf - Undes. Self 
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Des. -Des. des. Undes. 
Self Others elf Others 
-1.64 -0.64 1.52 -1.08 
0.92 0.83 0.99 1.23 
1.7 0.8 1.5 0.9 
.fe further tried to determine the relation in 
each group between rating self and rating others on 
the desirable and undesirable traits. Table 23 
gives the result of the Chi Sq. test of association. 
Table 23. 
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eS 2.012 1 <. 20 >.10 + 
Others 




1.865 1 20)0.10 + 
0.722 1 4.50;o.30 - 
2.006 1 < aO}.10 + 
0.080 1 430> . 70 + 
176. 
.áe note in the above 'fable a high positive 
association in the non - sensitive group between 
assigning undesirable traits to themselves and to 
others. As compared to this, the sensitive group 
shows no significant association between any of the 
four variables. 
;'le have presumed that the tendency to pro- 
jection is expected to be revealed in our testing 
situation by a negative association between rating 
self and others on undesirable traits. Since the 
non-sensitive group shows, on the other hand, a 
highly significant positive association, we feel 
justified in inferring for this group a comparative 
freedom from projection. In other words, our 
result suggests that a person who is not very sensi- 
tive about the "offensiveness" of the undesirable 
traits is on the average uninfluenced by projection 
while judging oneself and others with regard to these 
traits. The sensitive group shows a definite ten- 
dency to ascribe more undesirable traits to others 
than to itself and on this account we may presume 
that this group is liable to projection. But the 
more conclusive test,. the test of significance of 
association, does not yield a decisive evidence on 
this point. 
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de may summarise our study of projection in 
the following manner: - 
Our subjects were asked to check themselves 
and also others on a list of desirable and undesirabl 
trait names. They also checked another list against 
desirability, undesirability and reprehensibility. 
7e expected "projection" to be indicated 
among our subjects by a negative relation between 
checking self and checking others on undesirable 
traits. 
The total group gave no evidence of projection. 
:'ie divided the total group into those 
possessing more insight and those having less insight 
on the ground of scoring in the upper and lower halves, 
respectively, of the distribution of intelligence 
test scores. Positive evidence of freedom from 
projection was found for the group possessing more 
insight. Minor indications of liability to pro- 
jection were noted for the group having less insight. 
A "contrast formation" resulting in the (a) over- 
estimation of self, accompanied by under- estimation 
of others, and (b) under -estimation of self, accom- 
panied by over -estimation of others, was indicated 
for this group, and not for the group possessing more 
insight, as suggested by Sears. 
The total group was also divided into 
sensitive and non- sensitive oft the basis of the high 
ai_d low degrees of repugnance to the undesirable 
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traits. Positive evidence of freedom from pro- 
jection was found for the non - sensitive (coup. Clear, 
but not very conclusive, indications of liability to 
projection were noted for the sensitive Eroup. 
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Self -Other Ratio. 
As we mentioned above, Allport has suggested 
that insight as a variable of personality can be 
determined by the ratio between what a person thinks 
he is and what others think he is. In other words, 
the degree to which his judgment on himself approxi- 
mates to the judgment of others on him is the index 
of a person's insight. 
In order to measure insight in terms of the 
"sell -other ratio ", we proposed to have our subjects 
rate themselves and five other persons -of their class 
on the traits of 'ascendance-submission", "self- 
confidence-self-consciousness", and "sociability - 
solitariness". Accordingly, we prepared a five -point 
rating scale for each of the three traits. To 
devise suitable descriptions corresponding to the 
various points on the scale, we referred to the 
accounts of those traits in the work of Allport,20 
Bernreuter,21 and Flanagan.22 For the purpose of 
scoring, we assigned numerical values to the five 
descriptive points, ranging from 1 to 5, the lowest 
value being attached to the favourable end of the 
20 Allport, G. Vû. , "A test for ascendance- submission." 
Journ. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol. , 1928, 23, pp. 118- 
136. 
21 
Bernreuter, R., "The theory and construction of 
personality inventory." Journ. Soc. Psychol., 
1933, 4, pp. 387 -405. 
22 
Flanavan, J.C., Factor Analysis in the Study of 
Personality, pp. 46 -47. 
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scale and the highest to the unfavourable end. The 
rating scales along with the directions for rating 
are reproduced in Appendix IV. 
As will be noted in the direction for rating, 
in our rating device we made a slight departure from 
the usual practice. We did not present to our 
subjects a fore -determined list of persons and asked 
them to .rate each person against the given traits, 
for we felt that such ratings are often forced and 
arbitrary so that the rater sometimes fits a person 
under a description without really being in a 
position to rate him at all. To obviate this defect 
we asked our subjects to indicate five persons in 
their cuss whom they knew well enough to judge their 
character. These persons were not to be their 
friends, since ''a good rater of other people must be 
well acquainted with the ratees, but not too intimate 
with thee' .23 The names were to be put down at the 
top of the rating blank and the subjects had to rate 
them along with themselves on the five -point scale. 
We expected that given an opportunity to choose their 
own ratees from among those whom they could judge 
about with confidence, the raters would be in a 
position to offer a more dependable estimate in their 
ratings. 
After the ratings had been made, the names of 
23 
Vernon, P.E., "Some characteristics of the good 
judges of personality." Journ. Soc. psychol. , 4, 
1933, pp. 43-57. 
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all persons who rated a given person were sorted out 
and ratings on the same person by a number of other 
persons were, thus, secured. The position determine 
for a person by the average rating of others on him 
was assumed to be his "true" position on the scale. 
For computing the average, we decided at first to use 
five ratings on each subject. But it transpired 
subsequently that many of our subjects were rated by 
none, their names having occurred to no other person; 
while some other persons were rated by nine or ten. 
In other words, we discovered quite a number of 
seclusive persons for whom we could secure no rating 
by others. Obviously such persons were useless for 
the purpose of computing the self -other ratio. More 
over among those who were rated by others, only a 
small percentage were rated by five or more persons, 
as indicated by Table 24. Úe were forced, there- 
fore, to lower our standard from five to three rating 
in computing the average. Out of the total number 
of 167 subjects, there were only 76 for whom we could 
obtain three or more ratings, the remaining 91 being 
rated by one or two persons only or by none. The 
following Table shows the frequency distribution of 
the number of ratings for each person in the group : - 
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Table 24. 
Number of Rat-ins 
Frequency 
Female Lai e Both exes 
11 ' 1 1 
10 0 0 
9 2 2 
8 3 3 
7 3 3 
6 5 2 7 
5 13 2 15 
4 19 3 22. 
3 18 5 23 
2 21 12 33 
a. 18 16 34 
0 14 10 24 
N 117 50 167 
The .following histoL;ram.is plotted from the 
distribution of the total Eroup. 
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The above distribution may be supposed to 
represent a continuum of sociability- seclusiveness,24 
if we presume that those who get the largest number 
of ratings, under the peculiar circumstance provided 
in our rating scheme , are the most sociable persons 
and those who fail to secure any rating are the most 
seclusive. But the term "sociability" has been 
found to be very ambiguous, as used in psychological 
literature, and some psychologists have felt the 
necessity of bringing out the various implications of 
sociability as separate personality variables. 
Therefore, only when we choose to define sociability 
in terms of the number of acquaintances of a person, 
can we maintain that a person reported by a larger 
number as their acquaintance, with a sufficient degree 
of intimacy to enable them to judge his character, 
excels others in the trait of sociability. Con- 
versely, a person who is mentioned by none of his 
associates as their acquaintance falls in the class 
of the very seclusive. To verify this assumption, 
we compared with respect to each person the average 
position assigned to hira on the sociability- solitari- 
ness scale and the number of persons by whom he was 
rated. The following Table shows that the associa- 
tion between the two variables is not highly signifi- 
cant, but it tends in the expected negative direction, 
24 
Magner, R., Psychology of Personality, p. 11M. 
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i.e., a person occupyinw the higher position on the 
scale, and thus rated on the average as solitary, 
secures a smaller number of ratings than the person 
occupying a lower position, and thus rated socíable:- 
Table 25. 
N75 2 Chi L1 P Sign 
No. Ratings: Av. Rating 2.573 1 C.10.05 
The following Table shows for the three rating 
scales the mean self -rating score and the mean others-7 




T,T elf Other 
1. Ascend 
ance - 





















11 2.73 3.07 0.34 
11 3.09 2.77 0.32 
11'2.35 2.45 0.09 
The above Table represents the arithmetical m t. 
it was not considered worth while to compute the 
Standard deviations and the measures of significance 
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of difference, since the range of the scores was very 
narrow. It will be noted that the average ratings 
on ascendance - submission and self - confidence - self - 
consciousness approximate to the middle value, i.e., 
the third position, on the scale for both sexes, whil 
the average rating on sociability -solitariness lies . 
nearer to the second position. Further, the female 
group shows the tendency to , r át e itself and also 
others on ascendance - submission and sociability - 
solitariness as falling within the favourable halves 
of the scales. The male group manifests this 
tendency only in respect of sociability -solitariness, 
and rates itself lower than others on ascendance - 
submission, i.e., as more ascendant. The difference 
between the two sexes on "ascendance -submission' is, 
perhaps, due to the greater social emphasis put on 
"ascendance" as characteristic of masculinity and the 
consequent over -rating of itself by the male group on 
this quality. ae find the reverse of this in the 
case of self - confidence - self -consciousness, where 
both sexes tend to underrate themselves, i.e., judge 
themselves as more self- conscious, in comparison to 
others. 
,Te computed the self -other ratio, as a measure 
of insight, for each of the 76 subjects - 65 women 
and 11 men, and, in order to avoid fractional scores, 
multiplied it by 10. One subject had omitted to rat 
himself on ascendance -submission and sociability- 
solitariness, and two subjects had done so on self - 
confidence - self -consciousness. Hence we could 
compute the ratios for 77 subjects in two variables 
and of 74 in one. The following Table dives the 
frequency distribution of the self - other ratios for 
the total group, the male group being too small to 
merit separate treatment:- 
Table 27. 
Ascendance - Self- confidence - Sociability - 
Submission ,->elf-consciousness Solitariness 
Self -other Ere- Self -other Fre- Self-other Fre- 
Ratio 1 cuency Ratio 2 quency Ratio 3 quency 
14.50- 7 13.50- 1 
13.50-14.49 1 12.50-13.49 1 
12.50-13.49 10 11.50-12.49 3 
11.50-12.49 10 10.50-11.49 6 
10.50-11.49 7 9.50- 9.49 5 
9.50-10.49 12 8.50- 8.49 14 
8.50_ 9.49 14 7.50- 7.49 17 
7.50- 8.49 6 6.50- 6.49 17 
650- 7.49 7 5.50- 5.49 7 
5.56- 6.49 1 
N 75 







8.50- 9.49 6 
7.50- 8.49 15 
6.50- 7.49 5 
5.50- 5.49 3 
4.50- 5.49 2 
3.50- 4.49 1 
N 75 
,í';íean=10. 60, Med. = 
10.28 
ïean = 8.33, : íed. = 
8.08 
,Iean = 10.42, :'ied. 
10.55 
Tie following histograms are ])lotted for the 
above distributions. 
PP. 
S¢ENpRivCE-5Ofó M IS5I 00. 
- 
' 
71-0 //4o /3.5o 
SCLFcOIFPAGNCr --SrL FcopJ"SCto usNesó 
81-0 to4'o taso l4tno 
Soc ll/®tN rY- S06lTRR I N 6 55 
75 -o 9.770 / /'0 /3só 
Since the above sets of ratios obtained from 
the ratings on the three scales indicate in each case 
the same variable, viz., insight as indicated by the 
ratio between self -rating and others -rating, a fairly 
high agreement between them is expected. The follow - 




Sets of ïeasures 
Compared N- 74 Chi- 
1 f Significance 
Level or T Sign 
1 : 2 6.227 1 4.02>.01 + 
1:3 2.333 1 4.20?.10 + 
2 . 3 0.218 1 (.70>.50 + 
Table 28 shows a significant relation between 
the first and the second set of ratios, namely, those 
obtained by the self -other ratings on ascendance - 
'submission and self - confidence - self -consciousness. 
The relation is also positive. The third set of 
ratios, yielded by the self -other ratings on 
sociability-solitariness, does not seem to be 
significantly associated either with the first or the 
second. Perhaps, this discrepancy may be due to the 
fact that this trait, viz., sociability -solitariness, 
is not amenable to accurate assessment by rating. 
This might also have made the ratios calculated from 
the ratings far from reliable. As iIollingworth?5 
has observed, the ability to form an accurate estimate 
of oneself or of others does not vary only from 
individual to individual but also from trait to trait. 
In other words, some traits can be more accurately 
judged about than others. Our presumption is borne 
out, firstly, by the fact that the average self and 
others' ratings on the trait of sociability-solitari- 
2 
5 Hollingworth, 1. Op. cit., p. 56 and p. 79. 
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ness shows a sharp departure from the middle value of 
the scale. The average value, computed from the 
pooling of the individual ratings, is expected to 
approximate to the middle value or the third position 
on the scale. We find this to be true of the averag: 
values in the ascendance-submission and self- confi- 
dence - self -consciousness scales. Contrary to this, 
the average value falls near to the second position 
on the sociability- solitariness scale (Table 26, p. 
184) . `secondly, the distribution of the ratios 
derived from the self -other ratings on this scale is 
extremely irregular. Even apart from these consid- 
erations,our results in general are far from conclu- 
sive; our data are rather scanty, and, what is more 
important, our "true" measure, depending as it does 
upon three ratings only, can be hardly representative 
of the actual traits of the persons rated. Above all, 
the concept of a true" measure determinable by 
rating is open tograve suspicion and extremely in- 
consistent with the methodological framework which we 
have tried to work under in other parts of our 
investigation. 
In order to examine how far the "self - other" 
patio really furnished us with a measure of insight, 
we compared it with the scores on Intelligence Test 
33. 44e have noted that the self -other ratio is 
presumed to measure insight in terms of the distance 
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between the position a person assigns to himself .on a 
rating scale and the position others ascribe to him 
on the same scale. It follows, then, that the 
wider the 'ul± between the two positions the less 
insightful the person, and the narrower the gulf, the 
more insightful he is. Rendered in terms of ratio, 
the more insightful person would be one whose self - 
other ratio borders on unity, or, with reference to 
our scoring method, approximates to 10. Since the 
middle fifty per cent. of the distribution of the 
obtained ratios would be nearer to this value, we 
assumed it to represent the area of insight; the 
upper and lower quartiles of the distribution, 
representing; the extreme deviants of the ratios from 
the theoretical middle value, we took to cover the 
area of "lack of insight". It is iiaportant to note 
that according to this assumption the less insightful 
group would comprise persons who overrate themselves, 
i.e., whose self -rating exceeds others' rating on 
them, as well as those who underrate themselves, i.e. 
whose self-rating falls below others' rating. The 
more insightful group, on the other hand, would 
consist of those persons whose self -ratings converge 
with others' ratings upon them. If we divided the 
total group on this basis into the more insightful 
and the less insightful, then, intelligence being 
another measure of insight, we expected to get among 
the more insightful group a larger proportion of 
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persons scoring high on intelligence test as compared 
to the less insightful group. If we further divided 
the group as: (1) those scoring in the upper half of 
the distribution of intelligence test scores and (2) 
those scoring in the lower half, we ultimately get 
four groups: (a) more intelligent and more insightful 
(b) more intelligent and less insightful, (o) less 
intelligent and more insightful and (d) less intelli- 
sent and less insightful. The following Tables, 
condensed from a 3 x 2 contingency table, shoal the 
various proportions of a group of 57 male and female 
subjects falling in the four sub -groups, with respect 
to each of the three rating scales: - 
Table .29(a) . 
Ratio $elf -Other 1 Intelligence 
Upper Half Lower Half 
More Insightful 
(Middle 50 %) 
Less Insightful 










Ratio :pelf -other 2 Intelligence 
















iv = 57 29 28 
Table 29(c). 
Ratio ;pelf -Other 3 IntelliEence 
Upper Half Lower Half 
More Insightful 
(Middle 50;x) 
Less Insi jhtful 












itr=57 29 28 57 
lccording to our expectation, there should be 
a larger proportion in the upper left cells of the 
Tables as compared to the upper right ones; and 
similarly, a larger proportion in the lower right 
cells than in the lower left. But our results are 
just the reverse, so that in Tables 13(a) and 13(b) 
we find larger proportion of the more insightful 
¡Jerson.& among the less intelligent group and of the 
Tess insightful persons in the more intelligent group. 
-'able 29(c) shows an about equal proportion in all 
the four sub -groups, which also is contrary to our 
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expectation. ,e feel called upon to conclude, 
therefore, that our measure of insight as determined 
by the ratio between self- rating and rating by others 
did not lead to a positive result. 'v' de have already 
expressed our suspicion regarding the efficacy of 
this measure (p.189 ), since the "true" estimate of 
a person's position on a rating scale is likely to be 
far from determinable by the average of three ratings 
only, apart from our methodological disfavour for the 
concept of a "true" measure based on expression of 
opinion on personality. Nevertheless, the signifi- 
cant association between the first and second sets of 
ratios (Table 27) which is also reflected in the 
similarity of the findings represented in Tables 29(a) 
and 29(b), suggests that the ratings used in computin 
the ratios were not determined altogether by random 
unsystematic influences, but were governed by some 
underlying systematic factor, which we could not 
succeed to fathom in this study. 
(.:inden t 
We luxe presumed that the tergienay to ilItkAriative 
compensation is one of the factors which brinc ebout 
distorti on of quBstionnaire responses (p ). 
ordo z. to explore this factor lae wed three kinds 
of meariu.rements: (i ) Self-ratine on abilities, 
(ii) Self-ratine on desirnblo trait-name, (iii) 
,L;:',,rpression of interest in oecupetions O 4.ch socirtl 
standing. The first consisted of statements con- 
cerning those abilities and tnlento the pwsession 
of laich contributes to one, Dense of personel velue 
and enhancement of social esteem, The second involved 
name of personality traite of diverse character which 
nre given social a?proval and acceptaace. The 
materiLls used in the third w(,re of occupations 
which receive the stamp of social prestige and exe 
assigned high statue, A separate account of each 
type al' measurerent iu presented which is followed 
oz,' the deteratuLt ion of its relation tu the intellice- 
lace twit scores. At the end is 0.ven the result of 
the Chi Square '-'est uf C2,000Cietti011 between the 
meaourea under consieration; ona an attempt is made 
et interpretation ai hc in'i cated relationships. 
Aluzu3-1 
tari.,teviolc for this racesuremont conaiated of 
twerty items reinted t o bilitìeû r.nd personal 
Prowess, taken from Part 'VII of the Otrong Vocations]. 
1)5. 
Interest :.;lank. Tie subjects were required to rate 
themselves on each item by checking against '1es', 
'No or '?' as the case may be (Appendix V). 163 
subjects, 119 women and 44 men took this test. The 
following Table shows the frequency aad percentage of 




l!re- ! dlJer- Pre- Per- Fre. 
Item quency centiae quency centsge quency contage 
Male F- ale re- ale te wale rc- gale ve... gale Ft .- 
male male male male gala aale 
1 13 20 29.6 16.9 16 57 35.4 4.7.9 14 39 31.8 32.8 
2 25 45 .56.8 37.3 15 66 34.1 55,5 4. 8 9.1 6.7 
19 ; 61 4,3.2 51.317 32 38.6 26.9 3 25 13.2 21.0 
4 , 15 45 34.1' 37.8 13 40 29.6 33.616 32 36.11- 26.9 
5 1' 23 27.3 19.3 20 52 95.9 43.7 12 44 27.5 37.0 
6 13 14 129.6 11.3 22 30 50,0 67.4 8 25 15,2 2140 
7 , 24 70 54.6 53.8 12 33 27.3 27.71, 8 16 13.2 13.4 
8 15 21 134.1 17.6 22 73 50.0 63.3, 7 25 15.9 21.0 
9 36 , 89 p1.8 74.8 o 0 5.4 8 23 13.2 190 
10 35 93 !79.6' 78.1 3 6 6.8 5,4 6 18 13,6 15H 
11 30 80 A8,2 67.2 13 22 29.6 13.5 1 15 2.3 12.6 
12 20 47 45.4 39.516 61 36.4 51.3 8 11 18.21 9.2 
13 17 41 38,6; 344 18 4,7 40.9 394 9 31 20.4! 26.0 
14 22 48 poi() 4-0.3 4 23 9.1 19.ill8 48 4u.9 40.3 
1 
15 24 55 i54.6 46.2 3 26 6.81 21417 33 _33.6 31.9 
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19 42 43.2 35.3 9 39 2C.4 '1.9116 37 f36.431.1 
17 19 53 43.2 41-4-.5 13 l2 29.6 10.8!12 5027.342.0 
18 20 39 45.4 32.8 21 65 .47.7 54.6i 3 15 6.8 12.6 
19 14 53 31.8 44.5 17 25 33.6 21.0?13 41 29.6 34./4 
20 23 70 52.3 58.3 17 38 3a. 6 31.9 4 11 9.1 9.2 
4 ,: el_t ' 119 .Io_ien 
Table 30 does lot indicate any remarkable sex 
differences except for a few items. For example, 
more of the male group lay claim to initiative and 
leadership (Item 1), driving themselves steadily 
(Item 2), self- confidence (Item 6), mechanical ingen- 
uity (Item 8) , planning work in detail (Item 18) , 
While more o? the female group feel sure of their 
ability to 'sn oothe out tangles and di sa reement 
between people' (Item 19) . 
Table 31 shows the frequency distribution of 




hale Female Total Group 
16 -17 1 1 2 
14-15 2 1 3 
12 -13 5 12 17 
10 -11 12 27 39 
8- 9 14 38 52 
197. 
.co e Male Female Total Group 
F-7 9 26 35 
4-5 1 11 12 
2- 3 2 2 
0-2L 1 1 
Tv 119 163 
Mean 9.45 8.50 8.76 
+ .38 + .24 '+ . 21 
2.50 2.62 . 2.62 
The following histogram is plotted from the 





2 4 6 8 l0 IL 14 /6 /8 
There is no hißhl_y significant difference 
between the means of the two sexes and no significant 
difference between their standard, deviations as 
indicated by Table 32:- 
Table 32. 
Cbt. Diff. or Diff. t 
l,ïean 095 0.45 2.1 
's 0.12 0.32 0.38 
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Table 33 shows the frequency distribution of 




Male eiA l e Total Group 
13 1 2 3 
12 2 4 - 6 
11 2 6 8 
10 2 6 8 
9 1 9 10 
8 4 18 22 
7 7 18 25 
6 5 15 20 
5 7 18 25 
4 5 11 16 
3 3 7 10 
2 3 2 5 
1 2 2 4 
0 1 1 
N 44 119 163 
,. eaiz 6.16 5.74 6.58 
'T .45 + .24 T .22 
2.96 . 2.65 2.75 
The folio ink; histoL ram is plotted from the 
distribution of the total group : - 
The following Table shows the significance of 
the difference between mean checkins on 'yes' and 
mean checkings on 'no', for the male, fe_dale acid the 
total coups 
Table 34, 
ï,'a l e Female Total Group 
Cot. Diff. 3.29 1.76 2.18 
Cr piff. 0.59 0.34 0.30 
t 5.6 5.2 7.3 
The difference is highly sinificant in every case, 
Which clearly indicates the tendency of the group to 
overrate Itself on abilities, and supports our hypo - 
thesis that the ratings are not determined merely by 
objective evaluation of one's capabilities and tact, 
but also fulfil, for some subjects, the demand for 
imaginative compensati on. Murray reports similar 
results from his use of the same type of materi al.1 
The following Table shows lack of significant 
-array, H.A. , Explorations in Personality, p. 438. 
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association between self- rating on abilities and 
scores in Test 33:- 
Table 35. 
N Chi ,Sq. d -p Sign 
120 0.132 4.30 ?. 70 
A comparison between the sub -group falling in 
the upper half of the distribution of intelligence 
test scores and that falling in the lower half, 
showed no difference between their mean ratings oh 
abilities, as indicated by the Frequency Distribution 
Tables for the sub - groups (Appendix D) . We may 
presume, therefore, that intelligence played no part 
in the ratings. This was also expected, firstly, 
because few of the items involve superior intellectu . 
functions; and, secondly, because the need for con- 
pensation may not arise necessarily from a sense of 
inferiority in the intellectual field. 
Our result seems at first to be inconsistent 
with the finding reported by ';frenn, Ferguson and 
Kennedy.l ThesO authors compared the checkings on 
the same items as we used for the group falling in 
the up:>er 5% and the group falling in the lower 15% 
of the distribution of intelligence test scores. 
1 _ 
, C.G., Ferguson, L.J., and Kennedy, J.L., 
" Intelli ence Level and Personality', Journ. Soc. 
Psychol., 7, 1936, pp. 301 -308. 
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They found that ''the critical ratio between the 
average number of checks in the 'Yes' column for the 
inferior male group and for the superior male group 
was 8.3. In other words, there was a well - defined 
tendency for the members of the inferior group to 
check 'more in the 'Yes' column than did the members 
of the .superior group, thereby expressing a much 
greater confidence in their own ability". They 
further add this is true only for the men students". 
But we find that there is no real discrepancy between 
the results reported by these authors and our own 
findings. Firstly, because they compared the 
extreme groups and consequently it may be argued that 
the inferior group made more checki_gs on the average 
because they arbitrarily checked majority of the firs 
suggested answers (Yes) rather than considered over 
the alternative choices. Secondly, because of the 
very- small number of our male group having scores in 
Test 33 also, further sub- dividion of the group was 
not considered worth while and, consequently, our 
result affords no verification of the finding of 
:'reran, etc., which, as reported, is true only of the 
men students. 
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Self -Rating on Desirable Trait-Names. 
The tendency to rate oneself higher on desires 
ble trait -names has been consistently revealed in 
several investigations and, interpreted as expression 
of the need for 'social approval', for making 
'flattering responses', for putting up a 'favourable 
picture of oneself', and so on. de, consequently, 
presumed this measure to be a suitable index of the 
tendency to compensation and prepared a list of trait 
names, List 3, involving both desirable and undesira- 
ble characteristics (appendix VI). The list 
originally contained 50 items. de selected, out of 
these, 15 trait names that appeared to possess 
definite desirable significance and 20 which seemed 
to have definite undesirable significance. These 
were again mixed up and presented to 25 post- graduate 
students of psychology to be rated as desirable or 
undesirable. The classification yielded by the 
ratings anr_eed very closely with that made by us. 
158 subjects, 37 men and 121 women rated 
themselves on List 3. The following Table shows the 






requency :?ercentaf e 
Jieiaale ia1e ehi al e 
30 102 81 84 
2. Affable 20 81 54 67 
3. Charitable 20 33 54 68 
4. Conciliatory 16 58 43 48 
5. Forgiving 21 79 57 65 
6. Honest 31 106 34 88 
7. Lodest 14 49 38 40 
8. Outspoken 13 53 35 44 
9. Perseverins 20 73 54 60 
10. Fhilanthropic 8 45 22 37 
11. 4uick 16 46 43 38 
12. Reasonable 28 89 76 74 
13. 3e1-consistent 12 38 32 31 
14. Self-sacrificing 7 30 19 25 
15. Sympathetic 23 96 76 80 
Table 36 shows no remarkable difference 
between the sexes. 
The following Table shows the distribution of 
self-ratinEs on desirable traits:- 
-noaS req_oq. et{q_ ;To uoT.q_nc,TafirsTp fauenbaaT 
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Table 38 shows that the differences between 
the means and standard deviations of the two sexes 
are not statistically significant. 
Table 38. 







h com.2al'ison between self-ratings on desirable 
16raits List 1 (p.1.42-1q and those of the present list, 
List 3, shows that there is very highly significant 
positive association between the two variables in 
Site of the dissimilarity between the component 
items of the two lists, as indicated by Table 39:- 
Table 39. 
IT Chi Sq. ¿f P Sign 
_;Du 38.641 1 4 001 
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lei then variable has a significant association with 
scores in intelligence test No. 33, as indicated by 
the following Table:- 
Table 40. 
N Chi Sq. di P Sign 
Des. Trait List 1 100 0.110 1 4.30).70 + 
Des. Trait List 3 116 0.136 1 (.8O).70 + 
Comparison between thé means of the sub - groups 
falling in the upper and lower halves, respectively, 
of the distribution of intelligence test scores also 
shows no significant difference for either variable 
as indicated in Table 41:- 
Table 41. 
Obt. Diff. S. E. Diff. t 
Des. Trait List 1 0.12 0.94 0.13 
Des. Trait List 3 0.80 0.55 1.4 
The frequency distribution for the two sub - groups are 
shown in Appendix E. 
'de can presume, as in the case of self- rating 
on abilities, that the difference in intelligence 
does not mare for any variability in the tendency to 
assign desirable qualities to oneself. 
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Occupational Interest. 
.ie presumed that the tendency to portray one- 
self in the favourable light would reveal itself also 
in the expression of one's interest in occupations 
possessing a high social standing. 'We prepared, 
accordingly, a list of occupations in respect of 
which our subjects were required to express their 
'like', 'dislike' or 'indifference'. The occupation 
included in our list were selected from the lists mad 
by Collinsl and by Strong.2 Since some occupations 
are meant only for men and some only for women, we 
prepared separate lists for the two sexes. The list 
for men comprised 56 occupations and the list for 
women 52 occupations. The two lists and the direc- 
tions are reproduced in Appendix VII(a) and Appendix 
VTI(b) , respectively. 
153 subjects, 111 women and 42 men, 'rated 
themselves on the above lists. Their responses were 
analysed in order to determine the frequency of the 
checkings under each of the three categories - like, 
dislike and indifferent - for each occupation. The 
frequencies, also converted into percentages, are 
shown in Appendix F (Tables 1 and 2). 
The following Table shows for the female group 
the occupations: (1) which were liked by more than 
1 Collins, 1.ii. , The list of occupations is reproduced 
in Allan Macdonald's Ph.D. Thesis, Edinburgh 
University, 1939, pp. 80 -83. 
2 Strong, E. K. , Jr., Vocational Interest Blanks 
for Men and Women. 
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50% of the subjects and (2) those which were disliked 
by more than 50 %, in rank order of frequency:- 
Table 42. 




















Fact ory- worker 









Post Office- worker 
Telegraph- operator 
,e notice that the occupations which were more 
often liked by our subjects belonged mostly to the 
class of professions or highly skilled activities. 
On the other hand, most of the occupations that 
were 
more often, disliked fell . under the category of 
érical, semi -skilled or unskilled jobs. 
209. 
Table 43 shows for the male group the occupa- 
tions (1) which were liked by more than 50 per cent. 
of the subjects and (2) those which were disliked by 
more than 50 per cent., arranged in order of frequency 
Table 43. 






(Professor (Insurance Agent 










(Librarian (Laboratory Assistant 











Once again, we note that the occupations that 
belong to the class of professions or highly skilled 
work, and are thus attached greater social prestige, 
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were more often liked, while those coming under 
clerical, semi- skilled or unskilled jobs were more 
often disliked. The clergyman's occupation was more 
often disliked, . which is consonant with the unpopu- 
larity of the church and the related vocations among 
modern youths. The Civil Service was also more 
often disliked, which is due to the fact that the nain 
applies to a group of occupations with various ranks 
and denominations. Thus, Tables 42 and 43 indicate 
a general tendency for both the male and the female 
groups to express their interest in socially more 
'desirable' occupations and dislike for socially less 
desirable occupations. 
In order to determine which of the occupations 
were to be treated as of 'high' social standing and 
which as of 'low' social standing, we asked a control 
group of 30 women and 20 men students to rate each 
occupation as 'high', 'median', or 'low', with respec 
to the degree of social prestige generally attached 
to it (Appendix VIII) . The frequency of the ratings 
under each category together with the percentage is 
given in Appendix G. 
The following Table gives for the male group 
the lists of the occupations, which w_efinally 
selected as 'high' and 'low', respectively, on the 
basis of the ratings made by the control group. The 
frequency and percentage of the ratings are also 
































0 55 0 
4 40 20 
2 40 10 
3 40 15 
0 75 0 
1 60 
0,100 
1, 65 5 
3 40 15 
4 55 20 
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0 16 0 80 
0 20 0 100 
1 14. 70 
0 13, 0 65 
1 l2 ; 5 60 
1 17 
' 5 85 
0 0 65 
2 11110 55 
2 16 ` 10 80 
0 10;. 0 50 
1 13 ; 5 65 
4 12 ` 20 60 
0 17 0 85 
, 
0 14 0 70 
Lal e Group N = 20. 
evident from Table 44, occupations rated 
by 20 per cent. or less and 'high' by 40 per 
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cent. or more were treated as 'high', while occupa- 
tions rated high by 20 per cent. or less and low by 
50 per cent. or more were treated as 'low'. A cor - 
parison with Table 43 will show that eight or 50 per 
cent. of the occupations considered 'high' on the 
basis of rating were liked by more than 50 per cent. 
of our male subjects, while only one (clergyman) or 
6 per cent. of such occupations was disliked by more 
than 50 per cent. of the subjects. On the other 
hand, ten or 60 per cent. of the. occupations treated 
as 'low' were disliked by more than 50 per cent. of 
the subjects, while only one (photographer) or 6 per 
cent. of these was liked by more than 50 per cent. of 
the subjects. These differences reveal the general 
tendency for the group to show interest in the 
socially more desirable occupations and dislike for 
the socially less desirable ones. 
The following Table dives for the female group 
the lists of occupations which were finally treated 
as 'high' and 'low', respectively, on the results of 
the ratings made by the control group. The fre- 
quency and the percentage of the ratings for each 
occupation are also shown:- 
213. 
Table 45. 
Artist 24 080.00 
Author 26, o 36.6 
Broad- 
caster 1-7 0 56.66 






























keeper 0 12 
Cinema 
.Xttend,- 
0 ant 0 28 
0 1Confect- 
ioner 0 19 
333i Clerk 0 18 
0 Cook 0 22 
0 Dancer 1 14 
0 Dress- 
. maker 0 14 
3.33 
Factory 
jorker 0 28 
0 
Florist 1 17 
3.33 Fruiterer 0 19 
0 l'Jilliner 0 12 
Post 
Office 
Worker 0 17 
0 80.00 0 Shop Ass- 
istant 0 
O 90.00 0 
Telegraph 
0 100.00 0 Operator 0 
Typist 0 
-,,Vaitress 0 






















Table 45 shows that occupations rated low by 
3.33 per cent. or less and i,i , by 46.55 Per cent. or 
more were treated 'high', while those rated high by 
3.33 per cent. or less and low by 4Q per cent. or 
more were considered 'low'. A comparison with Table 
43 shows that 9 or 54 per cent. of the occupations 
considered 'high' on the basis of rating by the 
control group were liked by more than 50 per cent. of 
our female subjects, while none of these was disliked 
by more than 50 per cent. On the other nand, 9 or 
54 per cent. Of the occupations rated 'low' were 
disliked by more than 50 per cent., while only 2 
('Dancers and 'plorl st') , i.e. 12 per cent. of these 
occupations, were liked by more than 50 per cent. of 
our female subjects. This result supports the 
tendency we have marked for the mole group as well, 
na_nely, the sener_ al trend shown by the group to 
express interest in the socially more desirable and 
dislike for the socially less desirable occupations. 
rIavin determined the lists of 'high' and 
'low' occis estions for the male and the female groups, 
we counted the total number of checkings against 
'like' made by the two sexes in the two lists. 'le 
are presenting here the frequency distribution of the 
checkinvs on the 'higher' or more desirable occupa - 
bons, leaving that on the 'lower' or less desirable 
occupations to be presented subsequently under the 1 
'tendency to repudiation'. As will be seen in J 
215. 
Table 46, we have added the frequencies for the two 
sex group s to yield those for the total group, . 
feel justified in doing so in view of the statisti- 
callY negligible differences between the igeans and 






















8- 9 9 27 36 
6- 7 9 18 27 
4- 5 4 16 20 
2- 3 1 7 
e 
C- 1 2 












The following histogram is plotted from the 





Though the lists of occupations contain some 
items which are different for the two sexes, we find, 
as also pointed out above, no significant difference 
between the means or S.D's of the two sexes, as shown 
by Table 47. 
Table 47. 
Obt. Diff. Diff. t 




Table 48 shows that there is no significant 
association between expressed interest for the 'higher 
occupations and intelligence test scores:- 
Table 48. 
id Chi2 cti N 
122 0.032 1 4. 90.80 + 
A comparison between the checkings of those who score 
in the upper half of the distributio# of intelligence 
test and of those who score in the lower half, shows 
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no significant difference between the means as 
indicated in Table 49. The frequency distribution 
of the two sub- rgroupsis given in Appendix H. 
Table 49. 
Obt. Diff. 
0.02 0.57 .04 
Thus, we find no association between expressed 
occupational interest and intelligence, so that we 
can not presume that the less intelli;ent show a 
greater liking for the more desirable occupations 
than the more intelligent. 
le applied the Chit test of association to 
deter_aine the interrelationship of the measures we 
employed as indices of the tendency to imaginative 











N Chi2 ci. f P Sign 
112 7.247 1 4.005 + 
132 7.599 1 (.005 + 
133 2.921 1 4.10).05 + 
218. 
ï,ieasures 






























Table 5G shows a highly significant associatio 
between self- rating on abilities, self -rating on 
desirable traits List 1, and self -rating on desirable 
traits List 3. Since the components of these 
measures involve disparate aspects of personality, 
without any underlying basis of connection between 
them as actual characteristics of individuals, our 
statistical finding regarding their relationship can 
not be accounted for if we suppose that the self - 
ratings made by our subjects represent their 
objective evaluations of themselves with regard to 
the actual possession or lack of possession of the 
traits and abilities concerned. The relationship 
can only be explained if we presume that the ratings 
made by some of our subjects were determined by their 
general tendency to 'imaginative compensation' which 
made them overrate themselves in all the three 
measures, since by so doing they could present to 
others as well as to themselves a more 'acceptable' 
picture of their personality. Beside the fact of 
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the highly significant association between these 
measures, the tendency to overrate themselves is 
evidenced also by the high self -ratings made by our 
subjects in regard to the three measures. pis we 
have noted, our subjects showed on the average a 
greater tendency to affirm their possession of the 
abilities and accomplishments than to deny it (cf. 
P.199 ) Had they been uninfluenced by any factor 
other than the objective assessment of themselves, 
they should have, on the average, as often denied as 
affirmed their possession of those abilities. 
Similarly, w$ would note that in spite of the 
greater number of undesirable traits offered for 
self -rating, as compared to the desirable ones, the 
ratings in respect of the latter are, on the average, 
twice as large as those in the former, in case of 
Trait List 3, and about three times as large in case 








Here again, the traits presented for self -rating, 
being of extremely diverse character, were as likely 
to be actually possessed by a person as not, and 
consequently an objective evaluation of oneself in 1 
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respect of them should have yielded a comparatively 
lamer average for the group in the undesirable 
traits than the desirable traits. But the case is 
just the reverse. 
Contrary to our expectation, Table 50 shows a 
uniform lace of significant association bets een the 
expression of interest in more desirable occupations 
and the three other measures of compensation. ':íe 
feel just=ified in inferring, therefore, that express- 
ion of occupational interest is not influenced in the 
case of our subjects by the tendency to compensation. 
The reason is not far to seek. Our subjects be- 
longed to a class of undergraduate students of the 
university. University education is a preparation 
for the professions and the highly skilled vocations. 
Hence if a group of university students express a 
liking for the socio -economically higher class of 
occupations, they do so not to fulfil their need for 
compensation, but because by virtue of their training, 
they are ear -marked for them and for no inferior clas 
of jobs. The situation is different with respect to 
the other three variables. Then a random sample of 
abilities, mostly non scholastic, and of character 
traits of an extremely wide variety, are presented to 
these students, they are as likely to acknowledge the 
in themselves as not, since they may or may not be 
actually possessing them. but when we notice a wide v 
variability among them with respect to their affirma- 
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tion of these abilities and traits as belonging to 
themselves, we feel called upon to presume the 
operation of some deterinant of their judgment, 
other than their actual possession of the traits or 
abilities. '.dhen we notice, further, a significant 
relation between the affirmation of the abilities and 
that of the traits, which are very diverse in 
character, we find a reinforcement of our presumption 
regarding the operation of this additional determi- 
nant, or factor. But when from a list of occupation 
of a wide variety, our subjects show Greater interest 
in the socially more desirable ones, they do so 
because in virtue of their higher training they 
should have greater preference for them. Therefore, 
the expressed interest is determined by the objective 
factors provided by the environment and the higher 
training available to the students, and not by the 
tendency tq compensation, for one seeks compensation, 
on the level of imagination afld fantasy, in a positio 
to which he has no title in reality. Only he builds 
castles in the air who can not build one . on sand. 
Summary and conclusion:- (1) Self -rating on 
abilities, (2) self -rating on desirable trait -mes, 
and (3) expression of interest in occupations of high 
socio- economic status, were used as indices of the 
tendency to imaginative compensation; (4) self- rating 
on desirable trait -names, employed in our measurement 
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of projection, was also used_. 
definite tendency to overrate oneself was 
clearly evidenced in respect of all the four variable 
Measures on all the variables showed a consis- 
tent lack of association with intelligence test 
scores. It was inferred that the tendency to 
imaginative compensation is not at work only in less 
intelligent persons as compared to the more intelli- 
gent, since the need for compensation may not be 
aroused merely by a relative inadequacy in the 
intellectual realm. 
His'-ily significant association in the expected 
positive direction was found between (1), (2) anad (4) 
It was presumed, therefore, that the ratings in these 
cases were not determined only by the objective 
appraisement of real abilities and traits. They 
were also influenced by the tendency to portray an 
acceptable picture of oneself, what we have decided 
to call the tendency to 'imaginative compensation'. 
3xpression of interest in occupations of high 
social standing showed no significant association 
with any of the other three variables. It was 
supposed, therefore, that the subjects expressed 
greater liking for the professions or hishly skilled 
vocations, because, in virtue of their higher train- 
ing and scholastic attainment, they had earned a 
title to an occupation of this class. Their ex- 
pressed interests were not determined by the need for 
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imaginative compensation, but by their actual 
preferences for such occupations determined by 
opportunity and training. 
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Tendency to Repudiation. 
The tendency to repudiation has been treated 
by us as another factor which is responsbile for the 
falsification of questionnaire responses. To deter- 
mine this factor we used four different types of 
measures: (a) self- rating on occasional lapses of 
conduct, (b) self - rating on undesirable trait -names, 
(c) self -rating on interest in occupations having a 
low social standing, and (d) self -rating on belief in 
superstitións. All of these variables were presumed 
to involve situations which expose the individual to 
the danger of loss of social prestige and lowering of 
self - esteem. They were considered, therefore, to be 
likely to call for, in defence, the operation of the 
tendency to repudiation or denial. A detailed des- 
cription of each variable is given under a separate 
heading. The order of presentation is the same as 
adopted in our treatment of the measures of the 
tendency to compensation. 
Self -Rating on La se of Conduct. 
The items for this measure were taken from the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) The 
authors of the inventory have used these items as a 
check on the truthfulness of the respondents with 
regard to the rest of the inventory. Each question 
l Hathaway, S.R., and McKinley, J.C., Manual for the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. 
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relates to a very common laxity in every day conduct 
from which no one can, strictly speaking, claim per- 
fect immunity. As the authors observe, "The items 
are all stated in a way that tends to make even the 
most socialized subject who answers honestly confess 
to deviations from what is usually considered social].; 
desirable conduct. Apart from the special use they 
made of these items, they also suggest that the score 
in these items may be of interest in its own right 
as a measure of a special personality trendy'. We, 
accordingly, included these items among our measures 
of the tendency to repudiation. The list of ques- 
tions with direction for checking are reproduced in 
Appendix IX. 
Table 52 shows for the two sexes and the total 
group the frequencies of checkings on 'true' and 
'untrue', with respect to each item, together with 
the percentages of the checkings : - 
Table 52. 
37 Men. 122 Women. 
Frequency 
True 
1 25 61 36 
2 32 93 125 
3 36 114 150 
4 31 112 143 
5 11 30 41 
67.6 50.0 54.1 
86.5 76.2 78.6 
97.3 93.4 94.3 
83.8 91.8 89.9 
29.7 24.6 25.8 
8 46 54 1.6 33.6 34.0 
2 19 21 5.4 13.9 13.2 
1, 5 6 2.7 3.6. 3.8 
4 7 11 :1 0.8 5.1 6.9 
18 76 94 8.6 55.5 59.1 
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6 15 45 60 40.5 37.7 37.7 15 56 71 0.5 40.9 1111-.7 
7 34 114 148'91.9 93.4 93.1 0 1 1 0 0.7 0.6 
8 26 108 134`.70.3 88.5 84.3 7 9 16 8.9 6.6 10.1 
9 13 41 54 35.1 33.5 34.0 18 46 64 8.6 33.6 40.2 
10 32 93 125 86.5 76.2 73.6 3 21 24- 8.1 15.3 15.1 
11 34 106 140 91.9 86.9 38.1 2 14 16 . 5.4 10.2 10.1 
12 34 115 149 91.9 94.3 93.7 3 6 9 8.1 4.4 5.7 
13 36 117 15397.3 95.9 96.2 0 4 4 0 2.9 2.5 
14 22 57 79 59.5 46.7 49.7 13 58.71 35.1 42.3 Jifi .7 
15 31 79 110 83.8 64.8 69.2 3 23 26 8.1 16.8 16.4 
Table 52 shows that men confess more often than 
women to 'thinking things too bad to talk about (1)', 
'not telling truth always (2)', 'laughing once in a 
while at a dirty joke (10)', 'having inferior table 
manners at home than when out in company (14)', and 
'being disconcerted at losing a game (15)'; while 
women admit more often than men 'gossiping a little 
at times (8)', though the extent of the differences in 
terms of percentages is not large, ranging from 10.16;; 
- 19.03 %. The four items most often admitted by both 
sexes are the following, stated in rank order: - 
(13) Once in a while I put off until tomorrow 
what I ought to do today. 
(12) I do not read every editorial in the 
newspaper every day. 
(3) I get angry sometimes. 
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(7) I do not like every one I know. 
We note that each of these items refers to less con- 
sequential personal failings. The four items least 
often acknowledged by both sexes are the following, 
occupying the last four positions: - 
(5) If I could get into a movie without paying 
and be sure I was not seen, I would probably do it. 
(9) Sometimes at elections I vote for men 
about whom I know very little.. 
(6) I like to know some important people 
because it makes me feel important. 
(14) My table manners are not quite as good at 
home as when I am out in company. 
The total group seems to be more sensitive about these 
items than others because, perhaps, they involve a 
greater amount of social pressure. 
The following Table shows the frequency distri- 




Male Female Total Group 
15 1 1 
14 4 4 8 
13 1 19 20 
12 11 16 27 
11 9 27 36 
10 7 23 30 
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Lale Female Total Group 
9 1 12 13 
8 0 12 12 
7 1 6 7 
6 1, 2 3 
5 1 1 2 
N 37 122 159 
Liiean 11.14 10.53 10.67 
17- .34 ; .18 + .16 
CP" 2.04 - 1.95 . 1.99 
The following histogram is plotted from the 
frequency distribution for the total group:- 
Table 54 shows that there is no significant 
difference between the means and S.D's of the two 
sexes:- 
Table 54. 
Obi;. Diff. Diff. t 
Jeans 0.60 0.38 1.6 
6.D's 0.095 0.27 0.4 
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Table 55 shows that there is no association 
between admission of personal failin; s and intelli- 
gence level. 
Table 55. 
N Chit (If 'P Sign 
119 U.238 1 <.70).5C + 
Comparison between the means of the sub- úroups falli 
in upper and lower halves of the distribution of 
intelligence test scores also reveals lach of any 
highly significant difference as indicated in Table 
56. 
Table 56. 
'Obt, Diff. Diff. t 
0.75 0.36 2.1 
Thus, it does not seem very probable that less 
intelli`ent persons are more hesitant about admitting 
occasional lapses in conduct. Frequency distribu- 




Self -rating on Undesirable Trait -Names. 
As has been noted above, we found 20 trait- 
names in List 3 that had definite 'undesirable' 
character (p.202 ) . The following Table shows the 








1. Avoiding company 10 22 
2. Deceitful 3 5 
3. Dogmatic 6 35 
4. Egoistic 12 42 
5. Exacting 5 28 
6. Excitable 10 66 
7. Extortionate 0 1 
8. Fitful 12 33 
9. Hard -hearted 2 8 
10. Indecisive 15 49 
11. Malicious 0 2 
12. Overbearing 1 8 
13. Miserly 0 1 
14. Pretentious 2 4 
15. Self -distrusting 11 41 
16. Sly 16 62 
17. Sluggish 4 11 
18. Stubborn 15 49 
19. Submissive 4 15 


























Table 57 shows no remarkable sex differences. 
The traits of shyness, stubbornness, indecisiveness, 
egoism, self- distrust, receive the top rank ratings 
in both groups besides éxcitability in the female 
group and fitfulness in the male group. On the other 
hand, amöng the traits most often repudiated by both 
groups are: Miserliness, Extortion and Malice. 
The following Table shows the distribution of 














9 2 3 5 
8 1 6 7 
7 2 8 10 
6 2 11 13 
5 1 15 16 
4 9 15 24 
3 8 24 32 
2 5 13 18 
1 3 15 18 
0 4 7 11 
N 37 121 158 
Mean 3.51 4.04 3.92 
+ .38 + .24 + .20 
C" 2.34 2.61 . 2.56 
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The following histogram is clotted from the 
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fable 59 shows that the differences between 
the means and the S.Dss of the two sexes are not 
significant:- 
Table 59. 
übt. Diff. Diff. t 
ideans 0.53 0.45 1.2 
á.i)'s 0.27 0.32 0.84 
A comparison between self- ratings on undesira- 
ble traits of List 1 (p.11 tLt. and those of the present 
List (List 3) , shows that there is very highly signi- 
ficant association between the two variables, in 
spite of the dissimilarity between the component 
items of the two lists: - 
Table 60. 
NNT Chi2 ctf P Sign 
120 43.901 1 G.001 + 
,either variable has a significant association with 
scores in Intelligence Test .Lo. 33, as indicated by 
Table 61 :- 
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Table 61. 
Chit cti f N Sign 
Uncles. Trait List 1 1.443 1 ..30 >.2O 100 + 
Uncles. Trait List 3 3.452 1 4.10 ».05 116 + 
Comparison between the means of the sub- groups fallin 
in upper and lower halves of the distribution of 
intelligence test scores also reveals lack of signi- 
ficant difference for either variable as indicated in 
Table 62:- 
Table 62. 
Obt. Diff. Diff. t 
Uncles. Trait List 1 1.20 0.99 1.2 
Uncles. Trait List 3 0.45 0.50 0.9 
The frequency distributions for the two sub - groups 
are given in Appendix L. 
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Self -rating on Interest in Occupations 
of Low Social Standin. 
dé have given earlier (p.all ) the lists of 
occupations for men and women, respectively, which we 
decided to treat, on the ground of rating by a control 
group, as having low social standing. The following 
Table shows the frequency distribution of checkings 



















6-7 5 13 18 
4-5 11 24 35 
2-3 11 35 47 
0-1 12 32 44 
N 42 115 157 
.Jean 3.38 3.49 3.47 
+ .39 + .27 + .22 
0' 2.53 2.91 
2.28 
The following histogram is plotted from the 
distribution of the total. group. 
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Table 64 shows no significant difference 
'between the means and standard deviations of the two 
sexes. This fact gave us justification to treat the 
scores of the two sexes together under the total. 
group:- 
Table 64. 
Obt. Diff. S.E. Diff. t 




Table 65 shows a significant negative relation 
'between expressed interest in less desirable occupa- 
tions and intelligence test scores: - 
Table 65. 
N Chi Sq. Si Sign 
122 5.552 1 4.02%01 
A comparison between the means of the sub - groups that 
fall in the upper and lower halves of the distribu- 
tion of intelligence test scores also shows highly 
significant difference, as indicated by Table 66. 
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The frequency distribution for the sub - groups is 
given in Appendix M. 
Table 66. 
Obt. Diff. S.E. Diff. t 
1.50 0.50 3 
The difference is on the debit side for the 
more intelligent sub- group, as indicated in the 
association test also. In other words, the less 
intelligent persons showed greater liking for 
occupations of lower social standing than the more 
intelligent. It is difficult to account for this. 
Perhaps, a se ilse of inferior ability, brought home in 
the various spheres of their academic life, led in 
the less intelligent subjects to an extension of 
interest in the callings which make less demands on 
ability. Bradley1 has concluded from his review of 
various studies that the higher the intelligence of 
the individual, the more likely he is to choose a 
professional vocation, and the lower the mental 
ability, the more likely he is to choose a vocation 
from the semi - skilled or unskilled groups ". His own 
investigation resulted in the findings that "The 
higher the pupil's mental ability, the 'higher' is 
his choice of vocation." But Bradley's observations 
1 Bradley, ,l. A. , Jr., "Correlates of vocational 
preference," Genetic Psychol. Monog., Nov. 1943, 
Vol. 28. 
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are concerned with occupational choice, and not with 
occupational interest. In fact, expressed occupa- 
tional interest has been repeatedly found to have 
little relation to ability or even to measured 
occupational interest.2 Our interpretation, 
suggested above, is, therefore, not supported by 
previous investigations. Perhaps, the negative 
association found by us between intelligence test 
scores and interest in socially less desirable occu- 
pations is indicative of a greater range of interest 
among the less intelligent persons which is more 
clearly brought out in respect of the activities 
which lie below the level of those for which they 
are specially preparing. 
2 
Berdie, R.E., "Factors related to vocational 
interest," Psychol. Bull., 1944, 41, pp. 137 -158; 
Beddel, R., , "The relationship between self - 
estimated and measured interest," Journ. Apply 
Psychol., 1941, 25, pp. 59 -66; and Loffie, D.J., 
"The validity of self - estimated interest," 
Journ. Appl. Psychol., 1942, 26, pp. 606 -613. 
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Self-ratinF on Superstition. 
Primitiveness and superstition often go to- 
Bether. It is not meant that the more civilized 
groups are free from the influence of superstition. 
de intend only to emphasise that among the qualities 
which are manifested by an individual who is reared 
up in a civilized society, one of the most remarkable 
is his comparative freedom from beliefs which are not 
substantiated by or run counter to common day 
experiences. In other words, the capacity for 
'reality testing' or objective evaluation of ideas 
and beliefs, does not only grow with the age of a 
child, but also with the progress of civilization; 
or, it is not only bound with ontogenetic, but also 
with phylogenetic development. It is not unreason - 
able, therefore, to expect of a civilized and 
enlightened adult to blush, or to rationalize, if 
another person points to his susceptibility to super- 
stition. We presumed, accordingly, that though one 
may unwittingly manifest the influence of super- 
stitious belief on his conduct and attitude, he would 
be more likely to repudiate than admit this influence. 
Vie thought, therefore, that if we could prepare a 
list of some cone ^on local superstitions and ask our 
subjects to express their attitude with regard to 
them, that would provide us with still another index 
of the variable we are considering in this section, 
namely, the tendency to repudiation. Je expected 
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that subjects who are strongly under the influence of 
this tendency would show less readiness to confess to 
a belief in those superstitions arid that this fact 
would be revealed by the relationship between the 
number of superstitious beliefs repudiated by then and 
their scores in the other measures we used as indices 
of the tendency to repudiation. 
For our choice of the superstitions used by us, 
we are indebted to Dr. Wedeck. He had asked his 
subjects, in connection with the administration of 
some diagnostic tests of personality, to mention the 
superstitions which had influenced them from time to 
time. A wide variety of superstitions were indica- 
ted. From among, those, Jr. ;iedeck provided the 
writer a list of 10 superstitions which were most 
often reported. These are reproduced in Appendix X 
along with the direction. Dr. í edeck's subjectsaad 
mentioned superstitions having identical content, in 
different languages. Hence, for using them for our 
purpose, we had to translate them in the most 
appropriate language. For this we are :grateful to 
Dr. Collins who gave to each superstition the most 
suitable expression. 
It will be noted in the 'direction' that the 
subjects had to choose between three alternative 
responses: 'Always', 'Sometimes' and 'Never' 
(Appendix X). Since 'always' and 'sometimes' were 
equivalent for our purpose, we summated the checkings 
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under these categories and treated them as the same. 
Table 67 shows for the male and the female groups the 
frequency of checkings on 'never' and 'sometimes or 
always', with respect to each item, together with the 
percentage of checkings :- 
Table 67. 
Never Always or Sometimes 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
1 39 79 197.50 
2 29 37 172.50 
3 32 76 80.00 
4 35 90 87.50 
5 37 73 192.50 
6 39 101 97.50 
7 37 103 92.5C 
8 30 86 ;75.00 
9 38 110 } 95.00 





























76.79, 10 26 25.00 23.21 
98.21 2 2 5.00 1.79 
49.11 17 57 142.50 50.89 
N = 40 Men and 112 domen. 
The above Table shows remarkable sex differ- 
ences in respect of items 1, 2 and 5, that is, a 
relatively much larger percentage of women admit that 
they are 'bothered to see the new moon through glass' j 
(1); that they expect 'good luck if a black cat 
crosses their path' (2), and that they are inclined 
'to pick up a pin as it brings good luck' (5). The 
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largest percentage in either sex confesses to its 
uneasiness 'when required to walk under a ladder' (10). 
20 per cent. of the male and 31.25 per cent. of the 
female think that 'it is unlucky to spill salt' (3), 
and 25 per cent, of the male and 23.21 per cent, of 
the female think that '13' at 11 table is unlucky (8). 
On the whole the female group admits more often the 
influence of superstitions than the male, perhaps, 
because of the greater credulity and suggestibility 
of women, and, conversely, the conventional attribu- 
tion of _sore of the critical faculties to man. e 
can not decide at this stage how far the denial of 
the influence is factual and how far it is a self- 
defence, for it may be true as a matter of fact that 
women are more given to superstitious beliefs than 
men, or that men have to put up a stronger defence 
because being superstitious is socially more uncom- 
plimentary to them than to women. 
The following Table gives the frequency dis- 
tribution of checkin.gs against 'never' for the two 





:::ale Female Total Group 
10 15 21 35 
9 8 15 23 
8 8 21 29 
7 5 16 21 
6 1 16 17 
5 2 9 11 
4 0 6 6 
3 o 6 6 
2 1 1 2 
1 0 0 
0 1 1 
N 40 112 152 
Mean 8.48 7.23 7.56 
+ .28 + .21 + .18 
Cb- 1.75 2.20 2.16 
The following histora.m represents the 
distribution for the total `_.roup:- 
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Table 69. 
Obt. Diff. S.E. Diff. t 
Means 1.25 .35 3.6 
S.Dts 0.45 .24 1.9 
Table 69 shows that the difference between the 
means of the two sexes is highly significant, the 
female groups admits susceptibility to more super- 
stitions than the male group. There is no signifi- 
cant difference between the standard deviation for 
the two groups. In view of the highly significant 
difference between the means of the two sexes, we 
did not think it proper to combine them under one 
total group for the purpose of comparison with the 
other variables. We have accordingly treated them 
separately, using only the female group, as the 
number comprising the male group was rather small. 
The following Table shows no significant 
relation between intelligence test scores and denial 
of belief in superstition. 
Table 70. 
N Chi Sq. Í p Sign 
85 2.580 1 
85 Jomen. 
Comparison between those who scored in the upper half 
of the distribution of intelligence test and those 
Who scored in the lower half, shows no si =nificant 
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difference between the mean checkings on 'never', as 
shown in Table 80. 
Table 80. 
Obt. Diff. S.E. Diff. t 
0.98 0.52 1.9 
Table 81 gives the result of the Chit test of 
association used to determine the mutual relationship 
of the measures employed by us as indices of the 
tendency to repudiation: - 
Table 81. 
Measures Compared N Chi Sq. at P Sign 
Conduct -Lapse vs 
Undes. Trait 119 1.033 1 <.50).30 + 
Conduct -Lapse vs 
Undes. Trait3 151 2.834 1 <.10).05 + 
Conduct -Lapse vs 
Int. in 'Lo'' 0cc. 135 1.691 1 4.20).10 + 
Conduct -Lapse vs 
Superstition 103 1.142 1 ).30).20 
Undes. Trait1 vs 
Undes. Trait3 120 43.901 1 4.001 + 
Undes. Traiti vs 
'Low' Occupation 118 0.788 1 (.50.30 
Undes. Trait1 vs 
86 0.019 1 4.90>.80 - 
Superstition 
Uncles. Trait3 vs 
'Low' Occupation 
137 0.199 1 4.70)..50 
Undes. Trait3 vs 104 2.476 1 <.20>.10 
Superstition 
'Low' O c cup . vs 112 0.117 1 .(.80).70 
Superstition 
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Table 81 shows a highly significant positive 
association between self -rating on undesirable trait 
list 1 and self -rating on undesirable trait list 3. 
In other words, persons who underrate themselves on 
trait list 1, also underrate themselves on trait list 
3. The association may also suggest that those who 
overrate themselves on list 1 also overrate them- 
selves on list 3. But sinee the general tendency to 
underrate oneself on undesirable traits has been 
'clearly revealed by the large difference between the 
agerage self -ratings on the undesirable traits and 
the average self- ratings on the desirable traits 
(p.219 ) , the association is more likely due to 
underrating on both lists, than to overrating. The 
association can not be interpreted except on the 
assumption that the self -ratings are not determined 
merely by objective evaluation of one's traits but 
also by the tendency to repudiation which influences 
some subjects to underrate themselves on both lists, 
for the components of the two lists are entirely dis- 
similar in content. 
Table 81 shows that none of the three other 
measures, viz. self -rating on conduct -lapse, self - 
rating on superstitions, or self -rating on interest 
in 'lower' occupations, has significant association 
with any other measure. This may be interpreted on 
the ground that either these measures are not 
suitable for revealing the tendency to repudiation 
..e.s SEMV't .,7711... 
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among our subjects, or our hypothesis regarding the 
existence of such a tendency has no basis in fact. 
The second possibility may be set aside in view of 
the very high positive association between self - 
rating on undesirable traits List 1 and self -rating 
on undesirable traits List 3. Our conclusion is 
supported by numerous other investigations also to 
some of which we have already referred. These con- 
sistently point in the direction of the general 
tendency to underrate oneself on undesirable traits, 
which can be treated as another expression for the 
'tendency to withhold the admission of these traits - 
the tendency to repudiation. 
The first possibility, namely, the unsuitability 
of these measures to indicate the tendency to repud- 
iation seems, on closer scrutiny, to be strongly 
plausible. Turning to self- rating on lapses of 
conduct, we notice that the items used involve such 
common failings that a highly sophisticated and 
enlightened group like our subjects could not be 
easily motivated to deny them. Accordingly, we find 
that majority of the items were checked as 'True', by 
most of our subjects and 'Untrue' by very few of them. 
Thus, Table 52 shows that 10 oút of the 15 items have 
been denied only by 16.4 per cent. or less (p.2.2.5.2. 
quite obviously these items have little to contribute 
to the variance of the total scores made by our 
subjects. And since, these form two -thirds of the 
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total number of items, a comparison of the total 
scores with scores in any other variable is under the 
circumstances very unlikely to show a significant 
relationship. 
The same is true of the self- ratings on super- 
stitions. We find that our subjects consisted of a 
highly enlightened group of psychology students who 
were much more likely to be unaffected by supersti- 
tious belief than to be influenced by them. Their 
denial of susceptibility to superstition may have 
been actuated by fact than by any emotional considera 
tion. That being so, the self -ratings could not 
serve as a suitable measure for the tendency to 
repudiation. Only if the subjects were actually 
influenced by the superstitions but refused to admit 
this, could the self -ratings indicate the operation 
of the tendency. Our assumption that the self - 
ratings were based largely on fact is supported by 
the highly significant difference between the average 
ratings of the two sexes which is shown only in 
respect of this variable. Jomen being in fact more 
liable to superstitious beliefs than men, admit, 
accordingly, a larger number of these than men. 
Expression of interest in occupations of low 
social standing also provided no suitable situation 
for evoking the tendency to repudiation in our 
subjects. As the instruction for rating will show 
(Appendix VII. (a) and VII. (b)), we asked our subjects 
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to indicate their like, dislike or indifference with 
Iregard to the activity involved in the occupations 
concerned , disregarding the possibility of their 
taking them up. In other words, we explicitly 
instructed them not to indicate their occupational 
choices, but interest in the sort of activity com- 
prising an occupation. Hence, when, working under 
this set, some subjects expressed greater liking for 
the 'lower' occupations than others, this did not 
amount to their confession of something unacceptable 
in them, as was the case with the self -rating on un 
desirable traits. It only showed the extension of 
their interest beyond those lines of activities for 
which they were preparing themselves. That the 
interest might have been determined by 'curiosity', 
or by the association of the occupation concerned with 
Ha hobby, or any other trivial matter, is shown by the 
fact that among the 'lower' occupations 'photographer' 
was liked by more than fifty per cent. of our male 
subjects, and 'dancer' and 'florist' were liked by 
more than fifty per cent. of our female subjects . 
All the three involve highly interesting activities, 
though as occupations they may stand on a lower level. 
It seems reasonable, on above considerations, 
to conclude that neither of the three measures, 
na:ely, self- rating on conduct -lapse, self -rating on 
superstitions and interest in 'lower' occupations, 
was sufficiently potent to provoke, for one reason or 
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other, the tendency to repudiation in our subjects. 
The ratings are then not to be supposed as determined 
by this tendency and that is why they fail to show a 
significant relationship to any other measure. 
Summary and conclusion : - (1) Self- rating on 
undesirable traits, List 1; (2) Self -rating on un- 
desirable traits, List 3; (3) Self- rating on common 
lapses of conduct; (4) Self- rating on superstitions; 
and (5) Interest-in occupations of low social stand - 
ing, were used as indices of the tendency to repudia- 
tion. 
Highly significant positive association was 
found between the first two. It was concluded that 
the ratings were not determined merely by objective 
evaluation of personal characteristics, but also by 
the tendency to repudiation as a defence against 
lowering of self -esteem. 
No statistically significant association was 
found between the last three variables. An examina- 
tion of the contents of the measures showed that they 
were unfit to evoke the looked for tendency in our 
subjects. They could be used with advantage on a 
random sample of less sophisticated persons. 
There was no significant relationship between 
intelligence test scores and the other measures, 
except for interest in the 'lower' occupations. The 




In applying the factorial method of analysis, 
it is necessary that the same group of subjects 
should have taken all the tests. We found that 89 
subjects had taken all of our tests. Of these we 
left out the last four to keep the number at 85 - 62 
women and 23 men. Since the distributions of scores 
in some of our tests were badly skewed and irregular 
(p. i S ) we preferred to calculate Tetrachoric 
correlations, rather than using the Product Moment 
1 
method. In computing te$grachoric correlations we 
2 
used Thurstone's diagrams. Table 82 shows the t 
r 
between the scores of the 85 subjects in eleven tests. 
We did not include the 'superstition test' scores, 
since the latter showed highly significant difference 
between the means of the two sexes. Neither did we 
include the 'self- others ratia s' (p.196 ) as the 
number therewis much smaller. Correlation co- efficients 
indicating significant association (5'0 level) according to 
the Chit test are marked with an asterisk in Table 82. 
1. Vernon, P.E. Notes on Statistical Methods in 
Common Use in Vocational and Educational Research, 
III, Correlation Methods, para. 40. 
2. Thurstone, L.L., Chesire, L., Saffir, M., Computing 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In analysing the above correlation table, we 
applied Thurstone's Centroid Method, which has been 
designated by Burt as the 'simple summation Method' . 
For the details of the calculation, we referred to 
the accounts given by Vernon3 and Guilford .4 As 
will be noted, in guessing the ' communalities' of the 
various tests, we used the highest correlation co- 
efficient in each column, which was inserted in the 
diagonal cell at each stage of the factorisation 
(Appendix. f . ) . In view of the comparatively 
small size of our sample and the purely theorètical 
nature of our enquiry, we did not consider it worth 
while to use the method of 'successive approximation' , 
which calls for repeated revisions of the complete 
process of the analysis in order to make the guessed 
communalities approximate to the true values. 
As will be noted, in our analysis we have 
included only these measures which involved the 
process of rating, and, thus, left out Test 33. The 
analysis was carried to three factors. Table 83 
shows the factor loadings:- 
3 Op. cit., Factor Analysis, paras. l -27. 






2. Abilities. .211 -.549 -.266 
6. Des. Self 1 .470 -.582 -.110 
10 Des. Sef 3 .713 -.560 .196 
4. 'High' Occup. .589 -.072 -.229 
5. 'Low' Occup. .208 -.337 .390 
8. Uhdes. Self 1 .534 .794 -.352 
ll Uncles. Self 3 .452 ,727 .204 
3. Conduct Lapse .213 .167 .292 
7. Des. Other. .391 .063 ,250 




* The sum of the minus loadings is not equal to the 
sum of the plus loadings ,as required. 
1 
Since our 
calculations have satisfied the other checks suggested 
by Vernonaor Guilford'(Appendix P Tables 1 - 5), 
perhaps, this discrepancy is due to the fact that the 
guessed communalities do not make close approximation 
to the true values, We notice, accordingly, that the 
square of the loading of Factor II in Test 8 is not 
less than the guessed communality of that test used 
for the calculation of the second factor (Appendix R 
Table III) as it should be.4 
1. Vernon. op. cit. Para. 17. 
4. Vernon. op. cit. Para. G. 
2, orc7.t, 
3. Ot c3r 
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Similarly, Table 84 shows that the obtained communality 
for that test exceeds I, which is theoretically 
not possible. But as we have stated above, in 
view of the small size of our sample on which. 
Table 82 (p.151) was based, and starting with only 
a few significant correlation coefficients, we did 
not consider it orth while to repeat the process 
of analysis with revised commonalities and were 
content with interpreting the results Liven 
in the very first analysis. 
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Table 84 shows the squares of the loadings 
for each of the three factors and their sums. 
Table 84. 
Test 
2. Abilities. .044 .301 .071 .416 
6. Des. Self 1 .221 ..339 .012 .572 
10 Des. Self 3 .508 .314 .038 .860 
4. High Occup. .347 .005 .052 .404 
5. Low Occup. .043 .114 .152 .309 
8. Urides. Self 1 .285 .630 .124 1,039 
11 Undes. Self 3 .204 .528 .042 .774 
3. Conduct lapse .045 .028 .085 .158 
7. Des. Other. .153 .004 .062 .219 
9. Undes. Other .070 .056 .085 .211 
Total 1.920 2.319 ,723 4,962 
Average. .192 .232 .072 .496 
For testing the significance of the factor 
loadings we used the method suggested by Vernon,5 
namely, to see whether a certain loading exceeds 3 
times the standard error of zero correlation, which is 
;109 when N is 85. We note that six loadings in Factor 
I and six loadings in Factor II exceed this amount. 
Only two loadings in Factor III exceed 3 x .109 (Table 
83) . Hence we may conclude that the third factor is not 
significant. 
5. Cp . cit., para. 20. 
* Footnote p, 253. 
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Table 84 shows that the first factor accounts 
for 19.2 per cent. of the variance of the tests, the 
second factor for 23.2 per cent., and the third factor 
for 7.2 per cent. Together they account for 49.6 per 
cent. of the variance. 
We next pass on to the interpretation of the 
factors. Table 83 shows that the first factor has 
positive loadings for all tests. Its loadings are 
significant for six tests, and non-significant, 
though not very low for the remaining four. This 
factor may be interpreted as representing the 
'tendency to make arbitrary and lavish ratings' with 
regard to oneself as well as others. It seems at 
first sight, to be identifiable with what has been 
called the 'halo effect'. Symond6 discusses the 
nature of 'halo effect' and quotes, among others, 
ebb's observation regarding this process: Webb 
remarks "- - - that the observers in estimating the 
intelligence qualities are biased. in the direction 
of marking subjects who possess other desirable 
qualitities too .highly and vice versa." 
Hollingsiorth7 defines 'halo effect' as "the tendency 
for the strong impression of one trait to bias the 
estimates of all others". It seems, then that the 
'halo effect' is manifested in overrating a person on 
G Symond, P., Diagnosing Personality and Conduct, 
DD. 111 -113. 
7.Hollingworth, H.Ti., Judging Human Character, p.96. 
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desirable traits and underratiha him on undesirable 
traits, or, conversely, in overrating him on undesira- 
ble traits and underrating him on desirable traits, 
under the influence of some qualities which are con- 
spicuously and definitely indicated in him. But the 
factor which our analysis has revealed expresses the 
tendency to rate either oneself or another person in 
'the same direction on both desirable and undesirable 
qualities. It would not be proper to identify it, 
then, with 'halo effect'. In fact, it seems to us 
that the 'halo effect' is more akin to our second 
factor which, as will be seen presently, represents 
the tendency to overrate oneself on desirable traits 
and underrate oneself on undesirable traits. 
The second factor has significant negative 
loadings for tests 2, 6, 10, and 5 and significant 
positive loadings for tests 8 and 11 (Table 83). It 
has noisignificant loadings for tests 7 and 9, which 
involve rating others. It is thus a bipolar factor 
contrasting two groups of self ratings, namely, (1) 
those involving desirable traits and abilities, and 
(2) those involving undesirable qualities and 
attitudes. We find, at first, that interest in 'low' 
occupations presents an exception, since it falls 
under the same group with the desirable traits and 
abilities. But, in fact, this measure does really 
belong to the group under which it falls. As we 
have noted above (p.2.48), expression of interest in 
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occupations of low socio- economic level is not the 
same as expression of choice with regard to those 
occupations. It does not, therefore, expose the 
individual concerned to loss of social prestige and 
lowering of self -esteem, as vie thought earlier. 
As a matter of fact it works in the reverse direction. 
It enhances one's sense of personal value and fulfils 
the need for social acceptance as it affords the 
opportunity for giving evidence of one's catholicity 
of outlook, extolment of the dignity of labour, 
interest in the lowly and the humble, and disdain for 
the 'high brow' foppishness of the 'bourgeois' - qual- 
ities on which high premium is being put according to 
the modern standards of social values. We can, 
therefore, safely interpret the second factor as a 
bipolar factor of 'over-estimation - under- estimation' , 
manifested in the overrating of oneself on acceptable 
qualities and underrating of oneself on unacceptable 
qualities. That this tendency is definitely indicated 
in regard to self -estimation only is shown by the 
non -significant loadings for tests 7 and 9 (Table 83), 
which involve the rating of others on desirable and 
undesirable traits respe ctively. 
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We cari conclude from the above that our analysis 
affords clear indication of a bipolar factor of 
"over -estimation - under -estimation" which affects the 
reliability of self- estimates quite appre ciably; 
this factor accounts for 23.2 per cent of the 
variance of our total tests. It is now clear to us that 
the tendency to compensation and the tendency to 
repudiation which we presumed to influence self- rating 
on desirable and undesirable traits or activities, 
respectively, are not really separate mechanisms. 
Our analysis has shown them to be complementary 
processes. They serve the same need for the 
individual, viz. to win social approval and preserve 
one's self - regard. 
The first factor that our analysis reveals is 
also no less importait, thoughiwe did not anticipate it 
in the earlier part of our work. It seems to exert 
quite a potent influence on the reliability of 
self-rating; it accounts fOr 19.2 per cent of the 
variance of all tests. It appears quite legitimate 
to presume that the questionnaire responses lose their 
validity also because some testees make lavish, 
presumptuous or unsubstantiated ratings. Some check 
quite arbitrarily many it ems on 'yes' , others, many 
items on 'no' without duly considering their actual 
possession or lack of possession of the attitude or 
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10 
behaviour suggested in the item. Lorge 
reports a similar finding. He administered a number 
of personality and interest inventories to a group 
of adults. He found a positive correlation between 
the number of c he ckings on 'yes', or its equivalent, 
for the various inventories. Similar positive 
correlations were found with respect to the eheckings 
on 'no', as well as on'?'. The scoring of the tests 
used in our investigation, and inluded in correlation 
table (p.251), involved the affirmation or acceptance 
of traits, attitudes,abi_lities and interests. The 
positive loading of all the tests in the first factor 
supports the finding of Lorge. 
Summary and conclusion:- Tetrachoric 
correlation coefficients calculated between 10 of the 
measures used by us were subjected to factor analysis. 
Two factors were indicated: - 
The first factor represented the generp1 
tendency to make 'uncritical and lavish ratings'. 
The second factor represented the tendency 
to 'overrate oneself on desirable and underrate oneself 
on undesirable characteristics'. 
10. Lorge, I., "Gen Likes Halo or reality," 
Psycho'. Bull., 1937, 34, pp. 545 -546. 
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CHARIER 6. 
SUILNARY and CONCLUSION. 
Je noted a striking contrast between the 
reliability and validity of personality questionnaires; 
their reliability has been consistently reported to 
be fairly high, but their validity has been generally 
found to be poor. We traced this divergence to the 
errors of self- estimate on which the questionnaire 
responses ordinarily depend. A tendency to make 
flattering and fictitious responses was found to have 
been frequently suggested in previous investigations. 
It was presumed to account for the errors of self- 
estimate. 
We noted that the tendency to fake responses 
was not of necessity conscious and deliberate. It 
also seemed to influence a self -rater sometimes with- 
out his knowledge. This suggested the operation of 
some persistent factors of distortion which affect 
the questionnaire responses in a uniform manner and 
thus account for their high self -consistency. 
A survey of the allied literature suggested 
two probable factors of distortion: (1) Lack of 
insight or the capacity for self -knowledge; and (2) 
The need for conforming to the social standards of 
attitude and behaviour. 
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'e failed to determine the nature of insight. 
We could, however, find indications of the correlates 
of insight from. previous work. Those generally 
indicated ere abstract intelligence, liability to 
projection. and sense of humour. 
The need for social conformity appeared to put 
into operation, when not fulfilled directly in overt 
activities, certain mechanisms of defence. Of these 
(1) repudiation or denial, and (2) imaginative com- 
pensation seemed chiefly at work in the questionnaire 
situation. 
Repudiation was presumed to blot the memory of 
one's own 'unacceptable' thoughts and behaviour while 
responding to the questionnaire items. The term 
'repudiation',which may be both conscious as well as 
unconscious,was preferred to 'repression' since the 
latter always implies an unconscious process. 
Compensation was supposed to bring about a 
transformation of the memory of one's paBt attitudes 
and behaviour and, thus, work in putting up a 
'socially, and also personally, acceptable picture of 
oneself. 
The nee or social conformity was, thus, 
reduced to two factors: (1) Tendency to repudiation; 
and (2) Tendency to compensation. These two, in 
addition to (3) lack of insight, were finally adopted 
as the probable factors of distortion. 
Three groups of measures were assembled for 
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determining each of the three factors. The presence. 
of a factor was presumed to be indi cated by the 
inter -relationships between the measures under each 
group. 
For testing insight we used: (1) Intelligence 
Test 33, which is a test of abstract intelligence; 
(2) A test of projection which involved rating one- 
self and other persons on a set of desirable and un- 
desirable traits; and (3) Determination of the ratio 
between rating self and the average rating by others 
on a five point scale. 
The projection test showed some clear trends. 
A relation was indicated between abstract intelligence 
and liability to projection to the extent that those 
who fell in the upper half of the distribution of 
Test 33 were clearly found to be free from projection. 
But those who scored in the lower half showed only a 
general trend toward liability to projection. 
4e also examined, incidentally, the relation 
between liability to projection and sensitivity to 
the offensiveness of an attitude or character quality. 
The less sensitive group was definitely found to be 
free from projection. But the more sensitive group 
showed only a general trend to liability to projection. 
Determination of the 'self -other ratio' did 
not yield any conclusive result. The reason was a 
defect in the measurement. The average of ratings 
by others was based upon three ratings alone, since 
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many persons were rated either by done or by one or 
two other persons only. 
On the whole, our measures of insight did not 
offer any clear and direct indication of insight as a 
variable of personality. 
The two other sets of measures yielded more 
definite results. 
For measuring the tendency to compensation we 
used: (1) and (2) Self -ratings on two dissimilar 
lists of desirable traits; (3) Self- ratings on 
abilities; and (4) Expression of interest in 
occupations of high social standing. Highly 
significant positive association.was noted between 
the first three, which was interpreted as expression 
of the tendency to over- estimate oneself on desirable 
traits and a bilities. The last measure did not prove, 
on closer scrutiny, a suitable index of the tendency 
to compensation. Its lack of association with the 
other measures in this group thus seemed well 
warranted. 
l'or measuring the tendency to repudiation we 
used: (1) and. (2) Self- ratings on two dissimilar lists 
of undesirable traits; (3) Self -ratings on some 
common deviations frorocialised behaviour; (4) 
Self -ratings on belief in superstitions; and (5) 
Expression of interest in occupations of low social 
standing. Highly significant association was found 
between the ratings on the two lists of undesirable 
traits, in spite of their dissimilar components. 
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ire interpreted this as due to the tendency to under- 
¡ estimate oneself on socially unacceptable traits. 
The last three showed lack of significant association 
to any other measure in this group. A critical 
examination of these measures showed that they were 
not suitable for the purpose of evoking the tendency 
to repudiation in the group to which the measures were 
applied. 
Results of the two groups of measures revealed 
definite tendency among our subjects to over -estimate 
themselves on 'acceptable' traits and behaviour, and 
'under-estimate themselves on the unacceptable ones. 
Besides determining the interrelationship 
between the measures within each group, which was more 
directly related to our enquiry, we also tried to 
determine sex differences with respect to each of the 
measures. Hi h.ly significant difference was found 
only in self -rating on belief in superstition. We 
presumed that this difference was due to the greater 
credulity of women. 
Results of each of the measures of repudiation 
and compensation were compared to scores in intelli- 
gence test, Test 33. No significant association was 
found in any case, except for the expression of 
interest in occupations of low social standing. The 
association was negative, i.e., those whose scores 
fell in the lower half of the distribution of Test 
33 expressed a wider range of interest in the 
unskilled or semi- skilled occupations than those 
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whose scores fell in the upper half. 
Comparison between sub -groups classified on 
the basis of scores in Test 33, showed highly 
significant difference only for interest in occupations 
of low standing. 
Tetrachoric correlations were run between all 
the measures, except self -rating on belief in supr- 
stition, and the 'self -other ratios'. Significant 
correlations were found, in some cases, between 
measures placed by us within different groups. The 
resulting inter -correlation table was factor -analysed 
by the Centroid Method. 
The analysis yielded two factors. The 
first factor loaded all tests in the same direction. 
It was interpreted as representing the 'tendency to 
make arbitrary and lavish ratings', while estimating 
either oneself or others and with regard to desirable 
or undesirable characteristics. 
The second factor was a bipolar one since its 
loadings contrasted two groups of measurements; (1) 
those involving desirable qualities, and (2) those 
involving undesirable qualities. Expression of 
interest in occupations of low socio-economic level 
fell in the first group. It also, like the rest of 
the group, fulfilled the need for putting up an 
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acceptable picture of oneself. We realised, there- 
fore, that its inclusion under the measures of re- 
pudiation was not justified. 
The second factor had no significant loading 
for measures involving the rating of others. We 
interpreted it as expressing the tendency to over- 
estimate oneself on desirable and under- estimate 
oneself on undesirable traits and qualities, or, 
conversely, to under- estimate oneself on desirable 
and over- estimate oneself on undesirable traits and 
qualities. In this sense, this factor resembled 
'halo effect' influencing self -estimation of one's 
own characteristics. However, our earlier results 
had confirmed the preponderance of the tendency to 
over -estimate oneself on the desirable and under- 
estimate oneself on the undesirable. The second 
factor was, accordingly, presumed to manifest itself 
more conspicuously in this tendency than in the 
opposite trend to under- estimate oneself on the 
desirable and over- estimate oneself on the undesirable. 
The discovery of the second factor supported 
our hypothesis regarding the tendencies to repudia- 
tion and compensation. But instead of setting them 
apart, it showed them as functions of the same 
tendency adopting complementary modes of expression. 
We can draw some general conclusions from 
our results. 
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There are definite factors of distortion which 
act in a consistent manner in vitiating the reliability 
of self -estimate in answering personality 
questionnaires. 
The most important factor is the tendency to 
make an acceptable impression of oneself, expressed 
in 'over -estimation - under-estimation', with 
reference to desirable and undesirable traits, 
respectively. Questionnaire items involve reference 
to both desirable as well as undesirable attitudes 
and patterns oreaction, providing dichotomous 
choice reponses like 'yes', 'no', etc. , for checking. 
If a person is strongly influenced by tie tendency to 
'self- overestimation - self-underestimation', he is 
likely to check 'yes' anst the desirable items and 
' no' aginst the undesirable items, and thus make a 
high score in the favourable direction. 
The otter., factor also accounts for much of 
the distortion. Persons influenced by this factor 
are likely to check quite arbitrarily most items as 
'yes', or most itemsps 'no' , or even as ' ?' , if 
question responses are also provided, as usually done. 
The writer has compared, in the course of another 
investigation, the numbers of .che ckings on '?' in 
various sets of questionnaire items, and noticed a 
highly significant association. The result is not 
included here, as it opens up another problem, namely, 
2Gí8 
why some pers ons are more pr one to the ck on ' yes' , 
others on 'no', and still others on '?' . It is 
possible that this enquiry might reveal sane 
personality traits like ' confidence , 'diffidence' 
and so on, to account for the differential checking. 
The factor of insight which we expected to 
form one of the influences affe ctin3 thelaccuracy of 
questionnaire repponses did not come out very clearly. 
The reason is, perhaps, that the nature of insight is 
very dubious. If it means the capacity for accurate 
self-knowledge, a meaning which is akin to its usage 
in psychopathology, then insight would involve a very 
complex phenomenon embracing all factors which affect 
the accuracy of self -knowledge. In this case the 
factors which we determined above wou.also come 
under insight, for a person with strong influence of 
those factors is likely to suffer from the inaccuracy 
of self - knowledge and therefore to lack insight. It, 
then, seems to be no factor over and above those 
involving 'arbitrary rating' and 'tendency to over- 
estimation - under-estimation of oneself' . 
We _rave reiterated many times that our aim in 
this research was purely theoretical. The success of 
our endeavour can be judged from the fact that we have 
been able to isolate two persistent tendencies which 
are at work in lowering tie validity of personality 
questionnaires. We have been able to describe some of 
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their characteristics also and give them a rough 
opwation.al definition. We have also devised some 
tentative tests for measw°ing these tendencies,some 
of which have proved quite suitable. There is no 
doubt that they need reformulation and a thorough 
refinement. DTevertheless,theyJmay serve as a 
useful starting point,' 
g T T ,G1- Tfii 
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A -'i \iDIX I. 
Tu AIT LIST 1. 
name Christian Name gate 
Think of.2 persons of your own sex whom you know well enough to judge 
ee peculiarities of their character. The should not be our friends. 
friend is one with whom you are very in imate, w orn you desire -Eo meet 
yoften and whose company is a source of pleasure to you.) Write their 
es in the space below against numbers 1 and 2. Write your own name 




) 0 (other) 
3. S (self) 
Below is a list of character traits with 'S' and '0' printed against 
ch, Judge with respect to each trait whether you think it to be 
ssess'ed by any of the persons listed by you above, including yourself. 
atrait belongs to one or both of the persons, other than yourself, 
circle '0' (other). If it belongs also to yourself, encircle also 'S' 
pelf). If it belongs only to yourself, encircle o_n 'S' (self). For 
p , if 'D _strustful' is true of one or both of-the' other persons, and 
o of yourself, encircle 'S' and '0' in the following manner: - 
Distrustful 
If 'Distrustful' is true of one or both of the other persons and is 
true of yourself, encircle only '0', as : - 
Distrustful 0 S 
If 'Distrustful' is true only of yourself and is not true of the 
erpersons, encircle only 'S', as:- 
Distrustful 0 ® 
Read the above instructions very carefully and make sure that you 
e thoroughly understood them. 
Your answers will be held strictly confidential. 
List of Traits. 
Affectionate S 0 2. Ap_-lause- seeking S 0 
Arrogant S 0 4. Avoiding- company S 0 
Benevolent S 0 6. Broad- minded S 0 
Cliquish S 0 8. Cold- hearted S 0 
Cone ei t ed S 0 10. Congenial S 0 
Considerate S 0 12. Courageous S 0 
Courteous S 0 14. Credulous S 0 
Cowardly S 0 16. Degenerate S 0 



























Spit of ul 




































20. 5ner_ atic S 0 
22. Erratic 0 
24. Fault - finding ;S o 
26. Fraiik S o 
28. Generous o 
30. Good -tempered S o 
32. Heartless o 
34. Hot -tempered o 
36. Improvident U 
38. Irrit able o 
40. Kited- hearted S o 
42. Level- headed S 0 
44. Mercenary S o 
46. Lo o dy S o 
48. Open -minded S o 
50. Panicky S 0 
52. Public- spirited S o 
54. Reckless S o 
56. Self -absorbed S o 
58. Self- centred S o 
60. Self- depreciative S o 
62. Self -seeking S o 
64. Self- possessed S o 
66. Shy S o 









74. Treacherous S o 
76. Unas suming S o 
78. Unpracti cal S o 
80. Unambitious S o 
- o- 0- 0- 0- O- 
A'ít?t ENDIX II. 
name Christian Name 
Kindly rate the following trait -names as:- 
1. Commonly treated as strongly reprehensible (R). 
2. Commonly treated as undesirable but not strongly reprehensible (U) 
3. Commonly treated as desirable (D). 
Please indicate your rating by encircling 'R', 'U', or 'D', printed 
ainst each name, omitting that about which you are doubtful. 
If any name lacks uniqueness of significance, that is, is equivocal 
ambiguous, please encircle 'A'. 
Affectionate R U D A 2. Applause- seeking; R U D A 
,Arrogant R U D A 4. Avoiding- company R U D A 
,Benevolent R U D A 6. Broad- minded R U D A 
Cliquish R U D A 8. Cold -hearted R U D A 
,Conceited R U D A 10. Congenial R U D A 
,Considerate R U D A 12. Courageous R U D A 
,Courteous R U D A 14. Credulous R U D A 
,Cowardly R U D A 16. Degenerate ' R U D A 
Dependable R U D A 18. Distrustful R 'U D A 
Dogmatic R U D A 20. Energetic R U D A 
,Envious R U D A 22. Erratic R U D A 
Excitable R U D A 24. Fault -finding R U D A 
Fickle R U D A 26. Frank R U D A 
,Garrulous R U D A 28. Generous R U D A 
Good- humored R U D A 30. Good -tempered R U D A 
Hasty R U D A 32. Heartless R U D A 
Hospitable R U D A 34. Hot -tempered R U D A 
Ill- mannered R U D A 36. Improvident R U D A 
Insincere R U D A 3$. Irritable R U D A 
Just R U i) A 40. Kind- hearted R U D A 
Lethargic R U D A 42. Level- headed R U D A 
Malevolent R U D A 44. Mercenary R U D A 
iliserly R. U D A 46. Moody R U D A 
Obstinate R U D A 48. Open- minded R U D A 
Over- critical R U D A 50. Panicky R U D A 
Prudent R U D A 52. Public- spirited R U D A 
ivarrelsome R U D A 54. Reckless R U D A 
Secretive R U D A 56. Self- absorbed R U D A 
Self- assertive R U D A 58. Self- centred R U D A 
Self- confident R U D A 60. Self -depreciative R U D A 
Self- distrustful R U D A 62. Self- seeking R U D A 
Self- reliant R U D A 64. Self- possessed R U D A 
Sentimental R U D A 66. Shy R U D A 
Sincere R U D A 68. Sociable R U D A 
Spiteful R U D A 70. Tactless R U D A 
Talented R U D A 72. Timid R U D A 
Tolerant R U D A 74. Treacherous R U D A 
Trustworthy R U D A 76. Unassuming R U D A 
Unsympathetic R U D A 78. Unpractical R U D A 
Dishonest R U D A 80. Unambitious R U D A 
- 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 
name 
APPENDIX III. 
TRAIT LIST 2. 
Christian Name Date 
Below is a list of words some of which express desirable character - 
tics, that is, those about which you will be glad if you know that you 
ssess them, for example, 'truthful'. Some express undesirable 
aracteristics, that is, those about which you will be sorry if you think 
at they belong to you and which you would desire to relinquish, for 
ample, 'absent-minded'. Others express strongly reprehensible character- 
tics, that is, those which would occasion strong feelinLs of disgust and 
e in you if you realise that you possess them, or, expressions of strong 
otest if somebody wrongly attritbutes them to you, for example, 'deceitful' 
You are asked to indicate which of the following words express, 
cording to you, desirable (D) , undesirable (U) , or strongly reprehensible 
characteristics, by encircling D, U, or R, printed against each word. 
. Amicable D U R 2. Accommodating D U R 
Aimlause- seeking D U R 4. Arrogant D U R 
Avaricious D U R 6. Avoiding-company D U R 
Careless D U R 8. Chivalrous D U R 
I Cliquish D U R 10. Cold -hearted D U R 
, Cool -headed D U R 12. Conceited D U R 
Conscientious D U R 14. Cowardly D U R 
Credulous D U R 16. Cultured. D U R 
Cunning D U R 18. Degenerate D U R 
Dishonest D U R 20, Distrustful D U R 
Dogmatic D U R 22. Eccentric D U R 
Eraotionally- stable D U R 24. Enterprising D U R 
Envious D U R 26. Erratic D U R 
Excitable D U R 28. Extortionate D U R 
Fair- minded D U R 30. Fault- finding D U R 
Fickle D U R 32. Forgetful D U R 
Frivolous D U R 34. Garrulous D Ü R 
Gentle D U R 36. Hasty D U R 
Heartless D U R 38. Hot -tempered D U R 
Humorous D U R 40. Ill-mannered D U R 
Improvident D U R 42. Insincere D U R 
Intemperate D U R 44. Intolerant D U R 
Irritable D U R 46. Large- hearted D U R 
Lascivious D. U R 47. Lethargic D U R 
ïalevol ent D U R 59. Mercenary D U R 
lserly D U R 52. Modest D U R 











































































,Self-depreciating D U R 74. Self-distrustful D U R 
,Selfish D U R 76. :Self-seeking D U R 
, Sentimental D U R 78. Shy D U R 
Short -tempered D U R 80. Slanderous D U R 
Sober- minded D U R 82. Spiteful D U R.í 
Straight-forward D U R 84. Suspicious D U R 
Sympathetic D U R 86. Tactless D U R 
, Timid D U R 88. Treacherous D U R 
Unambitious D U R 90. Undependable D U R 
Unjust D U R- 92. Unpractical D U R 
Unscrupulous D U R 94. Unsympathetic D U R 
Untidy D U R 96. Untruthful D U R 
Upright D U R 98. Versatile D U R 
Vindictive D U R 100. dell-mannered D U R 
- 0 - 0 - 0 - U - 
name 
AFrEHDIX IV. 
Christian carne Date 
Think of 5 persons of your own sex in the Fsycholr Class with whom 
u are well ac uainted. They should not be your friends. (A friend is 
with whom you are vy intimate, whom you desire to meet very often, 
dwhose company is a source of great pleasure to you. An acquaintance 
a person whom you know very well because you happen to meet him very 
en in the class, club or other places.) drite the names of these 
sons (surname and christian name) in the space below against each of 
B, 0, D and E. `;cite your own nacre against F. Remember that you have 
cite the names of those persons only in the Fsycholoßy Class whom you 







Below is a list of 6 taes of descriptions with ,A, B, C, D, E and F 
under each description. Assign to each person listed by you the 
cription which you judge on the ground of ypur personal knowledge to 
acterise him most adequately, including yourself. Express your judg- 
nt by encircling the letter, or letters, Which correspond to the person, 
persons, to whom the description usually applies. For example, if 
scription Wunder Type 3 (page Z) applies to A, C and F (yourself) , 
circle these letters in the following manner: - 
W Liking for _cot .ct with ptïr es). A B D E F, 
!rive ,your honest judgment. Jei_ h our judgment very carefully before 
e ress it. 
Rest assured that your answers will be held strictly confidential. 
Read the above instructions carefully and make sure that you have 
roü hl understood ' eñ. 
DESCRIPTIONS. 
Under each type one description should be assigned to each person. 
ad all descriptions under a t, pe before you express your judgment.) 
TYPE I. 
3tr_° tendency to dominate, lead, organise in dealing with his (her) 
Iellows. 
A B C D E F 
`turn over 
Pendency to doz_inate, lead, organise. 
C 
Average: neither distinctly dominant nor submissive. 
A B C iD F 
Tendency to be Massive in contact with his (her) fellows. 
A 2,CDEF 
Strong tendency to be passive in contact with his (her) fellows. 
A B C D F 
TYPE 2. 
ci6h11 self - confident and exceptionally well adjusted to the environment; 
possessing unusual ability to face facts objectively and deal with them 
without internal conflict. 
A B C D E F 
Self -confident; well adjusted to the environment. 
A B C D E F 
xverag-es neither distinctly self - confident nor self -conscious. 
A 3 C D F F 
Self -conscious, shy. IIazyy have emotional difficulties. 
li B C D L F. 
2atremely self -conscious, shy and emotionally unstable. 
A B C D E F 
TYPE 3. 
hr, ónß liking for contact with others in the environment. Preferring 
company both while working and during leisure hours. Showing a strong 
tendency to talk proble.::s over and consult others before executing 
decisions. 
A B C D E F 
Liking for contact with others. 
A 3 C D E F 
tiverare 
s neither distinctly social nor solitary. 
A B C D E F 
Turn over 
Liking; for freedom from contact from others in the environnent. 
Preferring to be alone both while working: and during leisure hours. 
Showing a tendency to be contented with awn judgment in reaching 
decisions and formulating plans. 
A B C D E F 
Strong liking for freedom from contact. 
A B C D E F 
- 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 
name 
AFYLNDIX V. 
Christian Nanie Date 
Indicate below what kind of a person you are now and what you have 
Encircle 'Yes' if the item really describes you. Encircle 'No' 
it dóes not describe you. Encircle ' ?' if you are not sure. 
Be frank and honest and do not hesitate in pointin-- out jour weal 
nts. Res assure hat your answers wi_lTe 117e-id strictly confidential. 
Yes No ? Usually start activities of my group. 
Yes No ? Usually drive myself steadily (do not work by fits and 
starts). 
Yes No ? Win friends easily. 
Yes No ? Usually get other people do what I want done. 
Yes No ? Jsually liven up the group on a dull day. 
Yes No ? _i quite sure of myself. 
Yes No ? Accept just criticism without getting cross. 
Yes No ? Have mechanical ingenuity. 
Yes No ? Can carry out plans assigned by other people. 
Yes . No ? Can discriminate between more or less important matters. 
Yes No ? Am inclined to be reticent in confidential and semi - 
confidential matters. 
Yes No ? Am always on time with my work. 
Yes No ? Relaember faces, names and incidents better than the average 
person. 
Yes No ? Can correct others without giving offence. 
Yes No ? Am able to meet emergencies quickly and effectively. 
Yes No ? Can write a concise well organised report. 
Yes No ? Have -;ood judgment in appraising values. 
Yes No ? Plan my work in detail. 
Yes No ? Smooth out tangles and disagreements between people. 
Yes No ? Discuss my ideals with others. 
- 0- 0- 0- 0- 0- 
APEL%1DIX VI. 
TRAIT LIST 3. 
Below is a list of 
they you think it to 
wing a circle around 
Give your honest judment. 
adjectives . 
be true of 
the letter 
Rest 
Judge with respect to 








that your answers 
ain strictly confidential. 
Acco nno dating S 2. Affable S 
Artful S 4. ivoi ding company S 
Calculating S 6. Charitable S 
Conciliatory S 8. Conventional S 
Over -critical S l0. Dauntless S 
Deceitful S 12. Dog,raat i c S 
Egoistic S 14. Exacting 
Excitable S 16. Extortionate S 
Fitful S 18. Flexible S 
Forgiving S 20. Formal S 
Hard -hearted S 22. Honest S 
Indecisive S 24. Independent S 
Introverted S 26. Logical S 
aaliciou.s S 28. ï:,odest S 
Outspoken S 30. Overbearing S 
Parsimonious S 32. Liserly S 


























Submissive S 48. Suggestible cS 1..) 
Sympathetic S 50. Vindictive S 
- - 0- 0- 0- 0- 
name 
APPENDIX VII( a ) . 
Christian Name Date 
Indicate after each occupation listed below whether you would like that 
d of work. Disc regard conditions of salary, social standing, future 
sect what etc. Consider only whether you would like to do is 
o ved in he occupation. You are not asked if you would take up the 
cupation permanently, but merely whether you would enjoy that kind of 
k, regardless of any skills, abilities, or training which you may or 
not possess. 
Draw a circle around 'L' if you like that kind of work. 
Draw a circle around 'I' if youa.z`itdifferent to that kind of work. 
Draw a circle around 'D' if you dislike that kind of work. 
ork rapidly. Your first impressions are desired. Answer all the items 
List of Occupations. 
(Men) . 
Accountant L I D 29. Farmer L. I D 
Actor L I D 30. Hotel manager L T D 
Advertiser L I D 3l.Insurance agent L I D 
Artist L I D 32. Jeweller L I D 
Auctioneer L I D 33. Judge L I D 
Author L I D 34. Laboratory assistant L I D 
Aviator L I D 35. Lawyer L I D 
Architect L I D 36. Librarian L I D 
Army officer L I D 37. Manufacturer L I D 
Book seller L I D 38. Musician L I D 
Botanist L I D 39. Paint er L I D 
Broadcaster L I D 40. Photographer L I D 
Builder L T D 41. Poet L I D 
Carpenter L I D 42. Policeman L I D 
Cartoonist L I D 43. Politician L I D 
Chemist L I D 44. Psychologist L T D 
Cinema attendant L I D 45. Printer L D 
Civil servant L I D 46. Professor L T D 
Clergyman L I D 47. Reporter L D 
Clerk L I D 48. Research worker L I D 
Commercial traveller L I D 49. Sailor L I D 
Confectioner L I D 50. Salesman L I D 
Dentist L I D 51. Scientist L I D 
Doctor L I D 52. Sculptor L T D 
Editor L I D 53. Social worker L I D 
Engineer L I D 54. Surgeon L T D 
Factory worker I D 55. Tailor L I D 
Factory manager I D 56. Zoologist L T D. 
- 0- 0- 0- 0- 0- 
naine 
APPENDIX VII(b). 
Christian Name Date 
Indicate after each occupation listed below whether you would like 
at kind of work. Disregard conditions of salary, social standing, future 
sect etc. Consider only whether you would like to do what is 
volve in the occupation. You are not asked if you would take up the 
cupation permanently, but merely whether you would enjoy that kind of work, 
prdless of any necessary skills, abilities, or training which you may or 
not possess. 
Draw a circle Ground 'L' if you like that kind of work. 
Draw a circle around ' I' if you are indifferent to that kind of work. 
Draw a circle around. 'D' if you dislike that kind of work. 
.Mork rapidly. Your first impressions are desired. Answer all the item 




























L I D 27. Fruiterer L I D 
L I D 2$. Lawyer L I D 
L I D 29. Librarian L I D 
L I D 30. Milliner L I D 
L I D 31. Musician L I D 
L I D 32. Nurse L I D 
L I D 33. Poetess L I D 
L I D 34. Opera singer L I D 
L I D 35. Painter L T D 
L I D 36. Photo;rapher L I D 
L I D 37. Politician L I D 
L I D 38. Post office worker L I D 
L I D 39. Professor L I D 
L I D 40. Psychologist L I D 
L I D 41. Reporter L I D 
L I D 42. Research worker L I D 
L I D 43. Scientist I D 
L I D WI. Secretary L I D 
L I D 45. Shop assist ant I D 
L I D 45. Social worker L I D 
L I D 47. Surgeon L I D 
L I D 43. Teacher L I D 





















- 0- O- 0- 0- 0 - 
APPENDIX VIII (a) . 
.i s -choloRy Department, Edinburgh University. 
Below is a list of occupations with the letters H, M, and L, standing 
^'high' , 'median', and 'low', printed ay:ainst each. You are requested 
indicate the order of social standing, i.e., high, median, or low, to 
jeh an occupation belongswrith respect to the degree of social prestige 
erally attached to it. If an occupation is of high social standing 
ease draw a circle around H; if it is of median. - neither high nor low - 
,ial standing, draw a circle around M; and if it is of low social 
ending, draw a circle around L. 






































H E L 
H M L 
H M L 













27. Fruiterer H M L 
28. Lawyer H Iri L 
29. Librarian H M L 
30. Milliner H M L 








M TL L 
L 
34. Opera singer H Ii'I L 
35. Painter H M L 
36. Photographer H ì:í L 
7. Politician H I.i L 
38. Post office worker H M L 
39. Professor H M L 
40. Psychologist H r.i L 
41. ;Reporter H L 
42. Research worker H M L 
43. Scientist H IuI L 
44. Secretary H IiI L 
45. Shop assistant H L 
46. Sociel worker H 141 L 
47. Sur eon H M L 
48. Teacher H I,i L 
49. Telegraph operator H M L 
50. Typist H I4ï L 
51. Jai tress H M L 
52. 4ireless operator H M L 
- 0- 0- 0- 0- 0- 
APIEi`T.DIIL VIII (b) . 
Psychology :De-rartnent, Ldinbur . University. 
Below is a list of occui)ationsßwith the letters H, M, and L, standing 
;'high', '- tedian', and 'low', printed against each. You are requested 
indicate the order of social standing, i.e. , high, median, or low, to 
ich an occupation belongs with respect to the degree of social prestige 
erally attached to it. If an occupation is of high social standing 
;ase draw a circle around 'H' ; if it is of medi an - neither high nor low - 
lial standing, draw a circle around 'i;l', and. if it is of low social 
ending, draw a circle around 'L . 
Check each iteïi. 
List of Occupations. 
(Men) . 
Accountant H 1I L 29 . T arm er H IeI L 
Actor H k L 30. Hot el manager H Id L 
Advertiser H M L 31. Insurance agent H hI L 
Artist H LI L 32. Jeweller H II L 
Auctioneer H M L 33. Judge H ï,I L 
Author H M L 34. Laboratory assistant H L 
Aviator H I.'I L 35. Lawyer H IrI L 
Architect H M L 35. Librarian H S 
Array officer H M L 37. A;Ianuf a ctur er H L 
Book seller H 
Botanist H 
M L 38. Musi clan H 





Broadcaster H M L 40. Photographer H Iil L 
Buil der II M L 41. Poet H L 
C arm ent er H M L 42. Policeman H Iï L 
Cartoonist H M L 43. Politician H L 
Chemist 





44. Psychologist H 





Civil servant H hI L 46. Prof essor H Ili L 
Clergyman H M L 47. Reporter H P,I L 
Clerk H M L 4-8. Research worker H flI L 






49. Sailor H 





Dentist H tlI L 51. ,.>ciencist H rI L 
Doctor H M L 52. sculptor H L 
Editor H M L 53. Social worker H I:I L 
Engineer H M L 54. Surgeon H Idi L 
Factory worker H M L 55. Tailor H I:ï L 
Factory manager H M L 56. Zoologist H ILT L 
- 0 - O - 0 - - O - 
One 
A22IlADIX IX. 
Christian Name Date 
e; Country or Town. ;.arri ed or unmarried. 
(Cross whichever not applicable.) 
Below you find a number of statements about some transitory attitudes 
activities. Encircle 'l' if a statement is true of yourself. Encircle 
(untrue) , if it is untrue of yourself. Encircle '?', if you are not 
e whether it is true or untrue of yourself. 
Be frank and honest and do not hesitate in pointing out your defects. 
t assured that your answers will be held strictly confidential. 
Once in a while I think of things too bad to talk about. 
I do not always tell the truth. 
I get angry sometimes. 
Sometimes when I am not feeling well I WA cross. 
If I could `;et into a movie without -0ayi ng and be sure 
I was not seen I would probably do it. 
I like to know some important people because it makes 



















I do not like every one I know. T U ? 
I gossip a little at times. T U ? 
So:etLaes at elections I vote for men about whom I know 
very little. T U ? 
Once in a while I laugh at a dirty joke. T U ? 
At times I like T U ? 
I do not read every editorial in the newspaper every day. T U ? 
Once in a while I put off until tomorrow what I out to 
do today. T 
U 
? 
;,iy table manners are not Quite as good at haine as when I 
an out in company. T U ? 
,I would rather win than lose in a game. T U ? 




Christian Name Date 
(Town) (Country) 
There are some common beliefs which influence most of us. They relate 
some of the every day occurrences of life. A list is given below with 
ways', 'Sometimes' and 'Never' printed against each item. You are to 
dicate in each case how have you been affected by it. If you are always 
Petted by it, underline 'Always'. If sometimes you have been affected 
it and sometimes not, underline 'Sometimes'. If you have never been 
ected by it, underline 'Never'. 
Before indicating your reactions, make sure that you have made an 
urate estimate. 
Does it bother you to see the new moon 
through glass? 
If a black cat crosses your path, do you 
think that it might bring good luck? 
Do you think it is unlucky to spill salt? 
If a mirror falls and breaks, would you 
expect ''seven years' bad lucid' or a 
misfortune of some kind? 
Are you influenced by the rhyme: 
"See a pin and pick it up 
All day long you'll have good lucks ? 
Does the seeing of a solitary magpie 
suggest misfortune to you? 
If on returning home you find that'your 
umbrella is wet, would you have 
scruples about opening it? 
Do you think 13 at table unlucky? 
When ordering or buying something new to 
wear, would you be reluctant to choose 
material of a'green colour? 
Are you uneasy when required to walk under 
a ladder which is in your path? 
Always B(x_,.etime s Never 
Always Sometimes Never 
Always Sometimes Never 
Always Sometimes Never 
Always Sometimes Never 
Always Sometimes Never 
Always Sometimes Never 
Always Sometimes Never 
Always Sometimes Never 




3, Applause - seeking 
Arrogant 
5. Avaricious 
6. Avoiding -coy _nary 
1. Careless 





















9. Fair -minded 


















Let har;.i c 




hens. Des. :Jides. eore- I1ens. 
"id F lYl 1? ' hl li 
34 74 1 100 99 1 
30 72 4 3 33 96 12 4 
1 1 29 60 4 14 3 1 85 80 12 19 
1 13 44 21 30 1 38 59 64 40 
1 7 21 27 53. 1 21 28 79 71 
1 5 30 62 3 7 3 7 88 33 9 9 
1 31 71 3 3 1 91 95 9 4 
33 75 1 97 100 3 
29 61 5 14 35 81 15 19 
1 2 18 42 15 31 3 3 53 55 44 41 
34 75 100 100 
1 18 42 16 32 1 53 55 47 43 
31 73 2 2 91 97 6 3 
11 32 23 43 32 43 63 57 
3 9 28 61 3 5 9 12 82 81 9 7 
34 74 1 10() 99 1 
4 15 26 19 45 5 44 35 56 60 
16 25 18 50 47 33 53 67 
5 9 29 65 15 12 35 87 
1 20 42 14 32 1 59 56 41 43 
3 4 24 65 7 6 9 5 70 87 21 8 
2 2 28 66 2 7 6 3 32 88 6 9 
30 61 4 13 1 8:; 81 12 17 1 
34 75 100 100 
1 21 54 13 20 1 62 72 38 27 
1 3 31 58 2 4. 3 4 91 91 6 5 
2 6 31 67 2 6 8 91 89 3 
4 29 30 44 12 39 88 59 
34 75 1CG 100 
25 54 9 21 73 72 26 28 
29 58 5 17 85 77 15 23 
34 74 1 100 99 1 
2 5 28 65 2 5 6 7 82 87 6 7 
1 1 26 62 7 12 3 1 76 83 21 15 
30 72 4 3 88 96 12 4 
2 31 70 1 5 6 91 93 3 7 
1 14 30 20 44 1 41 40 59 59 
1 22 64 11 11 3 65 85 32 15 
33 75 1 
12 27 22 48 
97 100 3 
35 36 64 64 
29 63 4 9 85 84 12 12 
12 32 22 43 35 43 55 57 
2 23 46 11 26 3 68 61 32 35 
1 14 43 20 25 1 41 64 59 35 
27 59 7 16 79 79 27 21 
30 74 4 1 °:.J ^J 99 12 1 
8 16 21 51 23 21 52 68 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































97. Upright 33 74 1 1 97 99 3 1 
g8. Versatile 34 72 3 100 96 4 
99. Vindictive 16 26 18 47 47 35 53 63 
00. :Jell- maiin ered 34 75 100 100 
= 34 Len. 
75 :Jomen. 
Trait -names taken from List 1 are marked with an asterisk. 
APPENDIX B. 
(1) 
Self -rating on Desirable Traits, List 1. 
Group 1 
(Upper Half Test 33) 
Group 2 
(sower Half Test 33) 
Score Frequency Score Frequency 
22 - 23 9 22 - 23 5 
20 - 21_ 8 20 - 21 12 
18 - 19 6 18 - 19 8 
16 - 17 11 16 - 17 7 
14 - 15 6 14 - 15 7 
12 - 13 0 12 - 13 6 
10 - 11 7 10 - 11 2 
8 - 9 1 8 - 9 0 
6- 7 1 6 - 7 1 
4 - 5 0 4 - 5 1 
2 - 3 1 2 - 3 0 
0 - 1 1 
N 50 N 50 
Mean 1'.74 + .67 Mean 16.62 + .66 
S.D. 4.71 S.D. 4.69 
(2) 
Rating Others on Desirable Traits, List 1. 
Group 1 
(Upper Half Test 33) 
Group 2 
(Lower Half Test 33) 
Score Frequency Score Frequency 
24 : 25 5 24 - 25 5 
22 - 23 10 22 - 23 9 
20 - 21 9 20 - 21' 10 
18 - 19 10 18 - 19 10 
16 - 17 10 16 - 17 4 
14 - 15 3 14 - 15 7 
12 - 13 3 12 - 13 2 
10 - 11 1 
8 - 9 0 
6 - 7 1 
4 - 5 1 
N 50 N 50 
Mean 19.26 + .47 Mean 18.58 + .62 
S.D. 3.30 S.D. 4.40 
(3) 
Self- rating on Undesirable Traits, List 1. 
Group 1 
(Upper Half Test 33) 
Group 2 
(Lower Half Test 33) 
Score Frequency Score Frequency 
22 - 23 
20 - 21 
18 - 19 
16 - 17 
14 - 15 
12 - 13 
10 - 11 
8 - 9 
6 - 7 
4- 5 
2- 3 




















20 - 21 
18 - 19 
15 - 17 
14 - 15 
12 - 13 
10 - 11 
8 - 9 
6 - 7 
4 - 5 




















Rating Others on Undesirable Traits, List 1. 
Group 1 
(Upper Half Test 33) 
Group 2 
(Lower Half Test 33) 
Score Frequency Score Frequency 
22 - 23 
20 - 21 
1 
3 
18 - 19 4 18 - 19 1 
16 - 17 2 16 - 17 1 
14 - 15 4 14 - 15 1 
12 - 13 4 12 - 13 3 
10 - 11 5 10 - 11 4 
8 - 9 3 ffi- 9 4 
6 - 7 4 6 - 7 9 
4 - 5 8 4 - 5 7 
2- 3 10 2- 3 6 
0 - 1 6 0 - 1 10 
N 50 N 50 
Mean 7.66 + .80 Mean 7.14 + .85 
S.D. 5.67 S.D. 6. 01 
APPENDIX C. 
(1) 






Repugnance Test ) 
Score Frequency Score Frequency 
22 - 23 
20 - 21 
18 - 19 
lti - 17 
14 - 15 
12 - 13 
10 - 11 
8 - 9 
6 - 7 
4 - 5 
2 - 3 




















22 - 23 
20 - 21 
18 - 19 
16 - 17 
14 - 15 
12 - 13 
10 - 11 
8 - 9 

























Score Frequency Score Frequency 
24 - 25 4 24 - 25 6 
22 - 23 10 22 - 23 11 
20 - 21 7 20 - 21 10 
18 - 19 10 18 - 19 9 
16 - 17 10 16 - 17 5 
14 - 15 4 14 - 15 5 
12 - 13 3 12 - 13 2 
10 - 11 1 10 - 11 0 
8- 9 0 8- 9 o 
6 - 7 0 6- 7 2 
4 - 5 1 
N 50 N 50 
Lean 18.54 + .57 I:iean 19.18 + .50 
S.D. 4.01 S.D. 4.17 
(3) 







Score Frequency Score Frequency 
22 - 23 
20 - 21 
18 - 19 
16 - 17 
14 - 15 
12 - 13 
10 - 11 
8 - 9 
6 - 7 
4- 5 
2- 3 

















7.10 + .79 
5.52 
16 - 17 
14 - 15 
12 - 13 
10 - 11 
8 - 9 
6 - 7 
4- 5 
2- 3 

























Score Frequency Score Frequency 
22 - 23 l 22 - 23 1 
20 - 21 1 20 - 21 2 
18 - 19 2 18 - 19 4 
16-17 1 16 - 17 2 
14 - 15 2 14- 15 1 
12 - 13 3 12 - 13 LI- 
10 - 11 6 10 - 11 4 
8 - 9 4 8 - 9 2 
6 - 7 3 6 - 7 11 
4- 5 8 4 - 5 4 
2- 3 11 2 - 3 5 
0 - 1 8 0 - 1 10 
N 50 N 50 
Lean 6.94 + .83 Mean 8.02 + .91 
3.D. 5.79 S.D. 6.39 
APPENDIX D. 
Self -rating on Abilities. 
Group 1 
(Upper Half Test 33) 
Group 2 
(Lower Half Test 33) 
Score Frequency Score Frequency 
16 - 17 1 14 - 15 1 
14 - 15 1 12 - 13 7 
12 - 13 4 10 - 11 16 
10 - 11 15 8 - 9 14 
8- 9 20 6- 7 18 
6 - 7 12 4 - 5 2 
4 - 5 7 2- 3 1 
0 - 1 1 
N 60 N 60 
Mean 8.63 + .34 Mean 8.63 T .33 
S.D. 2.63 S.D. 2.53 
APJT L!iDIX E. 
Self- rating on Desirable Traits, List 3. 
Group 1 
(Upper Half Test 33) 
Group 2 
(Lower Half Test 33) 
Score Frequency Score Frequency 
14 - 15 1 14 - 15 2 
12 - 13 5 12 - 13 6 
10 - 11 21 10 - 11 13 
8- 9 14 8- 9 10 
6 - 7 11 6 - 7 14 
4- 5 3 4- 5 10 
2 - 3 3 2 - 3 0 
0- 1 3 
N 58 N 58 
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.j-4-44 -4 4 4 4 -4 
Occupation Frequency Percentage 
D I L D I 
50. Typist 12 76 27 10.44 66.12 23.49 
51. `daitress 13 87 15 11.31 75.69 13.05 











9. .rmy officer 







17. Cinema attendant 
13. Civil servant 
19. Clergyman 
20. Clerk 






27. Factory worker 
28. Factory manager 
29. Farmer 
30. Hotel manager 
31. Insurance agent 
32. Jeweller 
33. Judge 
34. Laboratory assistant 
35. Lawyer 
36. Librarian 















L D I L D I 
7 22-4 11 16.67 57.14 26.19 
18 14 10 42.86 33.33 23.81 
10 17 15 23.81 40.48 35.71 
25 11 6 59.52 26.19 14.29 
5 24 13 11.90 57.14 30.95 
37 0 5 88.10 0 11.90 
28 9 9 57.14 21.43 21.43 
23 8 11 5L1.76 19.05 26.19 
15 19 8 35.71 45.24 19.05 
16 13 13 38.10 30.95 30.95 
11 20 11 26.19 47.62 26.19 
25 7 10 59.52 16.57 23.81 
15 16 11 35.71 38.10 26.19 
18 12 12 42.86 28.57 28.57 
23 10 9 54.76 23.81 21.43 
10 17 15 23.31 40.48 35.71 
2 36 4 4.76 85.71 9.52 
2 23 17 2J.76 54.76 40.48 
8 25 9 19.05 59.52 21.43 
3 33 6 7.14 78.57 14.29 
8 25 9 19.05 59.52 21.43 
7 24 11 15.57 57.14 26.19 
7 21 14 16.57 50.00 33.33 
24 11 7 57.14 26.19 15.67 
27 7 8 64.29 16.67 19.05 
17 15 10 40.48 35.71 23.81 
3 30 9 7.14 71.43 21.43 
10 15 17 23.81 35.71 40.48 
19 10 13 45.24 23.81 30.95 
16 17 9 38.10 40.48 21.43 
2 31 9 /.75 73.81 21.43 
6 20 16 14.29 47.62 33.10 
18 10 14 42.36 23.81 33.33 
8 23 11 19.05 54.76 26.19 
15 16 11 35.71 33.10 a6.19 
24 9 9 57.14 21.43 21.43 
10 16 16 23.81 33.10 38.10 
30 3 9 71.43 7.14 21.43 
18 13 11 42.86 30.95 26.19 
25 6 11 59.52 14.29 25.19 
19 15 8 45.24 35.71 19.05 
3 27 7 19.05 64.29 16.67 
20 17 5 47.52 40.48 11.90 
29 3 10 69.05 7.14 23.81 
8 15 19 19.05 35.71 45.24 
27 4 11 54.29 9.52 26.19 
22 7 13 52.38 15.67 30.95 
30 8 4 71.43 19.05 9.52 
Occu-pation Frequency i:''ercentase 
D I L ï) I 
49. .;>ai lor 13 13 11 42.86 30.95 26.19 
50. Salesman 6 32 4 14.29 76.19 9.52 
51. Scientist 27 9 6 64.29 21.43 14.29 
52. i.;culptor 21 12 9 50.00 28.57 21.43 
53. Social worker 22 4 16 52.38 9.52 38.10 
54. 3urseon 25 11 6 59.52 26.19. 14.29 
55. Tailor 1 31 10 2.38 73.81 23.81 
56. Goolo, ist 13 15 14 30.95 35.71 33.33 
AP23;.:DIX G. 
(1) 
Rating of Occupations on Social Prestige Scale (Appendix VIII (b)) . 
20 Men Students. 
Occupation High Low % 'Ned. ¡ó 
1. Accountaht 5 25 1 5 14 70 
2. Actor 4 20 1 5 15 75 
3. Advertiser 3 15 6 30 11 55 
4. Artist 6 30 2 10 12 60 
5.. Auctioneer 1 5 13 65 6 30 
6. Author 11 55 1 5 8 40 
7. Aviator 7 35 3 15 10 50 
8. Architect 11 55 0 0 9 45 
9. .Army. officer 8 40 4 20 8 40 
10. Book seller 1 5 8 40 11 55 
11. Botanist 3 15 1 5 16 80 
12. Broadcaster 6 30 1 5 13 65 
13. Builder 0 0 10 50 10 50 
14. Carpenter 0 0 16 80 4 20 
15. Cartoonist 3 15 7 35 10 50 
16. Chemist 3 15 2 10 15 75 
17. Cinema attendant 0 0 20 100 0 0 
18. Civil servant 1 5 8 40 11 55 
19. Clergyman 8 40 2 10 10 50 
20. Clerk 1 5 14 70 5 25 
21. Commercial, traveller 0 0 13 65 7 35 
22. Confectioner 1 5 12 60 7 35 
23, Dentist 8 40 3 15 9 45 
24. Doctor 15 75 0 0 5 25 
25. Editor 12 60 1 5 7 35 
26. :engineer 5 25 3 15 12 60 
27. Factory worker 1 5 17 85 2 10 
28. Factory -ilanager 5 25 2 10 13 65 
29. Farmer 6 30 4 20 10 50 
30. Hotel manager 2 10 5 25 13 65 
31. Insurance agent 0 0 13 65 7 35 
32. Jeweller 1 5 5 25 14 70 
33. Judge 20 100 0 0 0 0 
34. Laboratory assistant 2 10 11 55 7 35 
35. Lawyer 13 65 1 5 5 30 
36. Librarian 0 0 3 15 17 85 
37. Lanuf acturer 7 35 2 10 11 55 
33, i usician 8 40 3 15 9 45 
39. Painter 2 10 16 80 2 10 
40. Photographer 0 0 10 50 10 50 
41. Poet 11 55 4 20 5 25 
42. Policeman 1 5 13 65 6 30 
43. Politician 7 35 6 30 7 35 
44. Psychologist 5 25 6 30 9 45 
45. Printer 1 5 9 45 10 50 
46. Professor 18 90 1 5 1 5 
47. Reporter 0 0 4 20 16 80 
Occupation High % Low Med. /0 
48. Research worker 8 40 1 5 11 55 
49. Sailor 4 20 12 60 4 20 
50. Salesman 0 0 17 85 3 15 
51. Scientist 12 60 0 0 8 40 
52. Sculptor 9 45 3 15 8 40 
53. Social worker 3 15 2 10 15 75 
54. Surgeon 20 100 0 0 0 0 
55. Tailor 0 0 14 70 6 30 
56. Zoologist 5 25 2 10 13 65 
(2) 
Rating of Occupations on Social Prestige Scale (Appendix VIII(a)) . 
30 Jomen Students. 
Occupation High ¡o Low Lied. 
1. Accountant 7 25.33 2 5.66 21 70.00 
2. actress 10 33.33 2 6.66 18 60.00 
3. Advertiser 3 10.00 3 10.00 24 80.00 
4. Artist 24 80.00 0 0 6 20.00 
5. Author 26 86.66 0 0 4 13.33 
6. Bank clerk 0 0 8 26.65 22 73.33 
7. Book keeper 0 0 12 4O.00 18 60.00 
8. Book seller 0 0 8 26.66 22 73.33 
9. Broadcaster 17 56.66 0 0 13 43.33 
10. 9artoonist 8 26.66 5 15.56 17 56.66 
11. Caterer 0 0 8 26.66 22 73.33 
12. Chemist 5 16.66 0 0 25 83.33 
13. Cinema attendant 0 O 28 93.33 2 6.66 
14. Civil servant 3 10.00 4 13.33 23 76.66 
15. Confectioner 0 0 19 63.33 11 36.66 
15. Clerk 0 0 18 50.00 12 40.00 
17. Cook o o 22 73..33 8 26.66 
18. Dahcer 1 3.33 14 46.66 15 50.00 
19. Doctor 29 96.56 0 0 1 3.33 
20. Dressmaker 0 0 14 46.66, 16 53.33 
21. Dress designer 14 46.66 1 3.33 15 50.00 
22. Editor 27 90.00 0 0 3 10.00 
23. Factory worker 0 0 28 93.33 2 6.66 
24. Farmer 8 26.56 3 10.00 19 63.33 
25. Films. star '12 40.00 1 3.33 17 56.66 
26. Florist 1 3.33 17 56.66 12 40.00 
27. Fruiterer 0 0 19 63.33 11 36.66 
28. Lawyer 28 93.33 0 0 2 6.66 
29. Librarian 5 16.66 1 3.33 24 80.00 
30. Milliner 0 0 12 40.00 18 60.00 
31. Eusician 24 80.00 0 0 6 20.00 
32. Nurse 6 20.00 3 10.00 21 70.00 
33. Poetess 23 76.65 1 3.33 .6 20.00 
34. Opera singer 25 83.33 0 0 5 16.66 
35. Painter 12 40.00 10 33.33 8 26.66 
36. Photographer 0 0 2 6.66 28 93.33 
37. Politician 26 86.66 1 3.33 3 10.00 
38. Post office worker 0 0 17 56.66 13 43.00 
39. Professor 29 96.66 0 0 1 3.33 
40. Psychologist 25 83.33 0 0 5 16.66 
41. Reporter 1 3.33 1 3.33 28 93.33 
42. Reaearch worker 24 80.00 0 0 6 20.00 
43. Scientist 27 90.00 0 0 3 10.00 
44. Secretary 1 3.33 2 6.33 27 90.00 
45. Shop assistant 0 0 28 93.33 2 6.66 
46. Social worker 6 20.00 24 80.00 
47. Surgeon 30 100 .00 0 0 0 0 
48. Teacher 12 40.00 0 0 18 60.00 
49. Telegraph operator 0 O 13 50.99 12 40.00 
50. Typist 0 0 19 63.33 11 36.56 
51. Jai tress 0 0 30 100.00 0 0 
52. ;,fireless operator 1 3.33 3 10.00 25 86.66 
APPENDIX H . 
Interest in Occupations of Hsh Social Standing. 
Group 1 
Gower Half Test 33) 
Group 2 
(Upper Half Test 33) 
Score Frequency Score Frequency 
16 - 17 1 
14 - 15 2 14 - 15 2 
12 - 13 9 12 - 13 12 
10 - 11 14 10 - 11 12 
8 - 9 14 8 - 9 13 
6 - 7 6 6 - 7 16 
4- 5 10 4- 5 5 
?- 3 3 2- 3 3 
N 59 N 63 
Lean 8.74 + .42 Mean 8.72 + .38 
S. D. 3.25 S. D. 2. 98 
APPENDIX K. 
Self - rating on Lapses of Conduct. 
.Group 1 
(Lower Half Test 33) 
Group 2 
(Upper Half Test 33) 
Score Frequency Score Frequency 
15 1 
14 3 14 4 
13 9 13 10 
12 9 12 11 
11 10 11 15 













Mean 11.22 + .23 
S.D. 1.79 
APi EL1 DI X L. 
Self -rating; on Undesirable Traits, List 3. 
Group 1 
(Lower Half Test 33) 
Group 2 
(Upper Half Test 33) 
Score Frequency Score Frequency 
10 - 11 
8 - 9 
6 - 7 
4 - 5 
2- 3 














12 - 13 
10 - 11 
8 - 9 
6 - 7 
4- 5 
2 - 3 
















Interest in Occupations of Low Social Standing. 
Group 1 
(Lower Half Test 33) 
Group 2 
(Upper Half Test 33) 
Score Frequency Score Frequency 
14 - 15 
12 - 13 
10 - 11 
8 - 9 






10 - 11 
3 - 9 




4- 5 14 4- 5 15 
2 - 3 16 2 - 3 17 
0- 1 8 0- 1 22 
N 59 N 63 
Lean 4.57 + .38 Mean 3.07 + .33 
S.D. 2.94 S.D. 2.60 
APPENDIX N. 
Self -rating on Belief in Superstition. 
Group 




(Upper Half Test 33) 
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